Abstract
Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition is examined. It is shown why the standard rationale for (or against) the condition tends to be inconclusive as it fails to consider the basic ‘game’ issue in social choice. Specifically it is explained how some recent results (Gibbard-Satterthwaite) on the general non-existence of strategy-proof voting procedures provide the strongest rationale for the independence condition. Also, it is shown that this rationale was exactly the one used by Condorcet in his work on decision rules for juries and elections.
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Blin, JM. How relevant are ‘Irrelevant’ Alternatives?. Theor Decis 7, 95–105 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141104
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141104