Abstract
Sometimes two wrongs do make a right. That is, others' violations of moral rules may make it permissible for one to also violate these rules, to avoid being unfairly disadvantaged. This claim, originally advanced by Hobbes, is applied to three cases in business. It is suggested that the claim is one source of scepticism concerning business ethics. I argue, however, that the conditions under which business competitors' violations of moral rules would render one's own violations permissible are quite restricted. Hence, the observation that two wrongs may make a right does not give people a broad warrant for ignoring moral standards in their business activities.
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Gregory S. Kavka is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. He was awarded a NEH Fellowship for Independent Study and Research, 1982–83. His most important publication is: ‘Some Paradoxes of Deterrence’, Journal of Philosophy (June 1978).
My work on this paper was partly supported by a University of California, Irvine Summer Faculty Research Fellowship. I am grateful to the University of Virginia for use of its library facilities, and to Mike W. Martin, Rick O'Neil, a referee for the Journal of Business Ethics, and participants at the Society for Business Ethics meeting at the Pacific Division APA convention in March 1982, for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Kavka, G.S. When two ‘wrongs’ make a right: An essay on business ethics. J Bus Ethics 2, 61–66 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382714
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382714