Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy, by Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Yale University Press, 2019, 352 pages, $40.00 (hardcover)

Ascending Order: Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions, by Rohan Mukherjee, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 352 pages, $36.32 (paperback)

The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers, by Michelle Murray, Oxford University Press, 2019, 280 pages, $46.45 (hardcover)

Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order, by Xiaoyu Pu, Stanford University Press, 2019, 176 pages, $33.83 (hardcover)

It is now a well-established notion that states not only pursue material interests related to national security but also place a high priority on achieving social status in the international community. Status is a distinctive resource in that it entails recognition. States can acquire material power without other states’ approbation, but they will not be able to gain status through such an approach. International society indeed features a complex system of rules, rituals, and institutions to recognize the status of states, placing them into various categories such as great power, middle power, regional power, and so forth. Consequently, the struggle for recognition forms the basis of status motives, which induce state behaviors distinct from those driven by security. On the other hand, because dominant states act as the gatekeepers of international pecking order, their willingness and ability to accommodate the status claims of rising powers has been considered a crucial source of international stability and legitimacy.

Rising powers are pivotal in the politics of status and recognition. As these states grow in material power, their demand for an international order that reflects their interests also intensifies. In this regard, they not only pressure the dominant powers to adjust but also push for reform of international norms and institutions. Ambitions or concerns for great-power status could potentially play a crucial role in shaping rising power strategy.

The volumes under review seek to address how status motives lead rising powers to contest, reform, or integrate into the international system. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko argue that the quest for status has been a driving force for Chinese and Russian foreign policies dating back to the early modern period. According to their account, from Alexander the Great and the Qing Empire to the twenty-first century, Russian and Chinese leaders have been committed to asserting national greatness by building a strong army, a big government, and a large economy. While these material and institutional resources address national security imperatives, they also provide status symbols to distinguish great powers from other actors in the international system. Similarly, Michelle Murray considers status aspirations a central motive for rising powers. In her view, rising powers seek not only physical security but also ontological security—namely, stable identities that yield cognitive certainty to state actors in the conduct of daily diplomacy. Xiaoyu Pu also shares the assumption that rising powers tend to be status aspirants, but he further argues that states may send contradictory signals of status as their leaders face multiple audiences with divergent expectations. Rohan Mukherjee focuses on international institutions as an arena for status politics. In his view, international institutions provide concrete manifestations of the existing order and enable leaders and diplomats to experience the status of their states; hence, the openness and procedural fairness of those institutions may shape how rising powers approach international order.

The works under review reveal several theoretical issues of central importance to the research agenda of international status. They encompass the nature of international status, status-signaling strategies, the triggers of status assertions, and the relevance of status in international conflicts.

1 What is status?

Larson and Shevchenko define status as a superior group identity based on prized attributes. With nation-states being the central groups in international politics, leaders and citizens tend to project their preference for positive group identity onto their state’s pursuit of international status. There are three essential criteria that are used to define status. First, status is subjective as states normally possess various attributes ranging from military power and regime ideology to historical traditions. Which attributes are prized is a matter of subjective judgment in the international community. Therefore, status symbols are historically contingent. Whereas overseas colonies symbolized great-power status in the nineteenth century, they are an illegitimate practice nowadays. Instead, aircraft carriers, multilateral initiatives, foreign aid, and developmental models have become symbols of great-power status in this century, according to Pu. If the norms of status evolve, competition for status does not necessarily lead to geopolitical rivalries.

Second, status is a positional good and exists only in a hierarchical structure. That is, an actor must gain its superior status by comparing to the lower placed actors. In turn, a state needs to outperform its rivals to advance its status. Not surprisingly, great-power status carries some longstanding markers. Murray finds that great powers are normally defined by exemplary military power, spheres of influence, and a voice over vital issues to international order. What unites these status symbols is their exclusionary nature: only well-established great powers possess or regularly exhibit such symbols. Similarly, Mukherjee argues that status is a club good: as more states join the elite club, its value diminishes. Because few states can develop the traits necessary for recognition as a great power, great-power status is typically a scarce resource.

A third criterion for definition of status concerns its social character. Exhibiting status symbols is necessary but not sufficient for a state to advance its status, because status acquisition ultimately depends on approbation by dominant states. It is the social character of status that positions the politics of status as a burgeoning research agenda in international relations. Status politics, in turn, revolves around iterative processes of signaling and recognition between status seekers and conferrers.

2 Status-signaling strategies

“Status signaling demonstrates the ranking or standing a state wants to have in international society” (Pu 2019, 32). Typically, states signal their demand for status through conspicuous acts. Accordingly, states may invest in material assets, undertake diplomatic activities, or use emotional rhetoric that clearly entails higher costs than their payoffs warrant in the near future. Such acts could make the status claims visible to a broad range of audiences at home and abroad. Pu regards conspicuous consumption as an effective vehicle for status signaling, as it can potentially reveal credible information regarding status ambitions. More specifically, the vast costs a state incurs in building material assets, contesting diplomatic protocols, and organizing diplomatic events and international institutions tend to convince the audiences of that state’s determination to pursue status. Furthermore, if these efforts yield favorable outcomes, the material and political achievements also indicate a state’s eligibility for higher status.

Murray suggests that status signaling aims not only to convince international audiences but also to fulfill the emotional needs of leaders and their followers. This is especially true for rising powers that face the challenge of navigating their way in the changing world. Although their status ultimately depends on the recognition of dominant states in the international system, rising powers often need to mitigate subjective uncertainty and insecurity. Consequently, they want to create a fait accompli of their aspired superior identity by demonstrating certain material assets as status symbols. This way, the acting state may “experience its social status as a brute fact” (Murray 2019, 16) and temporarily distance its identity from the recognition decision of relevant audiences. Thus, signaling status claims means that states act in a manner consistent with their desired status. This cannot guarantee status recognition, but is a necessary step to make both state actors and audiences aware that they are in a status game.

Still, there is considerable variation in how states signal claims to their aspired status. Larson and Shevchenko illustrate how China and Russia pursued their desired international status. When the Chinese and Russians considered the Western-dominated status hierarchy as receptive to their status claims, they would follow the existing norms and undertook reforms to elevate their status. If Chinese and Russian leaders recognize that their nations have been denied entry into a privileged status club due to underappreciated identity traits, they might either attempt to rehabilitate these misunderstood elements or advocate for new norms that could reshape global perceptions of their outstanding qualities. However, there were times when China and Russia did feel excluded and isolated internationally, as their domestic and international practices were contrary to the prevailing norms in the West. In such situations, they would opt to contest the dominant states—notably Anglo-American powers—through provocative rhetoric and behavior. This kind of assertiveness was designed to signal protest against the existing hierarchy, undermine its legitimacy, and pry it open to their claims of equality.

In short, a status-aspiring state “may try to move into a higher-status group, compete with the dominant group, or achieve preeminence in a different area” (Larson and Shevchenko 2019, 5). These status-signaling acts might not lead to status recognition, because multiple factors such as the character of international system and domestic political dynamics could complicate the clarity and credibility of status claims issued by state representatives. Nonetheless, status-aspiring states would adjust their strategy in accordance with their perceived changes in geopolitical or domestic political circumstances.

3 Triggers of status concerns

Although human beings are hardwired with status aspirations, such objectives do not necessary predominate foreign policy agenda as, policymakers constantly have to balance competing priorities. Indeed, as Pu notes, leaders often face multiple audiences and not all of them are concerned with their state’s international status; hence, international and domestic audiences could pressure leaders to pursue non-status interests even if leaders tend to invoke national honor, status, or prestige in their diplomatic discourse. It thus becomes important to demonstrate the conditions under which state leaders are inclined to adopt costly policies in the quest for status. This is necessary for analysts to address the role of status in international relations on a solid empirical basis.

The works under review point to two types of events as triggers of status concerns. One is related to significant shifts in the international balance of power. It is unsurprising that the authors unanimously focus on rising powers. For psychological and instrumental reasons such states are more sensitive to status. As new comers to great power politics, rising powers often face tremendous uncertainty about how to use their newfound power to further their growing interests overseas. In such situations, they would turn to their own feelings for guidance. In particular, leaders and diplomats tend to assess international threats according to displays of respect by their foreign counterparts. This is evident in Britain’s treatment of Germany’s ambition to command a large navy. When the Germans considered their received respect inconsistent with their aspired status, they perceived a hostile intent from London. As Murray notes, because Germany failed to receive respect from Britain in negotiations over naval arms race—an issue that was in fact less significant to Germany’s security and survival than to Britain’s—Berlin became more assertive in voicing its desire to be treated like a preeminent power. In contrast, once the United States received a satisfying degree of respect from Britain, they felt confident that their external environment was benign. This facilitated a peaceful power transition.

In short, rising powers are keen to advance their status so as to legitimize their interests. Declining powers would arguably harbor similar considerations, as a relative shortage of material resources would render them more reliant upon status to maintain international influence. The authors, however, fall short in studying the cases of declining powers. A partial exception is Murray’s work, which stresses that declining powers may misrecognize rising powers due to their concerns for status loss. Yet, while Murray suggests that shared identities and attachment to recognition are important causal variables, she gives little emphasis to the strategic calculus of declining powers. Arguably, declining states may fear their recognition acts will either enhance the bargaining position of rising powers in future conflicts or project an image of weakness to other geopolitical rivals. Since declining powers hold both instrumental and psychological motives in the politics of recognition with rising powers, the balance-of-power arguments should not be dismissed out of hand.

In addition to power shifts, humiliating events represent the second type of event that triggers status concerns on the part of leaders and their domestic audiences. Humiliating events feature diplomatic setbacks, challenges from lesser states, and significant military defeats. What unite these events is that they either damage a state’s image as a great power or clearly deny its international prerogatives. Post-colonial states are particularly inclined to interpret their diplomatic setbacks—which incur negligible material cost—through the lens of national humiliation. This perspective is shaped by their historical experiences of military defeats and subjugation under colonial rule by imperial powers. Since these powers remain a dominant grouping in the current international system, non-western states tend to consider diplomatic bargaining with them as implicating status positions. As Pu observes, China is now intensely conscious of its status as it negotiates its way into the center of world stage. The quest for status is thus a hallmark of foreign policy practices by non-Western rising powers.

4 Status, international conflict, and peaceful change

The importance of status lies in its causal significance to international conflict and peaceful change. Will status denials or misrecognition directly turn an interstate dispute into a longstanding rivalry or escalate it into a violent conflict? Does it act as a necessary cause for international conflict and peace?

For Pu, the answer depends on the preference of audiences on which leaders depend for their political survival. If domestic audiences are less concerned with their state’s international status, they will not be antagonized by events that signal a denial of status. Larson and Shevchenko provide important evidence that status loss did not induce provocative policies. In their account, whereas Joseph Stalin failed to gain recognition for the Soviet Union as an equal superpower with the United States, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, did not initially pursue provocative acts. Khrushchev instead adopted a more conciliatory approach to pursue symbolic equality with America. Similarly, after Mao’s policies contesting both the United States and the Soviet Union led to China’s international isolation, he did come to embrace the realpolitik line of aligning Beijing with Washington against Moscow. Since Chinese and Russian leaders could turn to a less costly strategy of status assertion, it follows that there are certain limits to their quest for status. That is, when leaders consider that their provocative status signaling tends to jeopardize national security to an unbearable extent, they will instead pursue moderate policies. If that is the case, we should not consider status denial a necessary cause for international conflict.

Equally important is whether status recognition will lead to a peaceful change of international order, though the answer remains unclear. Murray suggests that shared identities provide “discursive resources” necessary for “successful recognition speech acts,” whereas attachment to recognition “shapes the negotiating spaces in which acts of recognition and misrecognition are created and whether the issues under discussion are constructed to be divisible or indivisible” (2019, 195–196). Put simply, these variables might aid but not ensure success in recognition practices. It is unclear as to what constitutes sufficient causal mechanisms for successful recognition practices.

Mukherjee is ambivalent on this point too. For him, international institutions provide concrete manifestations of international order, and rising powers’ approach to the institutional rules demonstrates the extent of their satisfaction with the existing order. In turn, he suggests rising powers are more likely to cooperate with the rules and decision-making procedures of an international institution when they perceive it as open to their membership claims and applying uniform rules in its decision-making processes. By contrast, when the institution is either exclusionary or pursues double standards, rising powers attempt to expand the membership criteria or reframe their identities in a way that helps alter evaluations of their performance. These strategies are designed to reform international order in an incremental fashion, but reformist strategies may reflect a more ambitious aim on the part of rising powers to reshape the entire system of norms and rules that underpins an international order. Conceivably, a potentially revisionist state would try to integrate with international institutions in hopes of hollowing it out. It is thus imperative to investigate the conditions under which rising powers tend to harbor an ambition for normative revisionism. Mukherjee is agnostic about this, though his work purports to explain why rising powers become dissatisfied with the status quo order. Put bluntly, while committed to explaining how rising powers become dissatisfied with an international order conducive to its rise, Mukherjee is in effect focused on the strategies of rising powers. The variable of dissatisfaction is underexplored in his work.

Therefore, even if status accommodation could channel the energies of rising powers from provocative policies toward moderate approaches to the existing order, it remains possible that they would still decide to contest the normative foundations of that order when opportunities arise. This leaves us unsure as to whether status accommodation can lead to a peaceful change of international order. The fact that the quest for recognition in a status community is an inherent human aspiration does not mean that satisfying it could appease status seekers. Rather, precisely because status is rooted in human psychology, status accommodation could yield emotional consequences beyond actors’ control. Arguably, once recognized as a preeminent power, the status aspirant would see opportunities to improve its bargaining position, and its efforts to exploit those opportunities could readily antagonize the dominant states that have helped it advance its status. Hence, although status accommodation is essential for integrating rising powers into the international order, it is a process riddled with uncertainties and risks.

All being said, there is no denying of the importance of status to the rise of great powers and their interactions with the established powers. In this regard, the concept of international status opens a new avenue for research on rising powers. It urges analysts to revisit the enduring themes in the study of international relations such as the impact of rising powers, the source of international conflict, and the possibility for peaceful change of international order. The books under review offer new inspirations to address these enduring challenges facing the international order.