Abstract
In the late 1990s, the US Department of Defense funded a multimillion dollar contract called Project Jefferson to assess emerging bioweapons threats. This project consisted of a collection of classified and unclassified technical research activities. This chapter will examine the creation and work of Project Jefferson and describe not only what it was designed to do, but also what important omissions resulted from its design and implementation. As I will describe, the Project’s focus on technical aspects of bioweapons threats and notions of “technological surprise” removed from intelligence consideration a broader array of ways to conceptualize the nature of bioweapons threats and how to organize intelligence to assess these threats. This chapter contributes to the book’s focus on examining taken-for-granted ways of looking at a problem, resulting in critical absences and ignorances that can have significant real-world consequences. This chapter will end by discussing Project Jefferson’s legacy, and how this has important contemporary intelligence and policy implications.
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Notes
Vogel, Kathleen M. 2013. Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 16–158.
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© 2015 Kathleen M. Vogel
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Vogel, K.M. (2015). Project Jefferson: Technological Surprises and Critical Omissions. In: Rappert, B., Balmer, B. (eds) Absence in Science, Security and Policy. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137493736_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137493736_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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