Abstract
Over a long span of time, US aggregate risk has decreased while the risk for US nonfinancial corporations (or firms) has increased substantially.1 This general finding has been observed using sales (Comin and Mulani, 2006), stock returns (Campbell et al., 2001) and cash flows (Irvine and Pontiff, 2009) in addition to earnings,2 employment and capital investment (Comin and Philippon, 2005).
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© 2013 Craig O. Brown
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Brown, C.O. (2013). The Cash-Flow Risk of Corporate Market Investments. In: Batten, J.A., MacKay, P., Wagner, N. (eds) Advances in Financial Risk Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025098_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025098_2
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