Abstract
The notion of a category appears to have suffered a tragic decline. It started life as a basic concept of the grand metaphysical tradition of philosophy. By the heyday of linguistic philosophy it had been reduced to a tool of a purely negative project, namely the critique of certain philosophical doctrines or questions as based on linguistic mistakes. Later even its negative potential was questioned and it became common opinion that no coherent doctrine of categories can be devised. Later still, even these failures and disappointments were almost forgotten and the notion of categories seemed relevant merely to scholars of Aristotle and Kant.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Camp, E. (2004) ‘The Generality Constraint and Categorical Restrictions’, Philosophical Quarterly 54: 210–31.
Conant, J. (2002) ‘The Method of the Tractatus’ in E. Reck (ed.) From Frege to Wittgenstein ( Oxford: Oxford University Press ), pp. 374–470.
Crary, A. and Read, R. (2000) The New Wittgenstein ( London: Routledge).
Diamond, C. (1991) The Realistic Spirit ( Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Diamond, C. (2000) ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ’ in A. Crary and R. Read (eds) The New Wittgenstein ( London: Routledge ), pp. 149–73.
Evans G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference ( New York: Oxford University Press).
Glock, H. J. (1996) A Wittgenstein Dictionary ( Oxford: Blackwell).
Glock, H. J. (1997) ‘Philosophy, Thought and Language’ in J. Preston (ed.) Thought and Language ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ), pp. 151–69.
Glock, H. J. (2003a) Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Glock, H. J. (2003b) ‘The Linguistic Doctrine Revisited’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1): 143–70.
Glock, H. J. (2004) ‘Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?’, Metaphilosophy 35: 419–44.
Glock, H. J. (2006) ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ in J. Shand (ed.) Central Works of Philosophy, Vol. 4 ( Chesham: Acumen ), pp. 71–91.
Glock, H. J. (2008) What is Analytic Philosophy? ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Glock, H. J. (2014) ‘Nonsense Made Intelligible’, forthcoming.
Haack, R. J. (1971) ‘No Need for Nonsense’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 71–7.
Husserl, E. ( 1950 [1913]) Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 3 vols in Husserliana vols III–V ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
Kant, I. ( 1920 [1800]) Immanuel Kants Logik ( Jäsche-Logik): ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen ( Leipzig: Meiner).
Kant, I. ( 1998 [1787]) Kritik der reinen Vernunft ( Hamburg: Meiner).
Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. (1984) The Development of Logic ( Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Magidor, O. (2010) ‘Category Mistakes are Meaningful’, Linguistics and Philosophy 32: 553–81.
Moore, G.E. (1903) Principia Ethica ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Plato (1984) ‘Sophistes’ in W.F. Otto, E. Grassi, and G. Plambäck (eds) Platon: Phaidros, Parmenides, Theaitetos, Sophistes ( Hamburg: Rowohlt ), pp. 183–244.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and Object ( Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Quine, W. V. O. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays ( New York: Columbia University Press).
Quine, W. V. O.( 1980 [1953]) From a Logical Point of View ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
Quine, W. V. O. (1987) Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary ( London: Penguin).
Routley, R. (1969) ‘The Need for Nonsense’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44: 172–209.
Rundle, B. (1979) Grammar in Philosophy ( Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Ryle, G. (1970) ‘Autobiographical’ in O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds) Ryle ( London: Macmillan ), pp. 1–15.
Ryle, G. (1971) Collected Papers: II–Collected Essays ( London: Hutchinson).
Ryle, G. ( 1973 [1954]) Dilemmas ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Ryle, G. ( 1980 [1949]) The Concept of Mind ( London: Penguin).
Schroeder, S. (2004) ‘Why Juliet is the Sun’ in M. Siebel and M. Textor (eds) Semantik und Ontologie ( Frankfurt am Main: Ontos Verlag ), pp. 63–101.
Strawson, P. F. (1959) Individuals ( London: Methuen).
Strawson, P. F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason ( London: Methuen).
Strawson, P. F. ( 1980 [1974]) Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays ( London: Methuen).
Strawson, P. F. (1992) Analysis and Metaphysics ( New York: Oxford University Press).
Trendelenburg, A. (1846) Geschichte der Kategorienlehre ( Berlin: Verlag von G. Bethge).
Waismann, F. (1965) The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy ( London: Macmillan).
Wittgenstein, L. ( 1958 [1953]) Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe ( Oxford: Blackwell).
Wittgenstein, L. ( 1961 [1922]) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe ( Oxford: Blackwell).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2014 Hans-Johann Glock
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Glock, HJ. (2014). Nothing Categorical on Categories. In: Dolby, D. (eds) Ryle on Mind and Language. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137476203_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137476203_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-34817-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-47620-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)