China and Religious Diversity

Abstract

One of the almost paradoxical positions often found in philosophy, sociology, and the historical analysis of religion may be expressed as follows: Since (1) it is impossible to arrive at a generally accepted notion of “religion” and (2) equally impossible to (clearly) distinguish religious from nonreligious beliefs, convictions, motives, and/or actions, (3) reference to and arguments about religion and religiosity should employ general and vague notions of religion and avoid any attempt of isolating religious features. In my opinion, the second and third propositions are wrong and even politically dangerous. The second one is mistaken, since we can easily distinguish between beliefs in superhuman and supernatural beings such as gods, ghosts, and spirits and respective disbeliefs. We can even narrow the discourse by confining it to god-beliefs. This definition would still cover Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and even some Buddhist, so-called Confucian, ¹ and certain versions of Daoist beliefs, ² thus ensuring the relevance of our choice, namely reference to widespread and influential beliefs that are generally regarded as religions. Although the notion of god-beliefs needs further qualification, we would nevertheless employ a clear notion of “religion” or “religious belief” in the debate about “religious violence.” For instance, humans who think that they had to exterminate others because their god orders them to do so would doubtless follow a “religious” motive.