Abstract
Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz' law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression.
Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin
(Jacques Delors, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 July, 1988, No. 2-367/140).
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Computational assistance from Viola Kaltefleiter and Bernd Amann is gratefully acknowledged.
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Vaubel, R. The political economy of centralization and the European Community. Public Choice 81, 151–190 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053271
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053271