Abstract
Over the past three decades, regulatory agencies have become increasingly important actors in the policy process. While the role of government in the provision of goods and services has been reduced in most established democracies, the number of regulatory activities has increased, which has led scholars to coin such terms as ‘the regulatory state’ (Majone 1994b) and ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur 2005). Yet rather than relying on ministerial departments for the development and implementation of regulatory policies, governments and parliaments have tended to delegate these responsibilities to agencies that operate at arm’s length from ministerial hierarchies and the political process (Gilardi 2005, 2008; Jordana et al. 2011). These independent agencies are not only involved in policymaking at the national level, but they also participate in international policy networks, particularly at the European level (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Maggetti and Gilardi 2011). Hence, they are ‘the main institutional characteristic of the regulatory state’ (Gilardi 2008: p. 21; cf. Levi-Faur and Gilad 2004).
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Notes
In their study of the establishment of regulatory agencies in 48 countries, Jordana and his colleagues find that financial market regulation and competition policy currently are the responsibility of independent agencies in, respectively, 94 and 88 per cent of the countries (2011: p. 1346).
Independent agencies with responsibilities in the area of competition policy are present in all 21 countries on which this study focuses, with some countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom) having two competition authorities. Independent financial market regulators are only present in 19 of the countries. In Ireland, financial market regulation is the responsibility of the central bank. In Denmark, the financial market regulator (Finanstilsynet) is part of the hierarchy of the Ministry of Business and Growth, and is therefore not regarded as an independent agency. Both Australia and Canada have two financial market regulators.
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Koop, C. (2015). Assessing the Mandatory Accountability of Regulatory Agencies. In: Bianculli, A.C., Fernández-i-Marín, X., Jordana, J. (eds) Accountability and Regulatory Governance. Executive Politics and Governance Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137349583_4
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