Some Comparative Conclusions on Regulatory Governance and Accountability

Abstract

Recent decades have witnessed a general trend towards expanding regulations as instruments for governance, in parallel with the establishment of independent agencies responsible for the regulation of economic and social policy areas. Both the reasons for this expansion (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Heritier and Rhodes 2011) and the specific institutional regulatory model thus devised have been the focus of extensive analyses (Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Jordana. 2011). Moreover, a myriad of scholars have also focused attention on the many relevant aspects of such a large and global transformation in the tools of government and the intricacies of governance. Yet, the consequences of these significant governance innovations — including regulatory instruments and institutions — on accountability issues have remained to a large extent under-researched (there are a few exceptions; see, for example, Papadopoulos 2003; Verschuere et al. 2006; Papadopoulos 2010; Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Føllesdal 2011). This seems rather paradoxical as accountability has been portrayed as a relevant property that could contribute significantly to the provision of both wider democratic control and closer supervision by political representatives over these new modes of regulatory governance (Majone 1999). This turns out to be especially crucial given the non-elected character of those responsible in the agencies that operate ‘at arm’s length’ from government and often work under the protection of formal independence rules.