Abstract
The theme of Fichte and transcendental philosophy or even transcendental method is difficult since there is no agreement in the literature about what “transcendental philosophy” means. At present, any claim can be only normative, based on one’s interpretation of the term “transcendental.” What I offer is some preliminary remarks with the modest aim not of disposing of the problem but rather of clarifying some aspects.
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Notes
See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). This edition is cited in the text as B followed by the page number.
See Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
See Paul Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche (London: Routledge, 2009).
G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, 20 vols. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), XX, 387.
See G. E. Moore, “Refutation of Idealism,” Mind, n.s., 12, no. 48 (Oct. 1903), 433–453.
Peter Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966), 97.
See John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), viii.
Henrich, who traces transcendental argumentation to Wittgenstein and Austin, refers especially to Bennett’s and Strawson’s Kant interpretation. See Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 127.
See Kant, AA IV, 458; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62.
See, for example, Adolf Schurr, Philosophie als System bei Eichte, Schelling und Hegel (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1974).
Kant differentiates two models of system: Weltbegriff and Schulbegriff. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B867. Reinhold, who overlooks this distinction, goes back beyond Kant to a view of system presupposed by Chr. Wolff and Lambert, viz., the unity of cognition through an underlying principle or foundation. See, on this point, A. von der Stein, “Der Systembegriff in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung,” in A. Diemer, ed., System and Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Dokumentation (Meisenheim: Hein, 1968), 10ff.;
see also F. Kambartel, “‘System’ und ‘Begründung’ bei und vor Kant,” in Theorie und Begründung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 41ff.
See Martin Bondeli, Das Anfangsproblem bei Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Eine systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Philosophie Reinholds in der Zeit von 1789 bis 1803 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995), 13.
For comparison of Reinhold’s and Kant’s view of philosophy as system, see Wilhelm Teichner, Rekonstruktion oder Reproduktion des Grundes: Die Begründung der Philosophie als Wissenschaft durch Kant and Reinhold (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976).
Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); cited hereafter as SK followed by the page number.
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© 2014 Tom Rockmore
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Rockmore, T. (2014). Is Fichte’s Position Transcendental Philosophy?. In: Rockmore, T., Breazeale, D. (eds) Fichte and Transcendental Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137412232_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137412232_4
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