Introduction

The European Union (EU) has often been portrayed as a ‘normative power’ both by academics and political actors (Manners 2002; Withman 2011). However, in 2015 the dramatic conditions which led people to flee their homelands and seek better futures in Europe had given rise to various questions pertaining not only to the ability of the EU to solve fast-burning crises, but also questions about the EU’s commitment to its principles and values. While in most EU Member States the rhetoric of ‘fear’ and ‘the exclusionary rhetoric of othering prevailed’ (Krzyżanowski et al. 2018, p. 1; Thielemann 2018, p. 66), calls for strengthening European solidarity failed. Consequently, the EU opted to externalize the issue by concluding international agreements with third states, in particular with Turkey. The EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP)—provisionally agreed to in October 2015 and activated in November 2015—permitted the denial of entry to refugees who were arriving by way of the Aegean Sea, leading many to argue that the EU was undermining its human rights commitments (Lavenex 2018). Another source of suspicion was related to the rapprochement between the EU and Turkey, despite Turkey’s declining commitment to the Copenhagen political criteria (Niemann and Zaun 2018; Slominski and Trauner 2018).

This gap between the EU’s norms and actions has attracted considerable attention. Observers have argued that the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ has turned into a ‘solidarity crisis’ (Grimmel and Giang 2017; Takle 2017) or an ‘identity crisis’ (Rizcallah 2019, pp. 249, 256). In this regard, the EU–Turkey deal has been examined by tracing the institutional process that led to its entry into force (Smeets and Beach 2020) or by analysing the impact of the deal on the EU’s normative identity (Lavenex 2018; Martin 2019; Gürkan 2019). This article seeks to explain the EU’s response to the 2015 refugee challenge from a different angle. Here, the focus is on the justifications put forward by EU institutions, as well as on the power relations between them in the process of forming institutional preferences. More specifically, the question is why the EU opted to conclude an agreement with Turkey, despite this being in contradiction with its own values. Theoretically, to explain this outcome, this article builds on the normative/civilian power literature (Manners 2002; Duchêne 1972) and the new intergovernmentalist claims (Bickerton et al. 2015). While the former facilitates the examination of how EU institutions, beyond internal divisions and struggles, motivate their preferences and positions on the issue at stake, the latter provides a framework to understand how power relations at the EU level shaped the final outcome. This article examines the EU’s normative power in action and argues that in formulating the EU’s response to the refugee challenge, security prevailed over normative considerations, in particular over solidarity principle and humanitarian concerns, leaning the EU towards a civilian power. We devote particular attention to the attempts of EU institutions to translate the principle of solidarity into concrete action (Ross and Borgman-Prebil 2010; Grimmel and Giang 2017; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Bonjour et al. 2018), and trace different interpretations of solidarity in connection with the refugee challenge in 2015–2016.

Drawing on content analysis, the empirical part demonstrates that although internally divided (Guiraudon 2018; Ripoll Servent 2019), the European Parliament (EP) emphasized the importance of norms and values as an illustration of the EU’s normative power, the European Council and the Council (hereafter European/Council) privileged security and a state-centred conception of international politics as an illustration of the EU’s civilian power, with the Commission oscillating between normative and civilian power. This article concludes that the completion of the EU–Turkey agreement not only challenges the ontological characterization of the EU as normative power, but also lends support to the new intergovernmentalism as the outcome of the EU–Turkey agreement was a reflection of the priorities of the European/Council, rather than the preferred option of supranational institutions.

The article is structured as follows: The first section gives an account of the context and positions of key actors during the ‘refugee crisis’ from 2015 until the EU–Turkey statement in March 2016. The second section presents the theoretical argument, including an overview of how we operationalize civilian/normative power concepts. The third section outlines methodological considerations. The fourth section offers an in-depth analysis of the main actors’ preferences by highlighting their preferred solutions at different stages of the crisis as a result of the evolution of their power relations. The conclusion discusses broader theoretical and policy implications of main findings.

The context in the run-up to the EU–Turkey statement of March 2016

In May 2015, in response to an accelerated number of arrivals, and in particular to the death of over 800 refugees in the Mediterranean Sea in a single boat tragedy in April 2015, the European Commission launched the ‘European Agenda on Migration’. The Agenda called for both short-term priorities with a view to ‘taking immediate action to prevent further losses of migrants’ lives at sea’, as well as medium-to-long-term priorities for supporting Member States with better management strategies and coordination of all aspects of migration (European Commission 2015a, 2015b).

In order to implement the Agenda, the Commission adopted two packages of measures on 27 May and 9 September. The most divisive proposal was the call by the Commission to establish an emergency relocation scheme for a total of 160,000 migrants from three frontline Member States, namely Hungary, Greece and Italy. Under the second package, the emergency relocation proposal for 120,000 people was explicitly based on Article 78(3) of the TFEU, making the relocation procedure mandatory for all Member States. Similarly, the permanent relocation mechanism, which would be activated by the Commission when a Member State is confronted with a large and disproportionate inflow of third-country nationals, would be mandatory for all Member States with the exception of the UK, Denmark and Ireland, which had an opt-out (European Commission 2015c).

However, reaching consensus on the relocation of 120,000 people from the second package represented fundamental challenges. On 22 September, the Council adopted by qualified majority the relocation decision, although the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against this decision (Council 2015a). While northern EU Member States, in particular Germany, initially championed the Commission’s relocation plans, Central European states opposed the Commission’s agenda for various reasons (Trauner 2016, p. 320; Biermann et al. 2019), invoking mainly the security argument (Coman 2019; Gürkan 2019). Subsequently, as a result of domestic opposition, the ‘pro-quota camp’ led by Angela Merkel switched its position to opposing quotas, and the EU opted to search for alternative solutions to the crisis (Zaun 2018).

Following its informal meeting on 23 September 2015, the European Council instructed the other institutions to put more weight on diplomatic cooperation with EU partners in dealing with the refugee crisis as well as on fortifying the EU’s external borders. The European Council also called for ‘reinforcing the dialogue with Turkey at all levels’ to strengthen Turkey’s cooperation with the EU on migratory flows (European Council 2015a). The European Council meeting of 15 October 2015 considered the JAP with Turkey as ‘part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda based on shared responsibility’ (European Council 2015b). Also, in return for Turkey’s cooperation in the refugee crisis, the European Council promised to re-energize Turkey’s accession process.

In the run-up to the meeting of the EU heads of state and government with Turkey in November, Bulgaria decided to extend the fence along its borders with Turkey and Greece. Slovenia began to construct a barrier on its border with Croatia. Four Member States (Austria, Denmark, Germany and Sweden) and Norway (non-EU, but a Schengen member) re-introduced border controls (Morsut and Kruke 2018, p. 154). While these developments put the Schengen regime at risk, the informal meeting of the European Council in November 2015 concentrated on enhancing the control of the EU’s external borders and the modalities of diplomatic cooperation with Turkey. The summit meeting between President Erdoğan and EU leaders on 29 November activated the JAP. In return for Turkey’s cooperation in controlling irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, Turkey obtained financial support to cope with the high number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition, the EU promised to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen area and to re-energize the EU–Turkey accession process (European Council 2015c).

The subsequent (third) implementation package of the Commission and European Council meeting in December enhanced the measures aimed at containing migrants in adjacent regions and fortifying external borders rather than focusing on the relocation and resettlement measures initially proposed by the Commission. Finally, through the EU–Turkey statement of 18 March 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed to return to Turkey all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands (Slominski and Trauner 2018, p. 108), while the EU, in addition to granting an extra €3 billion for the refugee facility in Turkey, reconfirmed its readiness to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens (subject to some caveats), to upgrade the customs union with Turkey and to re-energize the accession process of Turkey (European Commission 2016).

The EU and Turkey agreed on a series of measures concerning asylum seekers, irregular migration, and Turkey’s accession to the EU (summarized in “Appendix 1”), which would potentially result in serious breaches of EU law and international legal obligations (Labayle and De Bruycker 2016; Rizcallah 2019, p. 257; Martin 2019, p. 1355). Legal scholars argued that the collective deportation of a group from a particular nationality to a country where they cannot claim asylum and may not thus be a ‘safe third country’ is in violation of the Geneva Convention and the European Human Rights Convention (Articles 3,4 of Protocol 4) and EU law (Guiraudon 2018, p. 17). Against the backdrop of these normative considerations, the next section sets the conceptual framework to analyse EU institutions’ response to the refugee challenge.

Normative power vs. civilian power in the shadow of intergovernmentalism

In this article, we argue that the EU’s response to the refugee challenge is more an expression of civilian power resting on diplomatic cooperation rather than a normative one. We contend furthermore that the EU–Turkey deal is a reflection of power relations at the EU level and of diverging conceptions of ‘what is normal’ as promoted by intergovernmental and supranational institutions. Therefore, the explanation has two facets: one is about normativity (What should the EU do?) and the second is about power (Which actor has the upper hand?).

For the former question (What should the EU do?), Normative Power Europe (NPE) and Civilian Power (CP) provide an analytical grid for classifying EU institutions’ preferences in the face of the refugee challenge. Following François Duchêne’s original work, CP concept dominated academic debates at the beginning of the 1990s. As Maull (1989) put it, CP is about ‘(a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; (b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and (c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management’.

In an attempt to overcome the debate about the EU as a military or CP, Ian Manners argued that a NP approach can lead to a better understanding of how the EU acts in the global arena. Using the familiar division of power into military, economic and ideological dimensions, Manners linked military power to the ability to use military instruments, civilian power to economic power or to the ‘ability to use civilian instruments’ of power, and normative power to the ability to define what is ‘normal’. He concluded that the ability to define ‘what is normal’ is the greatest power of all (Manners 2002, p. 253). From this perspective, ‘EU’s power cannot be enucleated to either military or purely economic means, it works through ideas, opinions and conscience’ (Diez and Manners 2007, p. 175; Manners 2002; Whitman 2011).

To overcome the conceptual fluidity of NPE, Forseberg (2011, p. 1190) defines both the concept of norm and normative. A norm is usually defined as ‘a principle of right action’, while ‘normative power’ is the ability to define what passes for normal. In his view, NPE means normative identity; that is, the set of norms and values on which the EU is founded. NPE implies normative interests, which represent a ‘common good’ rather than ‘selfish possession goals’. NPE implies using normative, rather than military or economic, means of power (Forseberg 2011, p. 1193). These elements, as Forseberg (2011) explains, constitute an ideal type, and are used in this article to group institutional preferences, opposing normative to civilian power.

Against this backdrop, one should argue that NPE empirically manifests:

  1. (1)

    by putting forward the identity of the EU. Normative identity derives from the nature of the EU as a values-based, treaty-based legal order. If the EU institutions invoke the EU’s normative identity, they are expected to place the EU’s constitutive norms and values at the centre of their positions, and seek to translate values—such as solidarity—into concrete political action. Put differently, if institutional actors’ motivations are grounded in NPE, we expect to see EU institutions calling for increased intra-European solidarity and/or to make references to the norms and values at the origins of its foundation for taking action.

  2. (2)

    by its pursuance of normative interests and ends. NP engages in (foreign policy) activities that aim at a common good, rather than selfish strategic interests, which characterize a traditional power. Therefore, if EU institutions argue in favour of normative interests, we expect to see EU institutions call on adopting policies that aim to extend solidarity to refugees by helping refugees in need, by addressing the root causes of migration and/or by extending solidarity to the EU’s external partners, to share the burden of refugees in the form of resettlement of refugees from third states to Europe.

  3. (3)

    by using normative means of power. NP uses normative means and persuades by making references to general rules, practices, international or cosmopolitan law and/or by shaping discourses about what is normal. If EU institutions argue in favour of normative means, we expect to see ‘standards for the others through the means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either military or economic means’ (Diez and Manners 2007, p. 175). Therefore, we expect EU institutions to make references to or to define norms-based approaches to refugees, as well as norms-based action to be taken at the global level or in the EU’s relations with its external partners. Furthermore, NP would seek to overcome ‘power politics through a strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states to sovereign equality’ (Sjursen 2006, p. 249).

Civilian power, in contrast, rests upon three dimensions:

  1. (4)

    the ‘centrality of economic power’ (non-military) in the achievement of national goals (Maull 1989);

  2. (5)

    the primacy of ‘diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems’ (multilateralism);

  3. (6)

    the willingness to work through legally binding supranational institutions (international law) (Manners 2002, pp. 236–237; Bickerton 2011, p. 27) in order to privilege security (see Whitman 2013, pp. 174–175).

On the second question (Which institution has the upper hand to define outcomes?), the literature is divided, as decision-making in the EU is fragmented and varies from one area to another. In recent years, scholars in European studies have unpacked the power relations between EU institutions in contrasting ways. Where the new intergovernmentalists (Bickerton et al. 2015; Puetter 2012; Fabbrini 2013; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016) see an increase in the power of the Member States, the promoters of the new supranationalism (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014; Dehousse 2015; Bauer and Bekker 2014; Savage and Verdun 2015) observe a continued empowerment of supranational institutions. The new intergovernmentalism states that since the beginning of the 1990s decisions at the EU level are influenced by the European/Council to the detriment of supranational institutions. It suggests that Member States have been increasingly inclined to solve collective problems by strengthening the power of intergovernmentalism, whereas the power of supranational institutions has been impaired (Fabbrini and Puetter 2016; Coman 2017; Bonjour et al. 2018). The rise in power of Member States is reflected in the attempts of the European Council to instruct the Commission and the Council to pursue particular policy initiatives, thereby monopolizing the agenda setting (Puetter 2015, p. 166). Due to the decision-making procedures at work, the central role of the European Council in the day-to-day decision-making process limits the room for manoeuvre of both the EP and the Commission as policy entrepreneurs. Although the Commission and the EP struggle to frame policy issues at stake against the preferences of the European/Council, supranational institutions are not able to ‘convince the Council that they represent a legitimate solution to the substantive problems raised by the crisis’ (Ripoll Servent 2019, p. 295), and they are constrained to follow the preferences of the European/Council which are often in stark contrast with their own positions (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016). Therefore, in this article, if the postulates of new intergovernmentalism hold, we expect to observe that the EU’s ultimate solution to the refugee challenge was shaped in line with the preferences of the European/Council, and despite diverging positions of supranational institutions.

Data and methodological considerations

The data generated for this article come from the qualitative content analysis of 65 texts. This dataset includes 50 speeches delivered at the EP plenary debates between April 2015 and July 2016 by three top Commission officials directly involved in the formulation of the EU’s response to the ‘crisis’ (President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, First Vice President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, and European Commissioner for Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos), as well as the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk and the Presidents-in-office of the Council (Bert Koenders, Klaas Dijkhoff, Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, Nicolas Schmit and Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert). To study the position of the EP, the analysis draws on nine resolutions related to migration adopted in the run-up to and immediately after the deal. Resolutions—rather than the parliamentary debates—were analysed as they represent the official and ultimate position. This dataset is triangulated with official documents and press releases issued by the European/Council and the Commission between April 2015 and July 2016. This period is rich in data because the European/Council and Commission officials briefed the EP on migration in every plenary sitting, and the EP issued a record number of resolutions on migration and refugees. Moreover, the data collection covers the period preceding the completion of the EU–Turkey deal and ends in July 2016. This enables us to focus on changes and continuities in institutional preferences in the run-up to the conclusion of the deal, leaving aside factors that altered the EU’s approach to Turkey following the coup attempt in July 2016 (Martin 2019).

The data have been analysed through computer-based manual coding by focusing on the nature of EU institutions’ preferred solutions about the adoption of distinct policies concerning the EU’s response to the refugee challenge across two meta-narratives (NPE and CP) and six subtopics, which are comprised of code.1/normative identity, code.2/normative interests/ends, code.3/normative means, code.4/economic power, code.5/diplomatic cooperation, and code.6/security (see “Appendix 2”).

Only those ideas/statements that belong to these six labelled codes were selected. The coding unit in this study was the idea rather than an entire text or a core sentence. The coded idea could span the length of a sentence or an entire paragraph. The passages that were coded contain a statement about how or why the EU or Member States should act in a certain way in response to the refugee challenge. If any two statements/ideas in a single text produce the same coding sequence, we coded it only once. For example, if the same Commissioner makes the same argument/idea about the same issue throughout the same text (or in two separate texts during the same intervention at the plenary), we coded this statement only once. But if the same action is justified through two separate ideas in the same text, we coded these statements separately. For example, if the same Commissioner refers to the need to ‘open safe and legal avenues for refugees to come to Europe’ as a way to extend solidarity to the refugees and as a way to help the EU’s neighbours, these two justifications were coded separately although they belong to the same thematic family (normative interests/ends). In the same vein, while generic references to the same sub-theme were coded only once, two different specific ideas belonging to the same sub-theme were coded twice. For example, if an institution refers to the importance of social inclusion of the refugees more than once in the same text, these references were coded only once as norms-based approach to refugees, but if the same institution makes references to two (or more) different ideas/policies on how the EU should act to achieve social integration of refugees (for example, through ‘language courses’ and ‘the validation of skills’ and ‘housing’ and ‘sporting activities’), these ideas were coded separately. This resulted in an amount of 667 total coded statements (253 for the Commission, 259 for the EP, and 155 for the European/Council).

The manual coding of data allowed us to identify the salience of discursive dimensions per institution, and observe changes across time per each institution, and in comparison to each other.

Empirical findings: EU institutions’ preferences in response to the refugee challenge in 2015–2016

To interpret the manually coded data, we proceeded in two steps. First, we calculated the emphasis put by each institution on a preferred solution to the refugee challenge between 2015 and 2016. Drawing on Wendler’s analysis, the emphasis scores were calculated as the percentage of each dimension of NP/CP in relation to all statements made by a given institution (Wendler 2014). These scores indicate not only the salience of a preferred type of response to the refugee challenge for each institution, but also allow us to compare institutions’ preferred response in relation to each other through emphasis ranks (Table 1). Second, to trace changes in institutional positions over time, we calculated the frequency of each subtopic per institution and per month. To track meaningful changes/continuity across time, we aggregated the data into three periods: the period preceding the agreement on the JAP (April–September 2015), the period covering the finalization of the deal (October 2015–March 2016), and the period succeeding the completion of the EU–Turkey statement (April–June 2016). For these three periods, we separately calculated periodic emphasis scores as the percentage of each dimension of NP/CP in relation to all statements made by a given institution during a given period (Table 2).

Table 1 Emphasis scoresa and emphasis score ranks (ESR)b of EU institutions’ preferred solution to the refugee challenge (2015–2016)
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Table 2 Changes in EU institutions’ preferred solution to the refugee challenge over time (April 2015–June 2016)
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The assessment of data provides insights in two ways. First observations relate to the overall preferred solution of all the three institutions. The data indicate that although both meta-narratives are key to understanding the EU’s response to the refugee challenge, dominant thematic emphasis for the whole dataset was NPE (57,9), while arguments pertaining to CP (42,1) remained secondary (see Table 1). Concerning specific discursive dimensions, arguments with regard to the adoption of normative means (36,1) constituted the core of the overall discussion on the EU’s response to the refugee challenge. Diplomatic cooperation with third states (19,2) and achieving security (16,2) were also frequently coded arguments followed by normative interests (12,7), normative identity (9) and economic cooperation (6,8). This set of observations indicate that while the preferred solution for all three institutions was framed primarily in normative terms, the outcome (in the form of the EU–Turkey agreement) reflected the preferred option of the European/Council, which had a clear preference for achieving security (30,3).

Second, the data indicate that preferences of EU institutions change over time with the exception of the EP, whose characteristic emphasis was on normative means throughout the crisis (Table 2). While the European/Council has consistently put forward arguments pushing the EU towards civilian power, its justifications/discursive dimensions switched from diplomatic cooperation with external partners (which was the main theme between April and September 2015) to security (from October 2015 onward). In accordance with our prior expectations, the extreme discursive shift took place in the European Commission, which, until the end of September, put the emphasis on normative ends, and then starting from October 2015 onward it advocated a diplomatic solution (mainly through the deal with Turkey).

The article now turns to the qualitative assessment of coded texts per institution with a view to examining the thematic content of each institutions’ preferred solution to the refugee challenge, and how institutional arguments relate to each other.

The European Commission: the limits of its normative power

Overall, although the Commission more frequently put forward arguments inclining the EU towards CP, the manual coding of Commission texts indicates similar emphasis scores for both meta-narratives (43,9/NPE and 56,1/CP). This observation is in sharp contrast with the high emphasis scores of the EP (88/NPE) and the European/Council (69,7/CP), which had a stronger emphasis on discursive dimensions embedded in the NPE and CP, respectively (see Table 1). In a similar vein, the argumentative content of the Commission’s discourse does not mark a high score in any of the specific discursive dimensions (26/diplomatic cooperation; security/20,5; normative interests/17,7; normative means/13,8; normative identity/12,2; and economic cooperation/9,4). This observation provides initial evidence for demonstrating half-hearted support by the European Commission to a solution inclining the EU towards CP.

Beyond these general observations, a closer look at the Commission’s discourse across time indicates an abrupt discursive shift in the Commission’s framing of the EU’s response to the refugee problem. Periodic emphasis scores calculated separately for the three time periods (see Table 2) show that from April until the end of September 2015, the Commission devoted particular attention to the situation of refugees, and frequently used arguments embedded in the normative conceptualization of the EU (ES: 73,3/NPE and 26,7/CP). During this period, the overarching theme in the Commission’s discourse was normative ends/interests (ES: 31,1), mainly the need to extend solidarity to refugees in the form of pursuing an open-door policy and creating legal avenues. This discursive dimension was frequently used in connection with the necessity to strengthen solidarity between Member States as well as adopting normative means to deal with the problem, as indicated by the identical and relatively high emphasis scores observed for both normative identity and normative means (ES: 21,1/21,1). The Commission’s call for fair-burden sharing among Member States in the form of relocation was used for supporting the Commission’s argument to extend solidarity to refugees through an open-door policy (Juncker 2015a, 2015b). This does not mean that the Commission advocated the opening of all borders, but the characteristic emphasis of the Commission was on helping those fleeing war, hence showing solidarity with refugees by adopting policies in favour of accommodating refugees in EU Member States (Timmermans 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e; Avramopoulos 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). Moreover, the qualitative review indicates that the Commission frequently made arguments related to a norms-based approach to refugees (ES for normative means: 21,1), in particular by putting universal norms at the centre of the EU’s relations with the outside world.

By the end of September 2015, facing increased opposition from Member State governments who contested the relocation scheme, and in light of several Member States’ decision to reintroduce internal border controls, the Commission started to side with the European Council in framing the response to the crisis. This is shown by the fact that the overall emphasis score for CP increased from 26,7 for April–September 2015 to 82,4 for the October 2015–March 2016 period (Table 2). Following the European Council’s acknowledgement of the need to enhance cooperation with Turkey to reduce and manage migratory flow, the Commission shifted its primary focus from extending solidarity to the refugees by adopting normative means and by strengthening solidarity among Member States (hence pushing for mandatory relocation schemes) to making a case for closer cooperation with neighbouring countries for externalizing the refugee problem (see Fig. 1). From that point onward, the Commission became complicit in keeping refugees out of the EU and took the lead in negotiating the deal with Turkey (Smeets and Beach 2020, p. 138).

Fig. 1
figure 1

European Commission—The shift in meta-narratives (April 2015–June 2016)

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This policy change was justified around two main discursive dimensions that received their highest emphasis scores between October 2015 and March 2016. First, the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve refugee crisis emerges as the principal argument for the European Commission (ES: 41,7/October 2015–March 2016, and 30,9/April–May 2016). The qualitative review indicates that most-frequently coded sub-themes under diplomatic cooperation were the argument of solidarity with Turkey and the emphasis on mutual gains. As for the former, the Commission’s rhetoric converged with that of several Member States as well as the European/Council, arguing that the EU’s effort to contain refugees in adjacent regions was an act of solidarity with EU external partners. For example, the JAP presented by President Juncker to President Erdoğan on 5 October 2015 was promoted as a set of ‘concrete measures covering support for refugees, migrants and their hosting communities’ (European Commission 2015d: 13). In other words, the plan was conceived by the Commission as a tool not only for preventing uncontrolled migratory flows from Turkey to the EU, but also for assisting Turkey in managing the massive influx of refugees (European Commission 2015e, see also Timmermans 2015f, 2015h, 2016b; Juncker 2015c; Avramopoulos 2016d, 2016e).

Besides the theme of assisting Turkey, Commissioners often voiced the argument of mutual benefits. The deal was a mutually beneficial diplomatic tool for the EU to stop refugee inflows and for Turkey to receive other benefits from the EU (Avramopoulos 2016a, Juncker 2015f, 2016a). While on some occasions, Juncker (2016b) defended the cooperation with Turkey as an essential tool for saving the Schengen regime, in other instances, the Commission justified the deal as a key component of EU strategy for stopping sea arrivals (Juncker 2015e; 2016c; 2016d; Timmermans 2016a, 2016b; Avramopoulos 2016b).

The second most-frequently used discursive dimension from the beginning of October onward was the necessity to protect external borders to ensure the security of the Union (ES: security/27,8 between October 2015–March 2016). In line with the arguments raised by the European/Council, the Commission maintained that the deal was necessary for stemming refugee flow and for securing the EU’s external borders (for the similarity of the arguments, see interventions by Juncker 2015c and Tusk 2015b; Schmit 2015a and Timmermans 2015f, 2015 g; Juncker 2015d and Schmit 2015b). However, we observed that the security argument becomes relatively less important following the agreement on the EU–Turkey statement between April–May 2016 (ES: 10,9), while normative arguments become once again more pronounced by the Commission (normative interests/means identical ES: 20/20, Table 2). This provides additional evidence to our main argument about the Commission’s oscillation between security and solidarity arguments.

In a nutshell, despite the Commission’s attempt to strengthen intra-European solidarity in order to extend solidarity to refugees, the resistance of Member States prevented it from giving meaning to the values of solidarity and shared responsibility enshrined in the treaties. In the end, the Commission followed the position of the European Council and the majority of Member State governments (Smeets and Beach 2019). This policy change was clearly captured by Timmermans who, following the conclusion of the deal with Turkey, stated that the agreement with Turkey was ‘the only way forward to solve that problem’ because it was impossible to curb the position of Member States (Timmermans 2016b).

The European Council and the Council: the champion of security and the EU’s civilian power

The data show that European Council and the successive rotating presidencies of the Council pushed the EU towards a civilian power (Fig. 2). From the beginning of 2015, the European/Council’s primary focus was on the stability and security of the EU, hence on the EU’s material interests. This is not to say that humanitarian norms were not important for these two institutions, but security had primacy over other (normative) considerations. This is shown by the low scores for normative dimensions (ES: normative identity, interests and means: 8,3/7,7 and 14,1, respectively) and the high overall emphasis score for security (30,3 see Table 1). These securitization arguments became the primary theme for the European/Council, as several Member States started to reinstate border controls. A qualitative review of the content of arguments shows that although the main theme in European/Council texts was the securitization of migration to the EU, the referent object (what is threatened) was conceptualized to encompass a broad array of values or policies of the Union. What needed to be protected ranged from ‘the collapse of Schengen’ (Tusk 2015e), ‘to political chaos in the EU’ and ‘the loss of control over external borders’ (Tusk 2016a, 2016b).

Fig. 2
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European/Council – Meta-narratives across time (April 2015–June 2016)

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The data indicate also that the main security theme in the European Council’s discourse was used in connection with the need to establish diplomatic cooperation with external partners, which received a similar overall emphasis score (ES: security/30,3 and diplomatic cooperation/29,6 see Table 1). The qualitative analysis of European Council texts supports this observation. It shows that securitization of the migration flow justified ‘policies of permanent exceptionality’ (Moreno-Lax 2018: 121) in the form of regaining the control of external borders (Tusk 2015c; 2015d; 2015e; 2016a; 2016b). For this, the European/Council relied upon diplomatic cooperation with the countries of origin and transit as well as on economic means. As early as April 2015, according to Tusk (2015c), the best way to address the refugee crisis was ‘to ensure that [refugees] do not get on the boats in the first place’. In order to achieve this, a recurring theme in his speeches was the need to cooperate with countries of transit to ‘monitor and control the land borders and travel routes’. The necessity of diplomatic cooperation with Turkey was a dominant theme in Tusk’s framing of a solution to the ‘crisis’ (2015b; 2015e). Similar arguments were also raised by the Council Presidency calling on closer cooperation with Turkey, despite Turkey’s authoritarian drift (Schmit 2015a, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, Hennis-Plasschaert 2016a). The President of the European Council and rotating Presidencies of the Council repeatedly called on Member States to financially support Turkey and other countries of origin and transit (Tusk 2015e; Schmit 2015e, 2015f, 2015g; Hennis-Plasschaert 2016b).

A comparison of the frequency and the content of the arguments between the institutions reveals that the European/Council’s emphasis scores are similar to the Commission’s altered position, which, between October 2015 and March 2016, overwhelmingly argued in favour of the primacy of diplomatic cooperation with third countries (41,7) and preserving the security of the Union (27,8 see Table 2). These two institutions’ convergence on securitization and diplomatic cooperation with partners is in sharp contrast with the position of the EP, which embraced exclusively normative arguments (see Table 2). This institutional cleavage again lends support to our hypothetical expectations, as it reveals not only how the European/Council pushed the EU towards civilian power by prioritizing security over normative concerns, but also the inter-institutional weight of the European/Council as the outcome (the conclusion of EU–Turkey agreement) reflected its security concerns despite diverging positions among the EU institutions.

The European Parliament: the champion of values and the EU’s normative power

The data for the EP consist of own-initiative reports and resolutions on topical issues which formed an ‘important channel of inter-institutional communication’ allowing the EP to set its normative priorities vis-à-vis the other institutions (Ripoll Servent 2018, p. 97). Although the non-legislative character of these resolutions arguably facilitated their adoption and magnified their normative emphasis, extreme scores recorded for these texts show that throughout the crisis, the EP had a clear preference for solutions pushing the EU towards NPE (88/NPE and 12/CP, see Table 1 and Fig. 3). Despite intra-EU divisions, the main political groups in the EP argued in favour of a norms-based approach to refugees, putting human rights, the right to asylum, and human dignity at the centre of the EP’s approach to the refugee challenge (Agence Europe, 7 October 2015). This is evidenced by high scores recorded for normative means (71) followed by normative interests (10,8) and normative identity (6,1) in EP Resolutions (see Table 1). While normative means remained the most-frequently used theme, it became more pronounced by the EP between October 2015 and March 2016 (ES for normative means/96,7 and NPE/100 for the same period, see Table 2). This extreme value is explained by the EP’s criticisms to both the Commission and the European/Council’s preferred option to the refugee crisis, which converged around the securitization and externalization of migration.

Fig. 3
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European Parliament – Meta-narratives across time (April 2015–December 2016)

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A closer analysis of EP Resolutions indicates that the EP’s discourse on the migration challenge had three characteristics. First, compared with other institutions, the EP’s framing of a solution to the ‘crisis’ rested on a rights-based discourse referring to the authority of laws, rules and regulations. In the EP’s argumentation, the act of seeking asylum was a fundamental right and not a security risk; hence, extending solidarity to refugees was a legal obligation. The EP repeatedly called on Member States to ratify all international treaties and conventions and to implement the highest international legal standards for ensuring the full protection of refugees’ rights (EP 2016b; 2016c paragraph 56). Consequently, the EP criticized the policies of the Member States and the European Council aimed at stopping refugee arrivals, and reiterated its preference for creating safe and legal routes for asylum seekers (EP 2015a, paragraph 13; 2016a).

The EP’s call for solidarity between Member States for pursuing a fair and equitable burden sharing was indeed a logical consequence of the EP’s call for an open-door policy to accommodate refugees in Europe (see EP 2015a, paragraph 4; EP 2015b, paragraph 3). In this regard, the EP’s call for solidarity between Member States overlapped with the initial position of the Commission as evidenced by similar periodical emphasis scores for normative identity both for the EP and the Commission (20/21,1 for the EP and the Commission, respectively, for April–September 2015, see Table 2).

The second component of the EP’s normative approach to the refugee crisis was manifested in its call for the adoption of a comprehensive EU policy, respecting in particular the humanitarian aspects. The EP emphasized the integration of refugees and asylum seekers by giving them access to housing, health care, education, social protection and the labour market. In this regard, the EP criticized the Commission’s reluctance to implement decisions concerning asylum seekers’ access to the labour market (EP 2016d, paragraph 38). Also, compared with the European Council, the EP had a fundamental difference in its argument in favour of enhancing controls in registering asylum seekers. Unlike the European Council which advocated stricter controls on the registration of asylum seekers at their arrival purely for security reasons, the EP highlighted the necessity of these controls for ensuring a timely and legal access of refugees and asylum seekers to the labour market and for preventing undeclared work practices and all forms of exploitation (EP 2016d, paragraph 40). Besides, the EP, unlike the other institutions, attached a particular importance to the protection of vulnerable groups, including children, women, LBGTI migrants and minority groups (EP 2016b).

Third, the way the EP approached the EU’s collaboration with external partners on refugee crisis management diverged from the European Council’s position. While the protection of external borders/security was the main argument behind the European Council’s discourse on collaboration with partners, the EP criticized EU policies of outsourcing refugee flows on moral grounds (EP 2015a, paragraph 16). In a similar vein, the EP was against the European Council’s decision to negotiate an agreement with Turkey, as according to the EP, ‘outsourcing the refugee crisis to Turkey [was] not a credible long-term solution to the problem’ (EP 2016e, paragraph 37) for two reasons. First, the EP was against forced returns, in particular regarding the return of migrants to countries where they could face human rights violations or persecution (EP 2016b, paragraph 84). Hence, given Turkey’s poor record in human rights, Turkey’s classification as a safe country by the EU was criticized (EP 2017, paragraph 67). Also, the EP placed more emphasis on the assistance programs for promoting refugees’ integration in third countries, such as access to education, health care and legal employment (EP 2015c). Second, the EP championed the consistent application of the EU’s political conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey. According to the EP, cooperation with Turkey on migration and the EU’s relations with Turkey were separate issues, and the EU should not have turned a blind eye to the erosion of the rule of law and fundamental rights in Turkey (EP 2016e, paragraph 3). This was in contrast with the European Council’s generous offer to Turkey to guarantee its collaboration in the refugee crisis (EP 2016e, paragraph 3). This observation is also supported by very low values recorded for diplomatic cooperation (6,1) and economic cooperation (2,3) for the EP (see Table 1).

Conclusion: failed intra-European solidarity, the affirmation of EU civilian power at the expense of normative power

This article sought to explain the EU’s response to the refugee ‘crisis’ that resulted in the conclusion of the EU–Turkey deal. The analysis showed that EU institutions had diverging policy emphases. While the EP framed EU’s response to the refugee challenge in 2015–2016 through normative means in accordance with the image of the EU acting as a normative power, the European/Council favoured a civilian power approach. The Commission, which, in an initial stage was the champion of the EU’s normative identity and normative interests, in the end found itself in support of the security approach and negotiating the deal with Turkey. As a result, the EU–Turkey agreement was more an expression of civilian power resting on diplomatic and economic cooperation to achieve security interests rather than a normative one.

These findings have broader theoretical and policy implications. First, the article suggests that CP and NP remain relevant conceptual tools for studying not only the content of argumentative justifications advanced by the EU in response to a crisis situation, but also the identity of the EU. The way institutions justify their preferences is important because, when framing a response to a crisis situation by choosing to weight material or moral dimensions more heavily than another, an actor is also asserting a specific identity (Hall 2005, p. 151). Accordingly, by using these concepts as analytical grids to classify the EU’s framing of responses to the crisis, this article shed light on the identity of the EU in a crisis situation. On this point, the analysis demonstrates that each institution put a special emphasis on a specific dimension of CP or NPE, and hence chose to assert one dimension of the EU’s identity more strongly than another. However, while the most-frequently introduced argument by all the institutional actors was framed in normative terms, the EU’s actual response was ultimately the pursuance of its material interests (security) through the conclusion of the EU–Turkey deal. This confirms scholars’ observation about the EU’s identity crisis referred to in the introduction of this article. Besides, this divergence between normative arguments and interest-driven policy outputs render the EU prone to mobilizing criticisms about the EU’s credibility in its external action, in particular in connection with the refugee deal with Turkey (Toygür and Gürkan 2020).

Second, this article not only lends support to the new intergovernmentalist claims, but also expands theory’s empirical scope to crisis situations. The new intergovernmentalism has been launched ‘to understand the changing dynamics of European integration in the post-Maastricht period’, and was criticized for failing to address the institutional dynamics set in motion by crisis situations (Hodson 2020). The analysis demonstrated that the EU’s handling of the European refugee crisis is largely consistent with the key claims of new intergovernmentalism. During the refugee crisis in 2015–2016, in accordance with new intergovernmentalist expectations, Member States sought to restore stability and security of the Schengen area at the expense of normative considerations raised by the Commission and the EP. While the EP consistently framed the EU’s response in normative terms, the Commission ultimately sided with the European/Council, which prioritized collaboration with third countries and border control over normative interests. Since 2015, subsequent proposals by the European Commission related to migration indicate a similar preference hierarchy for the Commission (EU Observer 2020; European Commission 2020). Third, and in a way related to the previous point, these observations suggest that when faced with an exogenous shock, the EU’s crisis resolution measures are determined through consensus-seeking at the European Council level but at the expense of ideational preferences of supranational institutions. First-order preferences of supranational institutions, especially those of the EP, remain marginal. Bridging ideational differences between the institutions and increasing the role of the EP in forming preferences in a crisis context would not only help to mitigate normative gaps in the EU’s policies, but also contribute to making the EU’s identity more value-driven.