Abstract
My aim here is to characterize a certain type of ‘virtue approach’ to questions of responsibility for belief; then to explore the extent to which this is helpful with respect to one fundamental puzzle raised by the claims that we have, and that we do not have, voluntary control over our beliefs; and then ultimately to attempt a more exact statement of doxastic responsibility and, with it a plausible statement of ‘weak doxastic voluntarism.’
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See my longest treatment of these in Montmarquet (1993). An account closer to the one presented here may be found in Montmarquet (2000). More recent treatments, emphasizing point (ii) just below, the role of context, would include Montmarquet (forthcoming).
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Montmarquet, J. Virtue and voluntarism. Synthese 161, 393–402 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9091-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9091-3