Abstract
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes something a norm, with consideration both of norms in general and a specific example: norms for informal argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Alexy R. (1989) A theory of legal argumentation. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Anand P. (1993) Foundations of rational choice under risk. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Anderson J. R. (1990) The adaptive character of thought. Lawrence Erlbaum Press, Hillsdale, NJ
Anderson J. R., Schooler L. J. (1991) Reflections of the environment in memory. Psychological Science 2(6): 396–408
Areni C. S., Lutz R. J. (1988) The role of argument quality in the elaboration likelihood model. Advances in Consumer Research 15: 197–203
Armendt B. (1993) Dutch books, additivity and utility theory. Philosophical Topics 21(1): 1–20
Atkinson D., Peijnenburg J. (2009) Justification by an infinity of conditional probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50: 83–93
Atkinson D., Peijnenburg J. (2010) Justification by infinite loops. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51: 407–416
Audi R. (2002) Epistemology: A contemporary introduction. Routledge, London
Aumann R. J. (1985) What is game theory trying to accomplish?. In: Arrow K., Honkapohja S. (Eds.), Frontiers of economics. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp 28–76
Axelrod R. (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Penguin, London
Bacchus F., Kyburg H. E., Thalos M. (1990) Against conditionalization. Synthese 85(3): 475–506
Bailenson J., Rips L. J. (1996) Informal reasoning and burden of proof. Applied Cognitive Psychology 10: 3–16
Binmore K. (1994) Game theory and the social contract, volume I: Playing fair. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Binmore K. (1998) Game theory and the social contact, volume II: Just playing. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Biro J., Siegel H. (2006) In defense of the objective epistemic approach to argumentation. Informal Logic 26(1): 91–101
Bishop M. A., Trout J. D. (2005) Epistemology and the psychology of human judgment. Oxford University Press, New York
Boger G. (2005) Subordinating truth—Is acceptability acceptable?. Argumentation 19: 187–238
Bovens L., Hartmann S. (2003) Bayesian epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Brem S. K., Rips L. J. (2000) Explanation and evidence in informal argument. Cognitive Science 24(4): 573–604
Brem S. K., Russell J., Weems L. (2001) Science on the web: Student evaluations of scientific arguments. Discourse Processes 32: 191–213
Broome J. (1999) Normative requirements. Ratio 12(4): 398–419
Buckwater W., Stich S. (2011) Competence, reflective equilibrium, and dual-system theories. Commentary on Elqayam & Evans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34: 251–252
Camerer C. (1995) Individual decision making. In: Kagel J., Roth A. E. (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Caplin A., Schotte A. (2008) The foundations of positive and normative economics: A handbook. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Chater N., Oaksford M. (1999) Ten years of the rational analysis of cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3(2): 57–65
Chater N., Oaksford M. (2000) The rational analysis of mind and behaviour. Synthese 122: 93–131
Chater, N., Oaksford, M. (Eds.). (2008) The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Chater N., Tenenbaum J. B., Yuille A. (2006) Probabilistic models of cognition: Conceptual foundations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(7): 287–291. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.007
Chrisman M. (2008) Ought to believe. Journal of Philosophy 105: 346–370
Christenesen D. (1996) Dutch-book arguments depragmatized: Epistemic consistency for partial believers. The Journal of Philosophy 93(9): 450–479
Christmann U., Mischo C., Groeben N. (2000) Components of the evaluation of integrity violations in argumentative discussions: Relevant factors and their relationships. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 19: 315–341
Cohen L. J. (1981) Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4: 317–370
Corner A., Hahn U. (2009) Evaluating scientific arguments: Evidence, uncertainty & argument strength. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 15(3): 199–212
Corner A. J., Hahn U., Oaksford M. (2011) The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument. Journal of Memory and Language 64: 153–170
Cox R. (1946) Probability frequency and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics 14: 1–13
Cox G. W. (1999) The empirical content of rational choice theory: A reply to Green and Shapiro. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(2): 147–169
Davidson B., Pargetter R. (1985) In defence of the Dutch book argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15(3): 405–424
de Finetti B. (1974) Theory of probability. Wiley, New York
Dodd J., Stern-Gillet S. (1995) The is/ought gap, the fact/value distinction and the naturalistic fallacy. Dialogue 34(04): 727–746. doi:10.1017/S0012217300011082
Douven I. (1999) Inference to the best explanation made coherent. Philosophy of Science 66: S424–S435
Driver R., Newton P., Osborne J. (2000) Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms. Science Education 84: 287–312
Eagly A. H., Chaiken S. (1993) The psychology of attitudes. Harcourt Brace, Orlando, FL
Easwaran K. (2011a) Bayesianism I: Introduction and arguments in favor. Philosophy Compass 6(5): 312–320. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.x
Easwaran K. (2011b) Bayesianism II: Applications and criticisms. Philosophy Compass 6(5): 321–332. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00398.x
Edwards W. (1961) Behavioural decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology 12: 473–498
Edwards, W., Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1967) Decision making. Penguin, Middlesex
Elqayam S. (2003) Norm, error and the structure of rationality: The case study of the knight-knave paradigm. Semiotica 147: 265–289
Elqayam S., Evans J. S. B. T. (2011) Subtracting “ought” from ‘is’: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34(05): 233–248. doi:10.1017/S0140525X1100001X
Evans J. St. B. T. (2002) Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin 128(6): 978–996
Evans J. St. B. T., Over D. E. (1996) Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press, Hove, UK
Evans J. St. B. T., Over D. E. (2004) If. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Evans J. St. B. T., Over D. E., Handley S. J. (2005) Suppositions, extensionality and conditionals: A critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002). Psychological Review 112: 1040–1052
Finnis J. (1980) Natural law & natural right. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Finlay S. (2006) The reasons that matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(1): 1–20. doi:10.1080/00048400600571661
Finlay S. (2010) Recent Work on Normativity. Analysis 70: 331–346. doi:10.1093/analys/anq002
Friedman M. (1953) The methodology of positive economics. Chicago University Press, Chicago
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. (1948). The utility analysis of choices involving risk. Journal of Political Economy, LVI, 279–304.
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. (1952). The expected-utility hypothesis and the measurability of utility. Journal of Political Economy, LX, 463–474.
Gigerenzer G. (1991) How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond ‘heuristics and biases’. European Review of Social Psychology 2(1): 83–115
Gigerenzer G., Edwards A. (2003) Simple tools for understanding risks: From innumeracy to insight. British Medical Journal 327(7417): 741–744
Gigerenzer, G., Selten, R. S. (Eds.). (2002) Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. MIT, Cambridge, MA
Gigerenzer G., Todd P. M. (1999) Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gilovich T., Griffin D. W., Kahneman D. (2002) Heuristics & biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Goldman A. I. (2003) An epistemological approach to argumentation. Informal Logic 23: 51–63
Goodman N. (1965) Fact, fiction, and forecast. Bobbs-Merrill, Cambridge, MA
Grice H. P. (1975) Logic and Conversation. In: Davidson D., Harman G. (Eds.), The logic of grammar. Dickenson, Encino, CA
Gruene-Yanoff, T., & Lehtinen, A. (2010). Philosophy of game theory. In U. Maki (Ed.), Philosophy of economics. Volume 13 of D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, & J. Woods (Eds.), Handbook of the philosophy of science. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Hahn, U. (2011a). Why rational norms are indispensible. Commentary on Elqayam and Evans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 257–258.
Hahn U. (2011b) The problem of circularity in evidence, argument and explanation. Perspectives on Psychological Science 6: 172–182
Hahn U., Oaksford M. (2006a) A Bayesian approach to informal fallacies. Synthese 152(2): 207–237
Hahn U., Oaksford M. (2006b) Why a normative theory of argument strength and why might one want it to be Bayesian?. Informal Logic 26: 1–24
Hahn U., Oaksford M. (2007) The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies. Psychological Review 114(3): 704–732
Hahn, U., Oaksford, M., & Corner, A. (2005). Circular arguments, begging the question and the formalization of argument strength. In Proceedings of AMKCL05—Adaptive knowledge representation and reasoning. Helsinki.
Hajek A. (2005) Scotching Dutch books?. Philosophical Perspectives 19: 139–151
Hajek A. (2008a) Dutch book arguments. In: Anand P., Pattanaik P., Puppe C. (Eds.), The handbook of rational and social choice. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 173–196
Hajek A. (2008b) Arguments for-or against-probabilism?. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59(4): 793–819. doi:10.1093/bjps/axn045
Hamblin C. L. (1970) Fallacies. Methuen, London
Hands, D. W. (2010). The positive-normative dichotomy and economics. In U. Maki (Ed.), Philosophy of economics. Volume 13 of D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, & J. Woods (Eds.), Handbook of the philosophy of science. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Harris A. J. L., Hsu A. S., Madsen J. K. (2012) Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem. Thinking & Reasoning 18(3): 311–343. doi:10.1080/13546783.2012.670753
Harris J. D., Freeman R. E. (2008) The impossibility of the separation thesis. Business Ethics Quarterly 18(4): 541–548
Hart H. L. A. (1961) The concept of law. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Heckerman, D. (1986). A rational measure of confirmation. In L. N. Kanal & J. F. Lemmer (Eds.), Uncertainty in artificial intelligence 2. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Heysse T. (1997) Why logic doesn’t matter in the (philosophical) study of argumentation. Argumentation 11: 211–224
Hoeken H. (2001a) Convincing Citizens The Role of Argument Quality. In: Janssen D., Neutelings R. (Eds.), Reading and writing public documents. Benjamins, Amsterdam
Hoeken H. (2001b) Anecdotal, statistical and causal evidence: Their perceived and actual persuasiveness. Argumentation 15: 425–437
Hookway, C. (1993). Epistemic norms and theoretical deliberation. In J. Dancy (Ed.). (2000). Normativity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Horvitz, E. J., Heckerman, D., & Langlotz, C. P. (1986). A framework for comparing alternative formalisms for plausible reasoning. In Proceedings of the 5th National Conference on AI (AAAI-1986), pp. 210–214.
Howes A., Lewis R. L., Vera A. (2009) Rational adaptation under task and processing constraints: Implications for testing theories of cognition and action. Psychological Review 116(4): 717–751
Howson C., Urbach P. (1996) Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach. Open Court, Chicago
Hume D. (1740) A treatise of human nature (1967 edition). Oxford University Press, Oxford
Huttegger S. M., Zollman K. J. S. (2012) The limits of ESS methodology. In: Okasha S., Binmore K. (Eds.), Evolution and rationality: Decisions, co-operation and strategic behaviour. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Jallais S., Pradier P. C., Teira D. (2008) Facts, norms and expected utility functions. History of the Human Sciences 21(2): 45–62. doi:10.1177/0952695108091414
Johnson R. H. (2000) Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument. Hillsdale, Mahwah, NJ
Johnson-Laird P. N. (1983) Mental models. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Johnson-Laird P. N., Bara B. G. (1984) Syllogistic inference. Cognition 16(1): 1–61
Johnson-Laird P. N., Byrne R. M. J. (2002) Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics and inference. Psychological Review 109: 646–678
Jones M., Love B. C. (2011) Bayesian fundamentalism or enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34(04): 169–188. doi:10.1017/S0140525X10003134
Joyce J. M. (1998) A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science 65: 573–603
Kadane, J. B., & Larkey, P. D. (1983). The confusion of is and ought in game theoretic contexts. Management Science, 1365–1379.
Kahneman D., Tversky A. (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision making under risk. Econometrica 47(2): 263–292
Kelly T. (2003) Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 612–640
Kelsen H. (1941) The pure theory of law & analytical independence. Harvard Law Review 55: 44–66
Kennedy R., Chihara C. (1979) The Dutch book argument: Its logical flaws, its subjective sources.. Philosophical Studies 36: 19–33
Keynes J. N. (1917) The scope and method of political economy (4th ed.). Macmillan & Co, London
Knowles J. (2003) Norms, naturalism and epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Kolodny N. (2005) Why be rational?. Mind 114(455): 509–563. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi223
Korb K. B. (2004) Bayesian informal logic and fallacy. Informal Logic 24: 41–70
Korb K. B., Nicholson A. E. (2004) Bayesian artificial intelligence. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL
Korpan C. A., Bisanz G. L., Bisanz J., Henderson J. M. (1997) Assessing literacy in science: Evaluation of scientific news briefs. Science Education 81: 515–532
Kruglanski, A. W., Fishbach, A., Erb, H. P., Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L. (2004). The Parametric Unimodel as a Theory of Persuasion. In G. Haddock & G. R. Maio (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on the psychology of attitudes. New York: Psychology Press.
Kuhn D., Udell W. (2003) The development of argument skills. Child Development 74(5): 1245–1260
Kuhn T. S. (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
Lando O., Beale H. (2000) Principles of European contract law. Kluwer Law International, Boston
Laplace, P. S. (1951). A philosophical essay on probabilities trans. (Original work published 1814), F. W. Truscott & F. L. Emory. Dover.
Lehtinen A., Kuorikoski J. (2007) Unrealistic assumptions in rational choice theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37(2): 115–138. doi:10.1177/0048393107299684
Leitgeb H., Pettigrew R. (2010a) An objective justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring inaccuracy*. Philosophy of Science 77(2): 201–235
Leitgeb H., Pettigrew R. (2010b) An objective justification of Bayesianism II: The consequences of minimizing inaccuracy*. Philosophy of Science 77(2): 236–272
Levinstein B. A. (2012) Leitgeb and Pettigrew on accuracy and updating. Philosophy of Science 79(3): 413–424. doi:10.1086/666064
Lindley D. V. (1982) Scoring rules and the inevitability of probability. International Statistical Review 50: 1–26
Maher, P. (1992). Diachronic rationality. Philosophy of Science, 59, 120–41.
Maher P. (1993) Betting on theories. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Mailath G. J. (1998) Do people play nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory. Jounal of Economic Literature XXXVI: 1347–1374
Manktelow K. I., Over D. E. (1991) Social roles and utilities in reasoning with deontic conditionals. Cognition 39(2): 85–105
Maynard Smith J. (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, NY
McGuire W. J. (1960) Cognitive consistency and attitude change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 60(3): 345–358
Mischo C. (2003) Cognitive, emotional and verbal response in unfair everyday discourse. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 22(1): 119–131
Mongin P. (2006) Value judgments and value neutrality in economics. Economica 73(290): 257–286. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00501.x
Neuman Y., Weinstock M. P., Glasner A. (2006) The effect of contextual factors on the judgment of informal reasoning fallacies. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental. Psychology 59(A): 411–425
Nichols S., Knobe J. (2007) Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nous 41: 663–685
Nickerson R. S. (2007) Aspects of rationality: Reflections on what it means to be rational and whether we are. Psychology Press, Hillsdale, NJ
Nisbett R. E., Ross L. (1980) Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgement. Prentice Hall, Prentice, NJ
Norris S. P., Phillips L. M., Korpan C. A. (2003) University students’ interpretation of media reports of science and its relationship to background knowledge, interest and reading difficulty. Public Understanding of Science 12: 123–145
Noveck, I. A., Sperber, D. (Eds.). (2004) Experimental pragmatics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Oaksford M., Chater N. (1991) Against logicist cognitive science. Mind & Language 6: 1–38
Oaksford M., Chater N. (1994) A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. Psychological Review 101: 608–631
Oaksford M., Chater N. (1998) Rationality in an uncertain world: Essays on the cognitive science of human reasoning. Psychology Press, Sussex
Oaksford M., Chater N. (2003) Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Mind & Language 18(4): 359–379
Oaksford M., Chater N. (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Oaksford M., Hahn U. (2004) A Bayesian approach to the argument from ignorance. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 58: 75–85
Oaksford M., Chater N., Larkin J. (2000) Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference.. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 26: 883–899
Okasha S. (2011) Optimal choice in the face of risk: Decision theory mMeets evolution. Philosophy of Science 78(1): 83–104. doi:10.1086/658115
O’Keefe D. J. (1997a) Standpoint explicitness and persuasive effect: A meta-analytic review of the effects of varying conclusion articulation in persuasive messages. Argumentation & Advocacy 34: 1–12
O’Keefe D. J. (1997b) Justification explicitness and persuasive effect: A meta-analytic review of the effects of varying support articulation in persuasive messages. Argumentation & Advocacy 35: 61–75
O’Keefe D. J. (2003) The Potential Conflict Between Normatively Good Argumentative Practice and Persuasive Success. In: van Eemeren F. H., Anthony Blair J., Willard C. A., Francisca Snoeck, Henkemans A. (Eds.), Anyone who has a view: Theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
O’Keefe, D. J. (2005). News for argumentation from persuasion effects research: Two cheers for reasoned discourse. In C. A. Willard (Ed.), Selected papers from the thirteenth NCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 215–221). Washington, DC: National Communication Association.
O’Keefe D. J. (2007) Potential conflicts between normatively-responsible advocacy and successful social influence: Evidence from Persuasion research.. Argumentation 21: 151–163
O’Keefe, D. J., & Jackson, S. (1995). Argument quality and persuasive effects: A review of current approaches. In S. Jackson (Ed.), Argumentation and values: Proceedings of the ninth Alta conference on argumentation (pp. 88–92). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.
Pearl J. (1988) Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: Networks of plausible inference. Morgan Kaufman, San Mateo, CA
Petty R. E., Cacioppo J. T. (1984) The effects of involvement on responses to argument quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to Persuasion.. Journal of personality and Social psychology 46(1): 69–81
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1991). Thought systems, argument quality, and persuasion. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 4, pp. 147–161). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pratt J., Raiffa H., Schlaifer R. (1995) Introduction to statistical decision theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Putnam H. (2002) The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Putnam H. (2003) For ethics and economics without the dichotomies. Review of Political Economy 15(3): 395–412. doi:10.1080/0953825032000086595
Railton P. (2000) Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume & Kant. In: Dancy J. (Ed.), Normativity. Blackwell, Oxford
Ramsey F. P. (1931) The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, London
Rips L. J. (1998) Reasoning and conversation. Psychological Review 105: 411–441
Rips L. J. (2001) Two kinds of reasoning. Psychological Science 12: 129–134
Robbins L. (1932) An essay on the nature and significance of economic science (2nd ed.). Macmillan, London
Rosenkrantz, R. D. (1992). The justification of induction. Philosophy of Science, 527–539.
Rowbottom D. P. (2007) The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument. Studia Logica 87: 65–71
Schreier M., Groeben N., Christmann U. (1995) That’s not fair! Argumentational integrity as an ethics of argumentative communication. Argumentation 9: 267–289
Schroeder M. (2009) Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons. Philosophical Studies 143(2): 223–248. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9200-x
Schum D. A. (1994) Evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning. John Wiley, New York
Satz D., Ferejohn J. A. (1994) Rational choice and social theory. Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 71–87
Sen A. (1987) On ethics and economics. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA
Sibler D. S. (1999) Dutch books and agent rationality. Theory and Decision 47: 247–266
Siegel H., Biro J. (1997) Epistemic normativity, argumentation & fallacies. Argumentation 11: 277–292
Siegel H., Biro J. (2008) Rationality, reasonableness, and critical rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical view. Argumentation 22: 191–203
Simon H. A. (1982) Models of bounded rationality (Vols. 1, 2). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Simon, S., Erduran, S., & Osborne, J. (2002). Enhancing the quality of argumentation in school science. In Proceedings of the annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, New Orleans, USA.
Skyrms B. (1993) A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments?. Philosophy of Science 60: 320–328
Skyrms B. (1996) Evolution of the social contract. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY
Skyrms, B. (2009). Evolution and the social contract. In The Tanner lectures on human values 28. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
Slob W. H. (2002) How to distinguish good and bad arguments: Dialogico-rhetorical normativity. Argumentation 16: 179–196
Slovic P., Lichtenstein S. (1971) Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgement. Organizational Behavior & Human Processes 6: 649–744
Slovic P., Tversky A. (1974) Who accepts savage’s axiom?. Behavioral Science 19(6): 368–373
Snow P. (1998) On the correctness and reasonableness of Cox’s Theorem for finite domains. Computational Intelligence 14: 452–459
Snow P. (2001) The reasonableness of possibility from the perspective of cox. Computational Intelligence 17: 178–192
Sober E. (1993) The nature of selection: Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Stanovich K. E. (1999) Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ
Starmer C. (2005) Normative notions in descriptive dialogues. Journal of Economic Methodology 12(2): 277–289. doi:10.1080/13501780500086206
Stich S. P. (1985) Could man be an irrational animal?. Synthese 64: 115–135
Stich S.P. (1990) The fragmentation of reason. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Sugden R. (2001) The evolutionary turn in game theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 8(1): 113–130. doi:10.1080/1350178001002328
Thaler, R. H., & Mullainathan, S. (2008). Behavioral economics. The concise encyclopedia of economics (2nd ed.). Liberty Fund.
Thomson J. J. (2008) Normativity. Open Court, La Salle, IL
Toulmin S. (1958) The uses of argument. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Tversky A., Kahneman D. (1982) Judgments of and by representativeness. In: Kahneman D., Slovic P., Tversky A. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review 90(4), 293–215.
van Eemeren F. H., Grootendorst R. (2004) A systematic theory of argumentation—The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
van Eeemeren F. H., Garssen B., Meufells B. (2009) Fallacies and judgements of reasonableness: Empirical research concerning pragmadialectical discussion rules. Springer, Dordrecht
van Eemeren F. H., Garssen B., Meuffels B. (2012) The disguised abusive ad hominemempirically investigated: Strategic manoeuvring with direct personal attacks. Thinking & Reasoning 18(3): 344–364. doi:10.1080/13546783.2012.678666
van Enschot-Van Dijk R., Hustinx L., Hoeken H. (2003) The Concept of Argument Quality in the Elaboration Likelihood Model. In: van Eemeren F. H., Anthony Blair J., Willard C. A., Francisca Snoeck Henkemans A. Anyone who has a view: Theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp 319–333
Von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. (1947) The theory of games and economic behaviour (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press, Princeton
Waidacher C. (1997) Hidden assumptions in the Dutch book argument. Theory and Decision 43: 293–312
Wason P. C. (1968) Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 20: 273–281
Williams B. (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Fontana Press, London
Woods J., Irvine A., Walton D. (2004) Critical thinking, logic & the fallacies. Prentice Hall, Toronto
Wyer R. S. Jr., Goldberg L. (1970) A probabilistic analysis of the relationships among beliefs and attitudes. Psychological Review 77(2): 100–120
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Corner, A., Hahn, U. Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?. Synthese 190, 3579–3610 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0211-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0211-y