Omissions and Different Senses of Responsibility

Abstract

Can we be morally responsible not only for actions but also for omissions? If we can be morally responsible for decisions to act, surely we can also be responsible for decisions not to act. But can we also be responsible for failing to decide to act? Take as given that we can be responsible for the outcomes of decision and of failing to decide. Can we similarly be responsible for the outcomes of decisions not to act and for the outcomes of failures to decide? Supposing we can, are we ever be responsible for outcomes of failures to decide that we did not foresee? I will argue that we can be morally responsible in all of these various respects, but that countervailing intuitions can be accommodated by noting that our practice involves different senses of responsibility, a number of which don’t involve desert. I contend that the senses that don’t involve desert should predominate in the kinds of circumstances under consideration.