Abstract
Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists (among others) still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes ‘objectivity’, especially in identifying it with what a ‘machine’ can do. I approach the problem in the light of two cognate circumstances: (a) the ‘measurement problem’ in quantum physics, and (b) the objectivity of standard mathematics, even though most of it is beyond the reach of ‘machines’. I argue that the only resolution to such problems is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are ‘objective’; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism. A material system which contains such loops is called ‘complex’. Such complex systems thus must possess nonsimulable models; i.e. models which contain impredicativities or ‘self-references’ which cannot be removed, or faithfully mapped into a single coherent syntactic time-frame. I consider a few of the consequences of the above, in the context of thus redrawing the boundary between subject and object.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Handler P. Introduction. In: Handler P, ed.Biology and the Future of Man. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970:3–6.
Bergman H. The controversy concerning the laws of causality in contemporary physics. In: Cohen RS, Wartowsky MW, eds.Logical and Epistemological Studies in Contemporary Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973:395–462. (Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science; Vol XIII).
Monod J.Chance and Necessity. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1971.
Rosen R.Anticipatory Systems. New York: Pergamon Press, 1985.
Rosen R.Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
von Neumann J.Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. [German ed, 1932]. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955.
Wheeler J, Aurek WH.Quantum Theory and Measurement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Wigner E. On the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics.Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 1960;13:1–14.
Mickens R, ed.Mathematics and Science. Singapore: World Scientific, 1990.
Kleene SC.Introduction to Metamathematics. Princeton, NJ: van Nostrand, 1950.
Gödel K. Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme.Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 1931;38:173–98.
Rosen R. Church's thesis and its relation to the concept of realizability in biology and physics.Bull Math Biol 1962;24:375–93.
Rosen R. Effective processes and natural law. In: Herken R, ed.The Universal Turing Machine: A Half-Century Survey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988:523–37.
Löfgren L. An axiomatic explanation of complete self-reproduction.Bull Math Biol 1968;30:415–29.
Rosen R. On a logical paradox implicit in the notion of a self-reproducing automation.Bull Math Biol 1959;21:387–94.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rosen, R. Drawing the boundary between subject and object: Comments on the mind-brain problem. Theor Med Bioeth 14, 89–100 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00997269
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00997269