Abstract
In this article, I analyze how the structure of the Chinese state affects the probability that local cadres will comply with the directives of the center. Because the Chinese state consists of a five-level hierarchy of dyadic principal-agent relationships, the existence of even moderate levels of routine incompetence and noise ensures that compliance will be less than perfect due to simple error. Moreover, because the center cannot perfectly differentiate between simple incompetence and willful disobedience, the structure of the state enables cadres to engage in strategic disobedience. I thus conclude that the complexity of the linkages between center and locality are a major factor in the observed persistence of corruption and institutional malfeasance.
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Additional information
Andrew Wedeman is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. His research focuses on the political economy of reform in China and specifically on the effects of corruption on development, both in China and elsewhere in the developing world. Recent publications include: “Budgets, Extra-Budgets, and Small Treasuries: The Utility of Illegal Monies”,Journal of Contemporary China; “Agency and Fiscal Dependence in Central-Provincial Relations in China”,Journal of Contemporay China; “Stealing from the Farmers: Institutional Corruption and the 1992 IOU Crisis”.China Quarterly and “Looters, Rent-Scrappers, and Dividend-Collectors: Corruption and Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines”,The Journal of Developing Areas.
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Wedeman, A. Incompetence, Noise, and Fear in Central-Local Relations in China. St Comp Int Dev 35, 59–83 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02732708
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02732708