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Sovereign Debt and its Restructuring Framework in the Eurozone

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Managing Risks in the European Periphery Debt Crisis

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Abstract

Debt is a particularly serious macroeconomic problem in the eurozone. Public debt ratios are high by international historical standards, with no immediate prospect of a significant reduction. Private — corporate and household — debt ratios are either flat or rising. Banks remain fragile and impose a contingent liability on the public purse. The most stressed economies have not had the option of renewing economic growth through exchange rate depreciation and a boost to exports. Thus, fiscal austerity has been their principal instrument to achieve debt reduction. But since austerity also hurts growth, the debt-to-GDP ratios have barely budged. Persistent low growth has also created deflationary tendencies, which further raise the challenge of debt reduction.

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  1. Ashoka Mody
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  1. Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK

    George Christodoulakis (Associate Professor of Finance) (Associate Professor of Finance)

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© 2015 Ashoka Mody

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Mody, A. (2015). Sovereign Debt and its Restructuring Framework in the Eurozone. In: Christodoulakis, G. (eds) Managing Risks in the European Periphery Debt Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137304957_10

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