Abstract
Inflation and its dynamics have been always capturing the attention of economic scholars and policymakers worldwide. Numerous theories in economic literature tried to define the concept of inflation by suggesting different sides of the phenomenon—by evoking the cost-push inflation side, the demand-pull, or both sides. Potential determinants of inflation discussed in the literature are diverse (see, e.g., Ben Ali and Ben Mim, 2011). The general consensus is to define inflation by its symptoms, as a persistent rise in the general price level in a given economy.
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© 2016 Mohamed Sami Ben Ali, Etienne Farvaque and Muhammad Azmat Hayat
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Ben Ali, M.S., Farvaque, E., Hayat, M.A. (2016). The Inflation-Central Bank Independence Nexus: Where Do MENA Countries Stand?. In: Ben Ali, M.S. (eds) Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137480668_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137480668_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-55918-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-48066-8
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