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Equity Financing

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Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research

Part of the book series: International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship ((IHSE,volume 1))

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Harvard University, USA

    Paul Gompers & Joshua Lerner

Authors
  1. Paul Gompers
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  2. Joshua Lerner
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Baltimore, Baltimore

    Zoltan J. Acs

  2. Indiana University, Indiana

    David B. Audretsch

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© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Gompers, P., Lerner, J. (2003). Equity Financing. In: Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B. (eds) Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research. International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24519-7_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24519-7_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-24080-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-24519-5

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