Abstract
Extreme skepticism aside, it may seem simply obvious that the senses provide us with knowledge of our surroundings. But even granting this, a basic question about the nature of such provision arises: does sense experience merely furnish causal preconditions of knowledge, or does it have, beyond this, some normative status or function, involved with the justification of belief or judgment? Just what I’m asking here needs some explanation. But the issue is worth delving into. It seems central to understanding the epistemic role of consciousness, and to unifying our senses with our intellect, and our bodies with our reason, in a view of ourselves as guided by a grasp of norms.
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© 2015 Charles Siewert
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Siewert, C. (2015). On Getting a Good Look: Normativity and Visual Experience. In: Doyon, M., Breyer, T. (eds) Normativity in Perception. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137377920_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137377920_2
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