Abstract
Saul Kripke is a phenomenon, nothing less, and the discipline of Philosophy is much the better for his contribution to it. My own intellectual development has benefited immeasurably from my association with Kripke. I begin with a pair of quotes from another great contemporary philosopher. Woody Allen said, ‘I don’t want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve it through not dying’. Like Allen, Kripke will live on through his work long after most of the rest of us are forgotten.
This chapter incorporates portions of my ‘Trans-World Identification and Stipulation’ (Salmon 1996) and is dedicated to the memory of a remarkable woman, Sandy Shaffer. It was delivered (in part) at the University of San Marino International Center for Semiotic and Cognitive Studies Conference on Saul Kripke’s Contribution to Philosophy, May 1996; and at the University of Haifa Conference on Naming, Necessity, and More, June 1999. I am grateful to those audiences for their reactions, and to Anthony Brueckner and Jill Yeomans for their astute observations.
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Salmon, N. (2014). Personal Identity: What’s the Problem?. In: Berg, J. (eds) Naming, Necessity, and More. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400932_5
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