Abstract
Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of the theory, conducted laboratory experiments (another field of study to which Roth made crucial contributions) and designed mechanisms in practice.
This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online edition, 2013. Edited by Palgrave Macmillan
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Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2005a. The New York City high school match. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 95: 364–367.
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Abdulkadirog lu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review 99: 1954–1978.
Ashlagi, I., and A. Roth. 2011. New challenges in multihospital kidney exchange. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 102: 354–359.
Ashlagi, I., and A. Roth. 2012. Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. Cambridge, MA: Mimeo.
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Dubins, L.E., and D.A. Freedman. 1981. Machiavelli and the Gale–Shapley algorithm. American Mathematical Monthly 88: 484–494.
Erev, I., and A. Roth. 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review 88: 848–881.
Gale, D., and L. Shapley. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69: 9–15.
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Jevons, W. 1876. Money and the mechanism of exchange. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
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Kagel, J. and A. Roth. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 201–235.
Kojima, F., and P. Pathak. 2009. Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets. American Economic Review 99: 608–627.
Kojima, F., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Matching with couples. Cambridge, MA: Mimeo.
Roth, A. 1979. Axiomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems #170. New York: Springer.
Roth, A. 1982a. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 9: 12–132.
Roth, A. 1982b. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7: 617–628.
Roth, A. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92: 991–1016.
Roth, A. 1991. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81: 415–440.
Roth, A. 2003. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70: 1341–1378.
Roth, A. 2008a. What have we learned from market design? Hahn Lecture. Economic Journal, 118: 285–310.
Roth, A. 2008b. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. International Journal of Game Theory (Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85th birthday), 36: 537–569.
Roth, A. 2013. Intellectual autobiography. Prepared by the Laureate to be posted at Nobel Organization’s website: http://www.nobelprize.org/
Roth, A. and I. Erev. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164–212.
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Roth, A., and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189–198.
Roth, A., and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89: 748–780.
Roth, A., and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137.
Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric society monographs No. 18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81: 1068–1095.
Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 457–488.
Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2005a. Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic Theory 125: 151–188.
Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2005b. Kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 95: 376–380.
Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2007. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review 97: 828–851.
Shapley, L., and H. Scarf. 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 23–37.
Slonin, R. and A. Roth. 1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak republic. Econometrica 66: 569–596.
Major Publications
Roth, A., and A. Postlewaite. 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137.
Roth, A. and J.K. Murnighan. 1978. Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189–198.
Roth, A. 1979. Axiomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems #170. New York: Springer.
Roth, A. and M.K. Malouf. 1979. Game theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Psychological Review 86: 574–594.
Roth, A. 1982. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 9: 12–132.
Roth, A. 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7: 617–628.
Roth, A. 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92: 991–1016.
Roth, A. 1985. The college admission problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 277–288.
Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric society monographs No. 18. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Roth, A. 1991. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81: 415–440.
Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81: 1068–1095.
Kagel, J., and A. Roth (eds.). 1995. The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Roth, A., and Erev, I. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior 8: 164–212.
Erev,I. and A. Roth. 1998. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review 88: 848–881.
Slonin, R., and A. Roth. 1998. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak republic. Econometrica 66: 569–596.
Roth, A. and E. Peranson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89: 748–780.
Kagel, J. and A. Roth. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 201–235.
Roth, A., and A. Ockenfels. 2002. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet. American Economic Review 92: 1093–1103.
Roth, A. 2003. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70: 1341–1378.
Roth, A., T. Sönmez, and U. Ünver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 457–488.
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth. 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review 99: 1954–1978.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Al Roth and Fanqi Shi for helpful comments.
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Kojima, F. (2013). Roth, Alvin (Born 1951). In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2873-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2873-1
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