Abstract
My chapter will focus on the interface, interaction, and tensions between the human rights tradition and the Islamic tradition. Both of these traditions—human rights and Islam—make normative demands upon all rational beings, and these demands are articulations of expectations regarding what counts as appropriate or inappropriate conduct in an endless range of contexts and social, economic, and political settings. Both traditions attempt to create normative cultures that define standards of ethics, morality, and even legality. In addition, both traditions make their claims in the name of humanity—in other words, both claim that their normative demands ought to be believed and adopted, ought to earn deference and compliance, and ought to be accepted and acted upon for the good of humanity; both claim that, overall, human beings will prosper and be better off if they accept the legitimacy and the binding nature of the respective traditions. The question that interests me here is whether these two systems of belief are mutually exclusive. I do not intend to hold the response to this question in suspense; the answer is that it entirely depends on the substantive natures of the particular systems of religious and human rights beliefs, that is, on how extensive, expansive, or even intrusive each is.
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Notes
See, for example, C. Fred Alford, Narrative, Nature, and the Natural Law: From Aquinas to International Human Rights (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),
And John Finnis, Human Rights and Common Good: Collected Essays, Volume III (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Carl Wellman, The Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).
Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Death Penalty, Mercy, and Islam: A Call for Retrospection,” in Religion and the Death Penalty: A Call for Reckoning, ed. Erik C. Owens, John D. Carlson, and Eric P. Elshtain (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004).
See Intisar Rabb, “Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: Hudūd Avoidance in Cases of Doubt,” Islamic Law and Society 17 (2010): 63–125. More generally, see her Doubt’s Benefit: Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, 7th–l6th Centuries (unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton 2009).
The term “law” here does not necessarily mean a detailed set of positive commandments; the law means the fundamental and basic Divine directives to human beings that are not subject to the vagaries of time and place. The Covenantal Law is absolute, immutable, eternal, and inherently good (Sharī’a) What is derived from the Covenantal Law is contingent, contextual, revisable, and experimental (fiqh). On the distinction between Sharī‘a and fiqh. see Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 2005), 150–51, 261, 263; Abou El Fadl, “The Islamic Legal Tradition: A Comparative Law Perspective,” in The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law, ed. Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
On humanistic orientations in medieval Islam and on their likely impact on the development of European humanism, see George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990);
Mehdi K. Nakosteen, History of Islamic Origins of Western Education (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1964);
Joel Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival During the Buyid Age (Leiden: Brill, 1986).
See Pauline Westerman, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis (Leiden: Brill, 1998), esp. 231–85. This is a controversy that I am not eager to engage, but would note that the argument that rights theory made sense only after it discounted the divine as an authoritative frame of reference obviously is a normative, and not a historical, claim.
See Elizabeth Bucar and Barbra Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God? (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005); especially the article by Max Stackhouse, “Why Human Rights Needs God: A Christian Perspective,” 25–40.
On the history of the colleges of law in Islamic history and their role, see George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).
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© 2013 Michael Cook, Najam Haider, Intisar Rabb, and Asma Sayeed
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El Fadl, K.A. (2013). Cultivating Human Rights: Islamic Law and the Humanist Imperative. In: Cook, M., Haider, N., Rabb, I., Sayeed, A. (eds) Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought. Palgrave Series in Islamic Theology, Law, and History. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137078957_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137078957_9
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