Abstract
An analysis of integrity services in cryptologic protocols is presented. The informal syntax, to be presented, attempts to model the integrity service as a property that is transferred from a key to a message. The message can, in turn, be a key. The modeling presupposes confidentiality and integrity to be the atomic properties or services offered by cryptologic algorithms. More complex algorithms and protocols, such as those for digital signature, identification protocols and non-malleable encryption, are considered to be ensembles of these services. This paper concentrates only on the analysis of the integrity service in signature techniques based on the proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm. The paper will demonstrate the usefulness of this modeling by identifying flaws in the recent proposals for an efficient electronic cash system and a key-recovery system.
Research Supported by the Australian Research Council grant A49804059
This is as opposed to an entity-centric view, such as that of the Ban logic [5].
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Viswanathan, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E. (2001). An Analysis of Integrity Services in Protocols. In: Rangan, C.P., Ding, C. (eds) Progress in Cryptology — INDOCRYPT 2001. INDOCRYPT 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2247. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45311-3_17
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