Abstract
Aufbauend auf den Arbeiten von Rajan/Zingales (1998, 2001) sowie Blair/Stout (1999) möchten die Autoren mit dem vorliegenden Beitrag eine Neubewertung des in Theorie und Praxis gleichermaßen akzeptierten Primats der Eigenkapitalgeber (Shareholder Value) anregen. Die vergangenen Jahre haben das besondere Interesse an einem Unternehmenstypus geweckt, der durch einen relativ geringen Bestand materiellen Vermögens und, im Umkehrschluss, durch eine starke Betonung des Humankapitals als werttreibendem Faktor gekennzeichnet ist. Die hohe Wissensintensität solcher Unternehmen gibt Anlass, die Anwendbarkeit einer primär auf Verfügungsrechte fokussierten Theorie der Unternehmung zu hinterfragen, wie sie Grossman/Hart (1986), Hart/Moore (1990) und andere formuliert haben. Die Autoren dieses Beitrags schlagen deshalb eine komplementäre Sichtweise der Unternehmung vor: Mitarbeiter sind Unternehmer, die unter alternativen Verwendungen ihres Humankapitals wählen. Ihre Entscheidung fällen die Mitarbeiter dabei auf Basis der zu erwartenden Humankapitalrendite, die wiederum von ihrem bestimmbaren Wert im Netzwerk der Unternehmung abhängt. Dieses selbstähnliche Netzwerk ist der „Entrepreneurial Cluster“. In der Konsequenz erwerben beide Gruppen, Mitarbeiter und Geber risikobehafteten Finanzkapitals, einen Residualanspruch. Obwohl das Primat der Eigenkapitalgeber im Kontext der Wertschaffung hiervon unberührt bleibt, hat diese Sichtweise potentiell weitreichende Implikationen für die anreizkompatible Wertverteilung. Eine Reihe spezifischer Maßnahmen wird diskutiert, die der Entwicklung einer Entlohnungsstruktur dient, welche mit dem hier vorgestellten Ansatz des unternehmerischen Clusters im Einklang steht.
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Baecker, P.N., Hommel, U. (2005). Die Unternehmung als Entrepreneurial Cluster. In: Achleitner, AK., Klandt, H., Koch, L.T., Voigt, KI. (eds) Jahrbuch Entrepreneurship 2004/05. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26823-5_2
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