Abstract
Simmons [17] introduced the notion of subliminal channel in 1983, by demonstrating how to “hide” secret information inside an authenticated message. In this paper we propose a practical subliminal-free authentication system and extend our results to subliminal-free signatures. The subliminal-freeness of our systems can be proven. We discuss applications in the context of verification of treaty and international bank communications.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
J. A. Adam. Ways to verify the U.S.-Soviet arms pact. IEEE Spectrum, pp. 30–34, February 1988.
M. Blum. Coin flipping by telephone — a protocol for solving impossible problems. In digest of papers COMPCON82, pp. 133–137, IEEE Computer Society, February 1982.
M. Blum, P. Feldman, and S. Micali. Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications. In Proceedings of the twentieth ACM Symp. Theory of Computing, STOC, pp. 103–112, May 2–4, 1988.
Y. Desmedt. Abuses in cryptography and how to fight them. August 1988. To be presented at Crypto’88.
Y. Desmedt. Major security problems with the “unforgeable” (Feige-)Fiat-Shamir proofs of identity and how to overcome them. In Securicom 88, 6th worldwide congress on computer and communications security and protection, pp. 147–159, SEDEP Paris France, March 15–17, 1988.
Y. Desmedt, C. Goutier, and S. Bengio. Special uses and abuses of the Fiat-Shamir passport protocol. In C. Pomerance, editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proc. of Crypto’87 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 293), pp. 21–39, Springer-Verlag, 1988. Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A., August 16–20.
U. Feige, A. Fiat, and A. Shamir. Zero knowledge proofs of identity. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth ACM Symp. Theory of Computing, STOC, pp. 210–217, May 25–27, 1987.
A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In A. Odlyzko, editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proc. of Crypto’86 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 263) pp. 186–194, Springer-Verlag, 1987. Santa Barbara, California, U. S. A., August 11–15.
O. Goldreich. Two remarks concerning the Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest signature scheme. In A. Odlyzko, editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proc. of Cypto’86 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 263), pp. 104–110, Springer-Verlag, 1987. Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A., August 11–15, 1986.
O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to prove all NP statements in zero-knowledge and a methodolgy of cryptographic protocol design. In A. Odlyzko, editor, Advances in Cryptology, Proc. of Cypto’86 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 263), pp. 171–185, Springer-Verlag, 1987. Santa Barbara, California, U. s. A., August 11–15.
O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design. In The Computer Society of IEEE, 27th Annual Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 174–187, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1986. Toronto, Ontario, Canada, October 27–29, 1986.
S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 28(2), pp. 270–299, April 1984. 11–15.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. Knowledge complexity of interactive proofs. In Proc. 17th STOC, pp. 291–304, 1985.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and R. Rivest. A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Siam J. Comput., 17(2), pp. 281–308, April 1988.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and R. Rivest. A paradoxical solution to the signature problem. In Proceedings of 25th Symp. on Foundation of Computer Science, pp. 441–448, 1984.
G. J. Simmons. Message Authentication Without Secrecy, pp. 105–139. AAAS Selected Symposia Series 69, Westview Press, 1982.
G. J. Simmons. The prisoners’ problem and the subliminal channel. In D. Chaum, editor, Advances in Cryptology. Proc. of Crypto 83, pp. 51–67, Plenum Press N.Y., 1984. Santa Barbara, California, August 1983.
G. J. Simmons. The secure subliminal channel (?). In H. C. Williams, editor, Advances in Cryptology. Proc. of Crypto 85 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 218), pp. 33–41, Springer-Verlag, 1986. Santa Barbara, California, August 18–22, 1985.
G. J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signatures. In T. Beth, N. Cot, and I. Ingemarsson, editors, Advances in Cryptology. Proc. of Eurocrypt 84 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209), pp. 364–378, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985. Paris, France, April 9–11, 1984.
G. J. Simmons. Verification of treaty compliance-revisited. In Proc. of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 61–66, IEEE Computer Society Press, April 25–27 1983. Oakland, California.
H. C. Williams. A modification of the RSA public-key encryption procedure. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 26(6), pp. 726–729, November 1980.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Desmedt, Y. (1988). Subliminal-free Authentication and Signature. In: Barstow, D., et al. Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’88. EUROCRYPT 1988. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 330. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45961-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45961-8_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50251-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45961-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive