Abstract
The earlier part of 1918 witnessed an interesting interplay between the ideas behind Allied intervention and its relationship to the Bolshevik and the anti-Bolshevik forces then contending for supremacy in Russia. This interplay only made the course of events even more complicated and confused, especially in North Russia. The intensity of the fighting on the Western Front through the spring and summer of 1918 did not alter the national goals of the individual Allies with respect to Russia. In fact, Russia retained its importance to the Allies insofar as what the Eastern Front could do to prevent German reinforcements from being sent to Western Europe. In August 1918 the arrival of Allied military forces in North Russia and Siberia marked the resumption of military action in the east and coincided with a major breakthrough against the German forces on the Western Front. The creation of alternate Russian governments in the North and Trans-Caspia in opposition to the Bolsheviks, as well as Allied control of Vladivostok, encouraged the Entente. Nonetheless, masked national agendas remained paramount. Military needs overrode any Allied good-will statements given to the Whites. As August proceeded into September, it was obvious that the Entente was winning the war. In turn, the sudden success only heightened the tendency of each partner to concentrate on achieving the best possible position when peace came.
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Notes
F. C. Poole to Henry Wilson, letter, Murmansk, 29 June 1918 in The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918–1922, ed. Keith Jeffery (London: The Bodley Head for the Army Records Society, 1985), 46 (hereafter MCHW) and Maynard, 51.
Henry Wilson to F. C. Poole, letter, London, 26 July 1918 in MCHW, 47 and John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 407–8.
Debo, Revolution and Survival, 293, and David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1921), 253.
Leonid I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel: The Story of Allied Intervention and Russian Counter Revolution in North Russia, 1918–1920 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), 7–8.
Joseph Noulens, Mon Ambassade en Russie Soviétique, 1917–1919 Vol. II (Paris: 1933), 180–1, 202.
Markku Ruotsila, Churchill and Finland: A Study in Anticommunism and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2005), 21.
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© 2015 Ian Campbell Douglas Moffat
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Moffat, I.C.D. (2015). Disaster for the Misunderstood — Anti-Bolshevik Support in North Russia, August–November 1918. In: The Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137435736_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137435736_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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