Keywords

JEL Classifications

Biographical

Hutcheson was born on 8 August 1694. His father, John, was a Presbyterian minister in Armagh, Ireland, and Francis spent his early years at nearby Ballyrea. In 1702 Francis and his elder brother, Hans, went to live with their grandfather, Alexander Hutcheson, at Drumalig in order to further their schooling. At the age of 14 Francis moved to a small denominational academy at Killyleagh, County Down.

In 1711 Hutcheson matriculated at Glasgow University, where he was particularly influenced by Robert Simson (mathematics), Gerschom Carmichael (moral philosophy), Alexander Dunlop (Greek) and John Simpson (the ‘heretical divine’). Hutcheson graduated in 1713 and embarked upon a course of study in theology under Simpson’s guidance.

Hutcheson was back in Ireland in 1719 when he was licensed as a probationary minister but moved to Dublin where he established an academy of which he remained head until 1730. His reputation established, Hutcheson was elected to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, succeeding Carmichael. It was as a lecturer that he made his mark, brilliant and stylish, using English rather than Latin. Hutcheson’s career as author and teacher amply confirms Adam Smith’s famous reference to the ‘abilities and virtues of the never-to-be-forgotten’ master.

Hutcheson lectured five days a week on natural religion, morals, jurisprudence, and government – an order which was to be followed by Adam Smith on his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1752. On three days he lectured on classical theories of morality, thus contributing (with Dunlop) to a revival of classical learning in Glasgow, which formed an important channel for stoic philosophy; a philosophy which was to have an important influence on Adam Smith. Hutcheson died on 8 August 1746 (his birthday) and was buried in St Mary’s churchyard in Dublin.

Social Order

Although this article is concerned primarily with Hutcheson’s economic analysis it will be convenient to say a little regarding his ethical work.

Adam Smith identified two key questions which the moral philosopher must confront. First, wherein does virtue consist, and, secondly:

how and by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenor, of conduct to another, denominates the one right and the other wrong; considers the one as the object of approbation, honour and reward, and the other of blame, censure and punishment. (TMS, VII, i.2)

Hutcheson addressed both questions, identifying virtue with benevolence while explaining the processes of judgement in terms of a particular sense, the ‘moral sense’. Smith was to reject Hutcheson’s answer to the first question on the ground that while important, the emphasis on benevolence neglected the role of self- command and the ‘inferior’ virtue of prudence. In the same way, while welcoming his master’s emphasis on sentiment rather than reason in explaining the means by which the mind forms judgements concerning what is fit and proper to be done or to be avoided, Smith rejected the notion of a special (internal) sense, the moral sense.

The common element evident in the work of Hutcheson, Hume and Smith is the emphasis on sentiment. But they also share another preoccupation, namely the attempt to explain the origins of social order; a crucially important element in the treatment, inter alia, of economic phenomena. The basic task was to explain how it was that a creature endowed with both self- and other-regarding propensities was fitted for the social state.

When we turn to Hutcheson it is to discover marked similarities with the work of his successor, especially in the context of his belief that ‘We may see in our species, from the vary cradle, a constant propensity to action and motion’ (System, I, p. 21). But in some respects the position is subtler than that stated by Smith. To begin with, Hutcheson argued that man has powers of perception which ‘introduce into the mind all the materials of knowledge’ and which are associated with ‘acts of the understanding’ (System, I, p. 7). Acts of the understanding assist in the isolation of objects to be attained (for example, sources of pleasure) or to be avoided, and culminate in acts of will.

Acts of will, which may be calm or turbulent, were divided in turn into the selfish or the benevolent. Benevolent acts of will which may be described as calm, tend towards the ‘universal happiness of others’ while the turbulent include ‘pity, condolence, congratulation, gratitude’.

Acts of will which are selfish but calm include ‘an invariable constant impulse towards one’s own perfection and happiness of the highest kind’ (System, I, p. 9) and do not rule out ‘deliberate purposes of injury’ (System, I, p. 73). The turbulent and selfish embrace ‘hunger, thirst, lust, passions for sensual pleasure, wealth, power or fame’ (System, I, pp. 11–12).

In Hutcheson’s case, the problem is that of attaining degree of balance between the turbulent and the calm, the selfish and the benevolent:

the general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many social, kind, innocent actions, and of many selfish, angry, sensual ones; as one or other of our natural dispositions happens to be raised, and to be prevalent over others. (System, I, p. 37)

While Smith was correct in identifying Hutcheson with that school of thought which found virtue to consist in benevolence, there is equally no doubt that he (Hutcheson) gave a prominent place to self-love:

Our reason can indeed discover certain bounds, within which we may not only act from self-love consistently with the good of the whole; but every mortal’s acting thus within these bounds for his own good, is absolutely necessary for the good of the whole; and the want of self-love would be universally pernicious … But when self-love breaks over the bounds above mentioned, and leads us into actions detrimental to others, and to the whole; or makes us insensible of the generous kind affections; then it appears vicious, and is disapproved. (1725, III.v)

As in the case of Smith, what is critically important is man’s desire to be approved of:

an high pleasure is felt upon our gaining the approbation and esteem of others for our good actions, and upon their expressing their sentiments of gratitude; and on the other hand, we are cut to the very heart by censure, condemnation, and reproach. (System, I, p. 25)

On Hutcheson’s argument an important source of control is represented by a capacity for judgement, including moral judgement, which is linked to man’s deployment of internal senses such as the ‘sympathetic’ which differ from external senses such as sight, sound, or taste, and ‘by which, when we apprehend the state of others, our hearts naturally have a fellow-feeling with them’ (System, I, p. 19).

It was Hutcheson’s contention that men were inclined to, and fitted for, society: ‘their curiosity, communicativeness, desire of action, their sense of honour, their compassion, benevolence, gaiety and the moral faculty, could have little or no exercise in solitude’ (System, I, p. 34).

This discussion was to lead to Hutcheson’s treatment of natural rights and of the state of nature in a manner which is reminiscent of Locke. He also advances the Lockian claim that the state of nature is a state not of war but of inconvenience which can only be resolved by the establishment of government in terms of a complex double contract.

This has been described as the ‘Real Whig position’ (Winch 1978, p. 46; Robbins 1968) and may explain the considerable influence of Hutcheson’s political ideas in the American colonies (Norton 1976). Hutcheson’s ‘warm love of liberty’ was attested by Principal Leechman in his introduction to the System (I, pp. xxxv–xxxvi); a sentiment which was echoed by Hugh Blair (Winch 1978, pp. 47–8) in a contemporary review of the book.

While agreeing that an essential precondition of social stability is some system of ‘magistracy’ (TMS, VII.iv.36), Adam Smith (like Hume) was to emerge as a critic of the contract theory. In addition, he criticized Hutcheson for seeming to imply that self-love was ‘a principle which could never be virtuous in any degree or in any direction’ (TMS, VII.ii.3.12). But for the economist it is important to note that Hutcheson distinguished often more clearly than did Smith between approval and moral approbation. As Hutcheson put it:

A penetrating genius, capacity for business, patience of application and labour … are naturally admirable and relished by all observers, but with quite a different feeling from moral approbation. (System, I, p. 28)

Whatever the differences of emphasis and of analysis which are disclosed in the writings of Hutcheson and Smith, the arguments reviewed in this section are or should be important to the economist for three reasons. First, it appears that social order as a basic precondition for economic activity depends in part upon a capacity for moral judgement. Secondly, it is alleged that the psychological drives which explain economic activity must be seen in a context wider than the economic.

Finally, the argument suggests that all forms of activity are subject to the scrutiny of our fellows.

Economic Analysis

There are five major topics covered in Hutcheson’s System, which is generally assumed to follow closely the content of his lecture course as a whole. The economic analysis is not given in the form of a single coherent discourse, but rather woven in the broader treatment of jurisprudence. Perhaps for this reason Hutcheson’s work did not attract a great deal of attention from early historians of economic thought. But the situation was transformed as a result of Edwin Cannan’s discovery of Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence. Cannan recalled that:

On April 21, 1895, Mr Charles C Maconochie, Advocate, whom I then met for the first time, happened to be present when, in course of conversation with the literary editor of the Oxford Magazine, I had occasion to make some comment about Adam Smith. Mr Maconochie immediately said that he possessed a manuscript report of Adam Smith’s lectures on jurisprudence, which he regarded as of considerable interest. (1896, p. xv)

While Cannan’s reaction may be imagined, the lectures had the effect of confirming Hutcheson’s influence upon his pupil on a broad front, but especially in the area or economic analysis (as distinct from policy). For what Cannan discovered was that the order of a large part of Smith’s course and its content corresponded closely with what Hutcheson was believed to have taught. It is this correspondence which served to renew interest in Hutcheson’s economics with remarkable speed. Quite apart from Cannan’s introduction to the Lectures, the same theme is elaborated in his introduction to the Wealth of Nations (1904). The link had also been noted, following the publication of the Lectures, in the Palgrave Dictionary of Political Economy (1896) and received its most elaborate statement in W.R. Scott’s Francis Hutcheson (1900). The most modern treatment of this kind is to be found in W.L. Taylor’s influential work Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of Adam Smith (1965).

But Cannan noted something else, namely that it may be that the ‘germ of the Wealth of Nations’ is to be found in Hutcheson’s treatment of value (1896, p. xxvi). It is this topic which forms the central feature of the remainder of the present argument although it will be convenient to begin with Hutcheson’s views on the division of labour where his influence on Smith may be particularly obvious.

But before we pass on to these subjects, it should be noted that Hutcheson’s work on economic topics has its own history. It is evident that he admired the work of his immediate predecessor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy – Gershom Carmichael (1672–1729), and especially his translation of, and commentary on, Samuel Pufendorf. In Hutcheson’s address to the ‘students in Universities’ (Taylor 1965, p. 25) the Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1742) is described thus:

The learned will at once discern how much of this compound is taken from the writing of others, from Cicero and Aristotle, and to name no other moderns, from Pufendorf’s smaller work, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem which that worthy and ingenious man the late Professor Gerschom Carmichael of Glasgow, by far the best commentator on that book has so supplied and corrected that the notes are of much more value than the text.

Carmichael’s influence as a student of ethics and of jurisprudence has been frequently celebrated, notably by Sir William Hamilton who stated that he may be regarded ‘on good grounds, as the true founder of the Scottish school of philosophy’ (Taylor 1965, p. 253). But it is to W.L. Taylor that we are indebted for the reminder that Carmichael (and Pufendorf) may have shaped Hutcheson’s economic ideas. Taylor concluded that:

The interesting point for the development of economic thought in all this is the very close parallelism between Pufendorf’s De Officio and Hutcheson’s Introduction to Moral Philosophy. Each man covered almost exactly the same field … The inescapable conclusion is that Francis Hutcheson took over almost in whole, from Carmichael, the economic ideas of Pufendorf. (1965, pp. 28–2)

The Division of Labour

A key issue for both Hutcheson and Pufendorf arose from the comparison of the social as distinct from the solitary state; or, as Pufendorf put it,

it would seem to have been more wretched than that of any wild beast, if we take into account with what weakness man goes forth into this world, to perish at once, but for the help of others; and how rude a life each would lead, if he had nothing more than what he owed to his own strength and ingenuity. On the contrary, it is altogether due to the aid of other men, that out of such feebleness, we have been able to grow up, that we now enjoy untold comforts, and that we improve mind and body for our own advantage and that of others. And in this sense of natural state is opposed to a life improved by the industry of men. (De Officio 1682, II, pp. 8–9)

This broad line of argument was developed in the System (II, p. 4) where Hutcheson offered two specific economic applications. First, he noted that the ‘joint labours of twenty men will cultivate forests, or drain marshes, for farms to each one, and provide houses for habitation, and enclosures for their stocks, much sooner than the separate labours of the same number’ (System, II, p. 289).

Secondly, Hutcheson drew attention to the importance of the division of labour:

Nay ‘tis well known that the produce of the labours of any given number, twenty, for instance, in providing the necessaries or conveniences of life, shall be much greater by assigning to one, a certain sort of work of one kind, in which we will soon acquire skill and dexterity, and to another assigning work of a different kind, than if each one of the twenty were obliged to employ himself, by turns in all the different sorts of labour requisite for his subsistence, without sufficient dexterity in any. In the former method each procures a great quantity of goods of one kind, and can exchange a part of it for such goods obtained by the labours of others as he shall stand in need of. One grows expert in tillage, another in pasture and breeding cattle, a third in masonry, a fourth in the chace, a fifth in iron-works, a sixth in the arts of the loom, and so on throughout the rest. Thus all are supplied by means of barter with the works of complete artists. In the other method scarce any one could be dextrous and skilful in any one sort of labour. (System, II, pp. 288–9)

Property

The discussion of the division of labour implied that members of society are interdependent in respect of the satisfaction of their wants. It also led to two further analytical developments: security of property and the problem of value in exchange (see especially Brown 1987).

Much of the discussion in Book 2, Chapter 6 of the System is concerned with ‘the right of property’. But Hutcheson also noted that:

If we extend our views further and consider what the common interest of society may require, we shall find the right of property further confirmed. Universal industry is plainly necessary for the support of mankind. Tho’ men are naturally active, yet their activity would rather turn toward the lighter and pleasanter exercises, than the slow, constant, and intense labours requisite to procure the necessaries and conveniences of life, unless strong motives are presented to engage them to these severer labours. Whatever institution therefore shall be found necessary to promote universal diligence and patience, and make labour agreeable or eligible to mankind, must also tend to the public good; and institutions or practices which discourage industry must be pernicious to mankind. Now nothing can so effectually excite men to constant patience and diligence in all sorts of useful industry, as the hopes of future wealth, ease, and pleasure to themselves, their offspring, and all who are dear to them, and of some honour too to themselves on account of their ingenuity, and activity, and liberality. All these hopes are presented to men by securing to every one the fruits of his own labours, that he may enjoy them, and dispose of them as he pleases.

Nay the most extensive affections could scarce engage a wise man to industry, if no property ensued upon it. (System, II, pp. 320–1)

Hutcheson attached a great deal of importance to freedom of choice and in fact concluded this phase of the argument by rejecting any suggestion that ‘magistrates’ may be involved, passages that may well have attracted the attention of the youthful Smith (System, II, pp. 322–3).

The Theory of Value

It is Hutcheson’s treatment of value that shows most clearly the influence of Pufendorf and of Carmichael where the latter observed that:

In general we may say that the value of goods depends upon these two elements, their scarcity, and the difficulty of acquiring them. Furthermore, scarcity is to be regarded as combining two elements, the number of those demanding, and the usefulness thought to adhere in the good or service, and which can add to the utility of human life. (Quoted in Taylor 1965, p. 65)

Pufendorf’s analysis received its most elaborate statement in the De Jure, in the long chapter ‘On Price’ (Book 5, Chapter 1). The most succinct statement, on which Carmichael commented, is to be found in Book 1, Chapter 14, of De Officio.

Hutcheson opened his analysis of the problem by pointing out that the ‘natural ground of all value or price is some sort of use which goods afford in life’, adding that ‘by the use causing a demand we mean not only a natural subserviency to our support, or to some natural pleasure, but any tendency to give any satisfaction by prevailing custom or fancy, as a matter of ornament or distinction’ (System, II, pp. 53–4). He continued:

But when some aptitude to human use is presupposed, we shall find that the prices of goods depend on these two jointly, the demand on account of some use or other which many desire, and the difficulty of acquiring, or cultivating for human use. When goods are equal in these respects men are willing to interchange them with each other; nor can any artifice or policy make the values of goods depend on any thing else. When there is no demand, there is no price, where the difficulty of acquiring never so great: and where there is no difficulty or labour requisite to acquire, the most universal demand will not cause a price; as we see in fresh water in these climates. Where the demand for two sorts of goods is equal, the prices are as the difficulty. Where the difficulty is equal, the prices are as the demand. (System, II, p. 54)

Hutcheson then added two points which are reminiscent of Pufendorf in commenting on issues that affect supply price and the rate of exchange. First, he argued:

In like manner by difficulty of acquiring, we do not only mean great labour or toil, but all other circumstances which prevent a great plenty of the goods or performances demanded. Thus the price is increased by the rarity or scarcity of the materials in nature, or such accidents as prevent plentiful crops or certain fruits of the earth; and the great ingenuity and nice taste requisite in the artists to finish well some works of art, as men of such genius are rare. The value is also raised, by the dignity of station in which, according to the custom of the country, the men must live or provide us with certain goods, or works of art. Fewer can be supported in such stations than in the meaner; and the dignity and expense of their stations must be supported by the higher prices of their goods or services. Some other singular considerations may exceedingly heighten the values of goods to some men, which will not affect their estimation with others. These above mentioned are the chief which obtain in commerce. (System, II, pp. 54–5)

As regards the rate of exchange, Hutcheson commented:

In commerce it must often happen that one may need such goods of mine as yield a great and lasting use in life, and have cost a long course of labour to acquire an cultivate, while yet he has none of those goods I want in exchange, or not sufficient quantities; or what goods of his I want, may be such as yield but a small use, and are procurable by little labour. In such cases it cannot be expected that I should exchange with him. I must search for others who have the goods I want, and such quantities of them as are equivalent in use to my goods, and require as much labour to produce them; and the goods on both sides must be brought to some estimation or value. (System, II, p. 53)

But although these positions do not differ significantly from those of Pufendorf, Hutcheson does seem to have taken notice of two additional points. First, he seems to suggest, as the above quotation indicates, that goods will exchange at a rate that will be in part determined by the quantity of labour embodied in them (a point later taken up by Smith). Secondly, he noted in a passage that may have been ‘foreshadowed’ by Pufendorf, that some commodities: ‘of great use have no price, either because they are naturally destined for community, or cannot come into commerce but as appendages of something else, the price of which may be increased by them, though they cannot be separately estimated’ (Hutcheson 1742b; quoted in Taylor 1965, p. 66).

Money

The discussion of value in exchange led Hutcheson on quite logically to consider the medium of exchange, namely money, and here too he followed an old tradition which had already been commented upon by Pufendorf. In Book I, Chapter 14 of De Officio he noted the inconvenience of exchange by barter:

But after men departed from their primitive simplicity and various kinds of gain were introduced, it was readily understood that common value alone was not sufficient for the transactions of men’s affairs and their increased dealings.

Once more, Hutcheson followed suit in explaining the problems of barter and the need to establish a standard or ‘common measure’ when settling the ‘values or goods for commerce’.

The qualities requisite to the most perfect standard are these: it must be something generally desired so that men are generally willing to take it in exchange. The very making of any goods the standard will of itself give them this quality. It must be portable; which will often be the case if it is rare, so that small quantities are of great value. It must be divisible without loss into small parts, so as to be suited to the values of all sorts of goods: and it must be durable, not easily wearing by use, or perishing in its nature. One or other of these prerequisites in the standard, shews the inconvenience of many of our commonest goods for that purpose. The man who wants a small quantity of my corn will not give me a work-beast for it, and his beast does not admit division. I want perhaps a pair of shoes, but my ox is of far greater value, and the other may not need him. I must travel to distant lands, my grain cannot be carried along for my support, without insufferable expense, and my wine would perish in the carriage. ‘Tis plain therefore that when men found any use for the rarer metals, silver and gold, in ornaments and utensils, and thus a demand was raised for them, they would soon also see that they were the fittest standards of commerce, on all the accounts above-mentioned. (System, II, pp. 55–6)

The familiar arguments concerning the need for coinage and the dangers of debasement follow (System, II, ch. 12), while there is also a hint of the need to find an invariable measure of value at least over long periods of time.

We say indeed commonly, that the rates of labour and goods have risen since these metals grew plenty; and that the rates of labour and goods were low when the metals were scarce; conceiving the value of the metals as invariable, because the legal names of the pieces, the pounds, shillings, or pence, continue to them always the same till a law alters them. But a days digging or ploughing was as uneasy to a man a thousand years ago as it is now, tho’ he could not then get so much silver for it: and a barrel of wheat, or beef, was then of the same use to support the human body, as it is now when it is exchanged for four times as much silver. Properly, the value of labour, grain, and cattle, are always pretty much the same, as they afford the same uses of life, where no new inventions of tillage, or pasturage, cause a greater quantity in proportion to the demand. ‘Tis the metal chiefly that has undergone the great change of value, since these metals have been in greater plenty, the value of the coin is altered tho’ it keeps the old names. (System, II, p. 58)

The analytical section of the work is concluded in the following chapter where Hutcheson demonstrated the need for interest, since if it were prohibited ‘none would lend’ (System, II, p. 72). He argued that the rate would be determined ‘by the state of trade and the quantity of coin, recognizing that ‘as men can be supported by smaller gains upon proportion upon their large stocks, the profit made upon any given sum employed is smaller, and the interest the trader can afford must be less’ (System, II, p. 72). Hutcheson was well aware of the relationship between interest and other forms of return, such as rent, and also introduced an allowance for risk. In sum, an interesting and often sophisticated analysis, taken as whole, which is likely to have made an impression of the youthful Smith.

Conclusion

This article has pursued a number of themes. First, it endeavours to establish a link between Hutcheson and Pufendorf. Secondly, the argument has elaborated on the parallel between Hutcheson’s order of argument and that developed by Adam Smith as suggested by W.R. Scott (1900, 1932), Cannan (1896, 1904) and W.L. Taylor (1965). While these parallels are important, it is noteworthy that Smith’s treatment of economic topics is worked out as a single discourse, while Hutcheson’s treatment is woven into the broader fabric of his analysis of jurisprudence. Finally, the argument has sought to give prominence to the role of subjective judgement as regards the determinants of value in exchange.

Edwin Cannan, as we have seen, considered that Hutcheson’s emphasis on the utility of goods to be acquired and on the effort (disutility) involved in creating the goods to be exchanged, with the attendant emphasis on demand and supply considerations, provided the ‘kernel’ of the Wealth of Nations. Taylor, on the other hand, suggested that Smith’s concern with material welfare served to obscure the line of argument set out by Hutcheson. Robertson and Taylor concluded that:

It is evident that the magnum opus was cast in a mould of a powerful unifying conception. Now within this framework it is evident that the measurement, in real terms, of the wealth of nations, and in particular of its progress would seem to call for some unvarying standard of value which would enable valid comparisons to be made through time ... for this reason, if for no other, it does not appear inexplicable that Adam Smith no longer paid so much attention to the lines of argument taken over from Hutcheson, which had served well enough in the Lectures. (1957, pp. 194–5)

What Robertson and Taylor did not note was that Smith’s preoccupation with a real measure of value may also have owed much to Hutcheson (Skinner 1996, 148–50).

Selected Works

  • All citations of System in the text refer to A System of Moral Philosophy (1755). Hutcheson’s Collected Works are published by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1969.

  • 1725. Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue. London, 2nd edn, 1726.

  • 1725–26. Reflections upon laughter and remarks on the fable of the bees. Dublin Journal No. 11 (5 June 1725); No. 12 (12 June); No.13 (19 June). Also in Hibernicus, Letters (1729).

  • 1728a. Essay on the nature and causes of the passions, with illustrations upon the moral sense. London and Dublin.

  • 1728b. Letters between the late Mr. G. Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson. London Journal.

  • 1742a. The meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Newly translated from the Greek, with notes and an account of his life. Glasgow.

  • 1742b. A short introduction to moral philosophy in three books, containing the elements of ethics and the law of nature. Glasgow.

  • 1755. A system of moral philosophy in three books. Published from the original Ms. by his son. Francis Hutcheson MD to which is prefaced Some account of the life, writings and character of the author. By the Reverend William Leechman, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the same University. Glasgow.