Abstract
In the experimental and theoretical literature on social heuristics, the case has been made for dual-process cooperation. Empirical evidence is thought to be consistent with the idea that people tend to be nice before thinking twice. A recent theoretical paper moreover suggests that this is also the type of dual process one would expect from evolution. In ‘Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation’ by Bear and Rand1, natural selection never favours agents who use deliberation to override the impulse to defect, while deliberation can be favoured if it serves to undermine cooperation in interactions without future repercussions. Here we show that this conclusion depends on a seemingly innocuous assumption about the distribution of the costs of deliberation, and that with different distributions, dual-process defectors can also evolve. Dual-process defectors intuitively defect, but use deliberation to switch to cooperation when it is in their self-interest to do so (that is, when future repercussions exist). The more general model also shows that there is a variety of strategies that combine intuition and deliberation with Bayesian learning and strategic ignorance. Our results thereby unify and generalize findings from different, seemingly unrelated parts of the literature.
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Acknowledgements
This paper benefited from the suggestions of audiences at the Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Symposium (Universiteit van Amsterdam), at the Gummersbacher Kolloquium (Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf) and at the UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications (Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, Lisbon). We thank A. Bear and D. Rand for comments. Financial support of the Research Priority Area Behavioral Economics of the University of Amsterdam is gratefully acknowledged. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
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S.J. and M.v.V. designed research, performed research and wrote the paper.
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Jagau, S., van Veelen, M. A general evolutionary framework for the role of intuition and deliberation in cooperation. Nat Hum Behav 1, 0152 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0152
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0152
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