Time, Narrative and Causality

Abstract

Historians subordinate ‘generalization to narration’, in John Gaddis’s opinion.¹ ‘The narrative is the form of representation that most historians use’, he continues, before proceeding to challenge the idea ‘that historians don’t generalize: we do this all the time, but we do it by incorporating our generalizations into our narratives rather than the other way around’.² Historical practitioners can qualify one detail by another set of details ‘down to and beyond the level of Napoleon’s fleas’, yet they choose not to, making conscious decisions about the adequacy of their simulation or representation.³ The problem is that Gaddis, like many narrative historians, fails to indicate not only when the procedure of qualification should stop (stating how much detail is required), but also where the act of description should start (justifying an object of study). His reply to the objection that ‘there are a potentially infinite number of links in any causal chain’ — for instance, ‘where did each flea come from’ and how did he or she attach himself or herself to the emperor’s underwear, and then to the emperor?’ - consists simply of the assertion that ‘There are some things we can’t know, there are some things we don’t need to know, and fortunately these categories overlap to a considerable degree’.⁴ From this perspective, generalizations are convenient mechanisms within the narrative form rather than means of answering a question and of explaining why change and continuity occur: ‘We use micro-generalizations to bridge such gaps in the evidence and to move the narrative forward [-] they make it possible to represent reality.