Abstract
I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the interplay between the particular theory of indicative conditionals developed here and Stalnakerian dynamics. The upshot is an attractive resolution of the so-called “Gibbard phenomenon” for indicative conditionals.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Ross Cameron, George Darby, Andy McGonigal and Daniel Nolan for discussion of this material. This paper was stimulated by thinking through the Gibbard phenomenon with students from my class on conditionals at the University of Leeds in 2006. Thanks to all involved.
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Williams, J.R.G. Conversation and conditionals. Philos Stud 138, 211–223 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9032-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9032-5