Abstract
A chosen-plaintext attack on two-key triple encryption noted by Merkle and Hellman is extended to a known-plaintext attack. The known-plaintext attack has lower memory requirements than the chosen-plaintext attack, but has a greater running time. The new attack is a significant improvement over a known-plaintext brute-force attack, but is still not seen as a serious threat to two-key triple encryption.
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Merkle, R. and M. Hellman, “On the Security of Multiple Encryption”, Communications of the ACM, vol. 24, no. 7, pp. 465–467, July 1981. See also Communications of the ACM, vol. 24, no. 11, p. 776, November 1981.
Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, “Exhaustive Cryptanalysis of the NBS Data Encryption Standard”, Computer, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 74–84, June 1977.
“Data Encryption Standard”, National Bureau of Standards (U.S.), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 46, National Technical Information Service, Springfield VA, 1977.
Internal study, BNR, Ottawa, 1989.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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van Oorschot, P.C., Wiener, M.J. (1991). A Known-Plaintext Attack on Two-Key Triple Encryption. In: Damgård, I.B. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’90. EUROCRYPT 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 473. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46877-3_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46877-3_29
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