Conclusion
In this essay I have begun to construct the liberal and the Marxian concepts of coercion. The differences between them are fundamental and probably irreconcilable. That does not mean, however, that given their respective ontologies, each is valid in its own right. On the contrary, neither concept is valid if its ontological presuppositions are insecurely grounded and/or if it exhibits internal inconsistencies or contradictions. The liberal concept of coercion, explicated by means of the agency model, suffers from both of these defects. The agency model of coercion is seriously, indeed fatally, flawed. For latter-day liberals this is an unpalatable conclusion. Yet I trust that my reasons for reaching this conclusion — however dry and prolix they may seem — are accessible to everyone, liberals and Marxists alike.
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An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Foundations of Political Theory group at the American Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, Sept. 2–5, 1976.I am much indebted to Bertell Ollman and Peter Euben for criticizing that paper.
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Ball, T. Two concepts of coercion. Theor Soc 5, 97–112 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01880862
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01880862