Abstract
We propose simple, realistic protocols for polling that allow the responder to plausibly repudiate his response, while at the same time allow accurate statistical analysis of poll results. The protocols use simple physical objects (envelopes or scratch-off cards) and can be performed without the aid of computers. One of the main innovations of this work is the use of techniques from theoretical cryptography to rigorously prove the security of a realistic, physical protocol. We show that, given a few properties of physical envelopes, the protocols are unconditionally secure in the universal composability framework.
This work was partially supported by the Minerva Foundation.
The original version of this chapter was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. This has been corrected. The Erratum to this chapter is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-34547-3_36
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Moran, T., Naor, M. (2006). Polling with Physical Envelopes: A Rigorous Analysis of a Human-Centric Protocol. In: Vaudenay, S. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006. EUROCRYPT 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4004. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_7
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