Abstract
This study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms’ engagement in corruption. Building on a survey of 341 executives in India, we find that if executives have social ties with government officials, their firms are more likely to engage in corruption. Further, these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive. The results collectively illustrate the role that executives’ social ties and perceptions have in shaping illegal actions of their respective firms.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Bert Cannella, Stewart Miller, Rajan Varadarajan, seminar participants at Arizona State University, Instituto de Empresa and participants of the 2005 JIBS Paper Development Workshop for valuable insights and the Center for International Business Studies and Mays Business School at Texas AandM University for financial support. An earlier version was published in the Best Paper Proceedings of the Academy of Management.
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Collins, J.D., Uhlenbruck, K. & Rodriguez, P. Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective. J Bus Ethics 87, 89–108 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9872-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9872-3