Aristotelian Virtuous Leadership: between Calculative Bureaucracy and Emotional Tyranny

Abstract

This paper argues for an Aristotelian account of good leader as ethical and effective by outlining the ethical motivation and the constraints that moral luck imposes on effectiveness. This account of a good leader, which is grounded on practical wisdom, is assessed against the contemporary leadership debate by addressing the tension between the ethical and the effective and by contrasting the Aristotelian virtuous leader against the dominant contemporary types of leadership. My Aristotelian proposal of a virtuous leader relies on an isomorphic relation between the ethical and political domains by proposing that as virtue is to vices rooted in calculation and desires, so the virtuous leader is to the calculative bureaucrat and the emotionally obsessed tyrant.

For the last couple of decades, Joanne B. Ciulla has set the ground for the normative evaluation of leadership by proposing a definition of the good leader as the ethical and effective.¹ Since she often alludes to Aristotle as an ancestor to her proposal, this paper examines the details of this affinity by assessing the ethical component with reference to Aristotle’s virtue ethics and by evaluating the effectiveness component with reference to the Aristotelian moral luck. Eventually, I revise Ciulla’s proposal with an eye to practical wisdom and juxtapose virtuous leaders to calculative bureaucrats and emotional tyrants.

The first half of the paper reconstructs the Aristotelian account. ‘The Honorific Leader’ derives a virtuous conception of the good leader in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) by focusing on the virtue as a mean (NE II.6) and the role of ethical practical wisdom (NE VI.5–6, 13). By shifting to Politics (Pol.), ‘The Co-deliberative Leader’ outlines the socio-political ability of a leader to motivate and engage others in co-operation by studying political practical wisdom (Pol. III.4) as it is exemplified in co-deliberation and co-operation (Pol. III.11).

The second half of the paper engages the Aristotelian good leader with contemporary challenges. ‘Conjunction of Ethical and Effective’, by discussing different approaches to virtue ethics, highlights the importance of the action, rather than its results, and reveals the constraints that moral luck imposes on effectiveness. ‘The Aristotelian Criterion’ examines various contemporary accounts of leadership against the proposed Aristotelian account, according to which as virtue is to the vices rooted in either calculation or irrational desires, so the good leader is to the bureaucrat or the tyrant.

The Honorific Leader

Bonitz (1870: 313) documents that Aristotle does not use the Greek verb for ‘to lead’ (hêgeisthai) in ethical or political context, while the terms for ‘leader’ (hêgetês/hêgêtôr) or ‘leadership’ (hêgesia) are absent from the Corpus Aristotelicum.² Still, the absence of the term for leadership does not entail the lack of the concept, since Aristotle often alludes to it honorifically to set the normative paradigm in his ethical works³ and he appeals to it to legitimise authority in his political treatises. Since Aristotle argues that practical and political wisdom are tokens of the same character dispositions, I propose an account of the good leader that unites the virtue based on ethical practical wisdom on the private domain (cf. ‘The Honorific Leader’) with the co-deliberation based on political practical wisdom of the public domain (cf. ‘The Co-deliberative Leader’).

Starting with the honorific conception of virtuous leadership, the highest manifestation of the ethical character, most are familiar with Aristotle’s celebrated definition of ethical virtue:

Virtue is a character disposition concerned with choice, which is a mean relative to us, that is determined rationally according to how a person of practical wisdom would have determined it. (NE II.6 1106^b36-1107^a2)⁴

This definition reveals three layers of analysis of the virtuous character⁵: the characteristics of the virtuous action which is situationally based on the virtuous mean and is determined by practical wisdom.

Virtuous Action

Virtuous leaders, qua virtuous agents, are ethically accountable for their choices since other unpredictable variables beyond their control may influence the outcome of their actions. The Aristotelian action starts from the point of choosing it,⁶ while choice distinguishes between the authentic virtuous acting and coincidental acts that appear to be virtuous or are the result of non-virtuous motivation (cf. footnote 24). NE II.4 (1105^a28–33) determines three essential characteristics of the virtuous action: intentionality (i.e. it is an informed, rather than coincidental, decision), intrinsicality (i.e. it is chosen for its own sake), and stability (i.e. it is the result of a firm disposition).

Intentional Action

Instead of praising people for choosing a course of action that coincidentally had positive results, we feel more confident in praising them when they deliberate firmly. Even when on some occasions bad luck distorts their intended goals, we feel sympathy for their hard work and confidence that their thorough decision-making process will eventually prevail. Similarly, we are disaffected with leaders who do things that happen to be effective; rather, we expect them to be effective in virtue of their intended choices. The latter is an ethical evaluation that focuses on the normative goodness of our leaders, while the former is fitting of a historical assessment of accidental chains of events that Poetics 9 (1451^b5–7) vindicates for relying on coincidental particulars, rather than certain universals.⁷ Additionally, we should be reluctant to evaluate ethically our leaders based on the perception of their followers or the future historian, rather than their genuine intentions.⁸

Intrinsic Action

Similarly, we expect our ethical decisions to be the outcome of our virtuous character (rather than their virtuousness, as ‘Virtuousness is not Virtue’ shows) which is a constituent of happiness, the summum bonum of our actions (NE I.1–2). Since the Aristotelian happiness is a eudaimonistic state of affairs, rather than a hedonistic state of the mind, the virtuous agent’s practical wisdom perceives how the virtuous character-traits come together and manifests the good life as the virtuous mean between reason and desire. Since Aristotle identifies the human good with the common happiness, leaders have both ethical and political reasons to pursue it.⁹

Stable Action

Virtue, as a solid disposition of the soul, gives rise to stable actions, so we expect our leaders to share such a firm commitment to their choices. Surely, they could have flexibility on deciding between the paths, but they should remain devoted to the final goal without being distracted by tempting alternatives.¹⁰ But even when they face a dilemma, our virtuous leaders are determined in their choice, regardless of their remorse for ignoring some other ethically relevant variables.¹¹

The Mean Relative to Us

The doctrine of the mean is arguably the most recognisable (but often misunderstood) constituent of the Aristotelian definition of virtue. Regardless of the interpretative debate about the details of the doctrine, we are safe to assume that the mean is the intermediate between opposite types of motivation and, consequently, the intermediate between the alternative paths of action that the agent must choose from in the specific situation.¹²

The Aristotelian mean is not about moderation (as Kant interprets it¹³), but a natural disposition of the virtuous person to act, which permits in some situations to be even passionate about our choice. Similarly, the Aristotelian mean cannot be associated with the unconditional surrender to our passions (as Hume understands human nature), since reason influences our ethical choice significantly. In each specific situation the virtuous agents are

[…] affected when they should, with the things they should, in relation to the people they should, for the sake of things they should, and [generally being] as they should, since this is the mean and the best, which is peculiar of virtue. (NE II.6 1106^b21-23)

The situationism of this passage insists that the virtuous choice should be at the correct time, for the fitting excuse, about the correct persons and for the appropriate purpose. Instead of following an established rule, the virtuous agents have the ‘ethical perception’ (cf. footnote 15) to recognise the appropriate to the situation, to adjust to it and to act accordingly. As to play nicely a music composition a lyre should not be tuned too loosely to sound flat nor too tightly to sound sharp, so the virtuous person should not be either too tightly to react with short-sighted calculation or too lax to be obsessed by desires.¹⁴ ‘The Aristotelian Criterion’ proposes an isomorphic to the virtuous mean normative criterion for good leaders which is between emotional obsession and short-sighted calculation.

Since the ethical domain lacks absolute accuracy, the virtuous mean adjusts to the situation. NE V.10 (1137^b29–34) argues by analogy from building for the flexibility that the particulars require: as we cannot measure a column with a standard ruler, but we need an elastic ruler (what Greeks describe as ‘lesbian ruler’), which bends to the shape of the curved stone, similarly the calculation of the virtuous mean must be adjustable to the specific situation. Instead of the Platonic contemplation of absolute rules, Aristotle’s virtuous leader deliberates on the specific situation and perceives what is ethically relevant for virtuous choice and action.

Practical Wisdom

As the above-cited definition of virtue states, practical wisdom (the conventional translation of phronêsis) establishes the criterion of the appropriate mean. NE VI.1 distinguishes the person of practical wisdom (phronimos) from the virtuously disposed person by claiming that the former perceives what is needed in the specific situation, while the latter simply acts accordingly. The crucial philosophical question is whether the phronimos possesses knowledge of principles that are simply implemented in the situation, in which case practical wisdom will be scientific, or is equipped with an ‘ethical perception’ that recognises the salient issues of the situation, in which case practical wisdom is about particulars.¹⁵ Plato is a supporter of the first approach and by insisting on the unity of knowledge (Republic I 332C-334C and 349A-350C) makes theoretical knowledge a prerequisite for, and extension of, practical expertise (Republic VI 510D-511E and VII 522A-534D), and defines virtue as the scientific knowledge of good and evil (Meno 87D-89E and Charmides 174B-C). NE VI provides a (rough, we must admit) account of the Aristotelian understanding of practical wisdom by contrasting it to scientific understanding (NE VI.5 1141^b3–9, 21–22; VI.8 1142^a25) and defining it as

the authentic character disposition accompanied by reason related to action about the human affairs that they are good and bad. (NE VI.5 1140^b5–6; cf. 20–21).

Practical wisdom involves both character disposition and rational ingenuity. It is an emotional disposition, since the phronimos, as a virtuously disposed agent, feels pleasure for the good and pain for the bad. But it is also a rational ingenuity, because the phronimos confirms the emotional disposition with the summum bonum and it is consistent with other emotional dispositions experienced. The emotional disposition, which everyone can develop through habituation in childhood, cannot be the exclusive reason for virtuous action since our virtuous character-traits are perfected as we are developing ethically and reflect rationally on our virtuous behaviour. All human beings who grew up within a society have the potential to develop virtuous dispositions through habituation, while all rational beings have the capacity to associate their virtuous or vicious character-traits with what is good for humans and, eventually, to confirm or criticise them with reference to human happiness.

NE VI.13 labels the ethical character-trait of the phronimos as ‘full virtue’ and of the novice’s virtuous inclinations as ‘natural virtue’. The novice lacks awareness of the interconnection between the instances of their virtuous behaviour and confirmation by their conception of happiness, so their actions are in accordance with correct reason. The phronimos develops a stable and holistic character-trait that motivates virtuous action from correct reason; the phronimos is characterised by the maturity of ‘full virtue’ that sets the standards of virtue, as the above-cited definition of virtue declares. Going back to the question at the opening of this section, practical wisdom is not a scientific understanding of the universal, but an ethical perception of the particular situation which is developed through experience (NE VI.8 1142^a11–30). Both Aristotelian agents, the phronimos and the virtuously disposed novice, are contrasted to the Platonic conception of practical wisdom which is identical with the scientific understanding of universal moral rules. Instead, the Aristotelian phronimos responds to their ethical perception of the particular situation and acts from correct reason, while the virtuously disposed novices behave in accordance with the reasoning of the phronimos without possessing themselves the ethical perception, but because of virtuous habituation.¹⁶

The Aristotelian practical wisdom has architectonic and instrumental elements (NE VI.12 1144^a6–9 and VI.13 1145^a4–6). Building on stable and virtuous character-traits, the phronimos confirms their ethical perception in each specific situation with the architectonic goal of happiness (how virtuous action is a component of human happiness) and incorporates them coherently with other virtuous dispositions (how virtuous behaviour is a manifestation of virtuous character-traits).¹⁷ At the same time, the phronimos also has the instrumental cleverness for reaching the ethical goal (due to the architectonic element, the instrumental cleverness would incorporate the ethical significance of the virtuous action). Between architectonic ‘full virtue’, which is about the ends, and instrumental cleverness, which is about the means, practical wisdom has a pivotal function: to perceive the ethical goal in the actual situation and to legitimise the appropriate means (NE VI.12 1144^a7–9, 20–29; VI.13 1145^a4–6). NE I.2 (1094^a23–24) illustrates this point with reference to happiness: the archer’s architectonic goal is understood formally as the perfect exercise of their function and substantively in that situation as success in hitting the target, while the instrumental considerations have to do with the technical details of how to shoot straight the spear; still, if the architectonic goal were vicious, the same degree of instrumental cleverness would be ethically abominable.

Aristotle does not dismiss the value of the instrumental component, especially since it is part of the action. Accordingly, he mocks abstract-minded thinkers, like Anaxagoras and Thales, for lacking practical wisdom about the ends of their particular actions, even though they have scientific wisdom about the universals (NE VI.7 1141^b3–23). He would be discontented with persons who persistently fail to perform their action, because they lack the ethical perception to act in accordance with the appropriate end on the specific situation. But, he would not be so harsh with those whose odd action ends up ineffective due to external conditions of bad moral luck (cf. ‘Moral Luck and Effectiveness’), as long as they learn from their experience, readjusting their judgments and avoid repeating the same architectonic or instrumental mistakes.

Aristotle values much higher the architectonic component. He praises Pericles, a good leader with practical and political wisdom, for knowing what is good for him and what is good in being a human (NE VI.5 1140^b7–11). Eudaimonia serves here as the bridge between individualistic and communal happiness since what is good in being a human (eudaimonistic happiness) is good for every human, regardless of how someone may feel about it subjectively (hedonistic happiness). So, the phronimos is free from Sidgwick’s (1907: xii) threat of ‘the dualism of the practical reason’ between prudential and moral thinking and can perceive the mean in each situation, confirming it with reference to human happiness, and working towards its accomplishment.

A modern alternative to phronimos is the economic prudent with the instrumental problem-solving rationale that focuses exclusively on the effectiveness of the means by assuming ethical neutrality about the ends and by insisting only on risk-aversion (cf. Machiavelli’s The Prince, chs 15 and 18). Such an approach, however, leaves space for non-virtuous (or, even vicious) instrumental cleverness. Cleverness per se is ethically irrelevant, since its ethical value is due to the ends that it serves (cf. the opening of ‘The Aristotelian Criterion’). Since more are at stake when the effect is beyond the private domain, ‘The Co-deliberative Leader’ explores the counterpart of practical wisdom in the political domain, the co-deliberative political wisdom.

The Co-Deliberative Leader

NE VI.8 (1141^b23–30) argues that practical and political wisdom are two manifestations of the same character disposition in different domains. As practical wisdom is constituted by the architectonic ‘full virtue’ and by the instrumental cleverness, political wisdom is similarly constituted by an architectonic type, which determines the final goal of the polis, and by instrumental types, which deal with deliberation and judgement about particular policies (NE VI.9 1142^b31–33). This section is going to explore these components of political wisdom by focusing on a distinction between types of excellence in Pol. III.4 (1276^b20–34) as they apply in the political domain.

Obviously, the abovementioned three constituents of the definition of virtue are relevant in both the ethical and the political domains: our virtuous action (i.e. finding the path between our desires and the norms) relies on the mean relative to us (i.e. the relevant ethical aspects of the situation we are facing) as is determined by practical wisdom (i.e. the skill of ethical judgement). But the political domain is characterised by a peculiar fourth constituent, the socio-political ability to engage others in virtuous action. Such a virtuous political leader is compatible with Aristotle’s vision of political philosophy as the educational counterpart of his ethical philosophy, so such a pragmatic conception of a leader would aspire and educate fellow-citizens by approximating the phronimos through co-deliberation.

Political Wisdom

Pol. III proposes political wisdom as the peculiar capacity that distinguishes legitimate political leaders from other forms of political power. Aristotle proposes two separate criteria for political distribution: a threshold of who is capable of citizenship and has the potential of having legitimate authority, for which political wisdom is the substantive answer (Pol. III.12 1282^b31-1283^a3), and a criterion of fair distribution of political power among the potential candidates, which is decided with reference to their contributions (Pol. III.12 1283^a14–22).¹⁸

The first criterion sets the threshold of who has the potential to be a leader through an analogy from the arts: as in the case of flute playing, flute players are those that have the capacity of playing the flute, similarly in the case of leading legitimate rulers should have the peculiar capacity to lead.¹⁹ Earlier on, he identifies political practical wisdom as the peculiar capacity that legitimises leaders:

the only among the excellences that is peculiar excellence for a ruler. All other excellences are taken to be necessarily the same for rulers and subjects, but for a subject the peculiar excellence is the possession of true belief, rather than practical wisdom. So, the subject is like the flute maker, while the ruler resembles the flute player who uses [the flute]. (Pol. III.4 1277^b25–29)

In parallel to flute players, the legitimate rulers (a.k.a. leaders) possess political wisdom and aim at perfecting their proper activity of leading, while the rest, parallel to flute producers, possess the ‘true beliefs’ of technical expertise that make them effective in the exercise of the skills of the leaders. Since most humans have the potential of some virtue and practical wisdom, Pol. III.4 (1277^b25–27) concludes that the natural political arrangement is the ‘political rule’ of ruling and being ruled in turn.

Granted that Aristotle is a firm supporter of distributive justice and that ethical virtue comes in (at least two) degrees (‘natural’ and ‘full virtue’), do we have to admit that only those who reach the ethical maturity of the phronimos should be legitimately assigned as our leaders? Such a solution is problematic for two reasons. First, since Aristotle admits that such an ethical maturity is rare (Pol. VII.14 1332^b16–23), we run the danger of ending up without legitimate leaders. Second, since each human manifests some political practical wisdom, it would be wasted simply because it is not of the pure type.

Ethical and Effective Co-deliberation

Aristotle seems to suggest that we should seek for leaders among all those who possess political wisdom; granted that the political domain incorporates several different partial perspectives, a combination of our partial perspectives will improve even further the ethical and epistemic outcome. Taking advantage of all politically capable citizens is both ethical (i.e. fair and just) and (epistemically) effective, as the famous political analogy of the Ship of State suggests:

As [we say] that a seafarer is each one of the members of a community [of a ship], so we say of the citizen. ^{[excellence1]}Among the seafarers who are dissimilar with reference to capacity—since the one is a rower, another is a cox, another a bower, and others have other names to signify [their distinct capacity]—it is obvious both that the most accurate definition will be peculiar to the excellence [of each seafarer^=excellence1] and that similarly ^{[excellence2]}a common [definition] will fit them all. For the safety of the cruise is the function of all of them; since this is what each of the seafarers reaches at. Similarly for the citizens too, ^{[excellence1]}even though they are dissimilar, ^{[excellence2]}the safety of the community is their function, and community is the constitution [...]. And since there are many types of constitution, it is obvious that the excellent citizen does not admit of a single excellence that is final; contrarily, we acknowledge a person as excellent with reference to a single excellence which is final. (Pol. III.4 1276^b20-34)

The passage distinguishes between two types of political excellence that run in parallel with the two components of practical wisdom: the instrumental excellence1, which is distributed and individuated to different technical skills, like the political sciences and skills, and the architectonic excellence2, which is collectively developed and held by individuals collaborating on a common project, which is to be identified with political wisdom. Everyone who is familiar with rowing would be able to appreciate the force of the Aristotelian analogy: all the different instances of excellence1 are complementary for the faring of the ship and none of them is exclusively dominant. So, there is no single seafarer in the Aristotelian ship who fully controls the steering in virtue of excellence1; even the cox who handles the rudder is unable to steer alone the ship to a different direction.²⁰

Even though excellence1 exists in abundance in different artists and producers, excellence2 is rare in isolated individuals, so we need an account of how we can reach it. Aristotle’s proposal is collaboration in deliberation and action. NE IX.9 reveals an important use of the perfect type of friendship, among persons who are alike in virtue, in promoting each other’s self-knowledge since the alter-ego friend serves as a mirror of ourselves. The opening of Metaphysics α(ΙΙ).1 (993^a30-^b8) admits that even though each of us is grasping a part of the truth, a single individual rarely can grasp the whole truth, so co-deliberation is a preferable necessity. Pol. III.11 (1281^b1–15), a couple of chapters after the Ship of State analogy, offers the Feast analogy to reinforce the importance of collaboration by suggesting that the collaboration of different individuals in the production of a dinner would satisfy more individuals than a single superior chef. Waldron (1995) aptly labels this suggestion as the Doctrine of the Wisdom of the Multitude and argues for the advantage of moving from the partial perspective of the one person to the intersubjective perspective of the community using the peculiar human political ability of logos to enforce unanimity within the human society (contra Hobbes understanding of logos as the divisive ability that ignites animosity and war). Thus, the Doctrine of the Wisdom of the Multitude is a paradigm of our co-deliberative capacity that necessitates pluralism for the existence of the political society which cannot be constituted by dissimilars (Pol. II.2 1261^a18–25). Cammack (2013) amends Waldron’s interpretation by focusing on the collective excellence, rather than co-deliberation, in the coming together of individual excellences when the citizenry acts collectively. Putting aside the interpretative disagreement between the two scholars, they both allude to my reconstruction of Excellence2 as the counterpart of the architectonic component of practical wisdom: the collective political wisdom can enhance epistemically as well as ethically the partial perspective of individuals in the political domain.

The Aristotelian proposal becomes clear when we contrast it to the top-down Platonic appropriation of the Ship of State in Republic VI (488A-489C). In contrast to the Aristotelian Ship of State which is the commonwealth of all the seafarers, the Platonic Ship of the Kallipolis should be steered exclusively by the philosopher-king who, due the knowledge of the Forms, has a privileged scientific epistemic status to determine the route; individual members of the Aristotelian crew, on the other hand, cannot claim such unqualified knowledge of the route, so they use collectively excellence2 to determine their common goal. Moreover, the Platonic captain, due to inexperience in communicating the knowledge to those who are not philosophers (think of an abstract-thinking mathematician explaining to a lay person her research!), is eventually be overtaken by the rebellious and ignorant crew and led to disaster; in virtue of co-deliberation, excellence2 of the Aristotelian crew improves themselves. To summarise, even though the Platonic philosopher-king is more privileged epistemically, the Aristotelian crew would fare much better epistemologically (due to their continuous self-improvement) and ethically (thanks to their collective wisdom).

There are several lessons to learn regarding the epistemic status of the possessors of the two types of excellence in our passage, which eventually (in ‘Aristotelian Participatory Leadership’) will assist us in distinguishing the authentically good leader. Excellence1 equips its possessors with a partial perspective of their individual functions which, at best, results to the complementarity of their individual tasks, while excellence2 offers a holistic perspective. Excellence1 provides the instrumental know-how for the overall goal, while the architectonic excellence2 defines the goal.²¹ In virtue of excellence1 we, at best, behave in accordance with correct reason, while only excellence2 allows us to act from correct reason.

Facing the peculiarities of the political domain, the Aristotelian co-deliberative leaders end up being preferable to the Aristotelian phronimos or the Platonic philosopher-king, both of whom are rare. Even though Aristotle recognises the inseparability of the private and the public domains, he does not treat them as identical; rather, since it is the best forum for habituation, the political domain is more apt for the development of virtue and happiness (NE X.9). Moreover, against Plato’s unity of knowledge, Aristotle convincingly argues that there are different types of knowledge related to different degrees of accuracy in different domains (NE I.7 1098^a25–30), so there is a difference between ethical practical wisdom and political practical wisdom, the latter being a peculiar knowledge of the political domain that is achieved and expanded through co-deliberation and appreciation of the other’s perspective, which is difficult for a single person to develop. Additionally, due to the intersubjective nature of the public domain, people can educate each other through co-deliberation and dialogue improving constantly the epistemic status of all persons involved. To sum up, it would be unfair to ignore the political wisdom of capable citizens and unjust to let it waste especially since, as Aristotle believes, nature does nothing in vain.²²

Conjunction of Ethical and Effective

So far, I argued that the normative evaluation of good leaders should be based on their character as it is determined by the practical and political wisdom they exercise in particular situations, rather than either their behavioural compliance to some universal moral maxims (as the deontologists believe) or the results of their actions (as the consequentialists suggest). In what follows, I focus my attention to Ciulla’s (1995) definition of the good leader as ethical and effective by calling attention to the danger of evaluating leaders with reference to either the appearance of their behaviour or the results of their actions, the former being motivated by a deontic misinterpretation of virtue as virtuousness, while the latter neglecting moral luck. I think that the interconnection of the ethical and effective components can be served better by an appeal to the Aristotelian practical wisdom: the architectonic ‘full virtue’ would focus on the character-trait, rather than the virtuousness, and the instrumental cleverness will be separated from external conditions that are beyond our control.

Ciulla herself (2012: 534–535; cf. 2004: 325) appeals to Aristotle and proposes that NE II.6 (1106^a15–24) supports her definition of the good leader as the ethical and effective, since virtue perfects the ethical character and the effective function of the individual. To illustrate with Aristotelian examples, her interpretation claims that as the excellence of an eye makes it good and perfects its function of seeing or the excellence of a horse makes it good and perfects its function of fast running, so virtue will perfect the leaders both ethically and effectively.²³

Still, there are cases where virtue influences the ethical character without improving, yet or continuously, its effective function. To illustrate, an eye that possesses the excellence of seeing well is a good eye, even when it is currently blindfolded by external obstacles, or a horse possessing the excellence of fast running is a good horse, even when it is currently resting in its stable. De Anima (II.1 412^a22–26; II.5 417^a22–30) recognises that virtue transforms the potential of the agent’s functioning and develops a scheme of first and second actualities to elaborate this point: Aristotle may have excellent knowledge of Greek (first actuality) even when he is not exercising it, since a fluent interlocutor would allow him to exercise it perfectly (second actuality). It would be odd to suggest that, judging from the moments when he happens not to speak Greek due to the absence of an appropriate interlocutor, Aristotle is not effectively a Greek speaker.

What I want to suggest is that effectiveness and ethics cannot carry a symmetrical burden of proof for the good leader, so an appeal to practical wisdom can serve as a better candidate. Since the instrumental cleverness of practical wisdom gets ethical value from its architectonic component, so its effectiveness should be judged with reference to the action, which is within the agent’s control, not the effects, which can be influenced by external conditions. Denying, for instance, that King Leonidas of Sparta was a good leader due to his defeat in the Battle of Thermopylae would be a mistake, if his action were determined by his ethical perception qua phronimos and admits that instrumental cleverness gains ethical value due to its architectonic connection with eudaimonistic, rather than hedonistic, happiness.

Virtuousness Is Not Virtue

My discomfort with Ciulla’s definition reveals a deep deviation within virtue ethics about virtuousness. Ciulla, following the Kantian interpretation of the virtuous mean as moderation (cf. footnote 13), subscribes to a deontic approach in understanding virtue as the behavioural disposition to act in conformity with rules of action. Such an approach shifts from action to virtuousness and interprets the virtuous person as the agent who acts accordingly. The deontic approach discounts the Aristotelian motivational psychology and fails to distinguish between virtuous acting, which is peculiar to the ‘full virtue’ of the phronimos, and acts that are in accordance with virtue, the typical behaviour of the ethical novice.²⁴ Additionally, it is open to the situationist challenge.²⁵

Alternatively, the aretaic approach to which I subscribe interprets virtue as the character-traits that ground virtuous behaviour, although other factors are also decisive for happiness. This approach is faithful to Aristotle for several reasons: only virtue, qua a matter of choice, rather than other aspects of behaviour that are beyond the agent’s control (e.g. feelings or capacities) have ethical significance (as NE II.5 establishes); it maintains the situationism of the Aristotelian mean (as NE II.6 1106^b21–23 requires); and it grounds action on motivation (as NE II.6 1106^b23–27 reveals). Virtuousness, on the other, can only serve the educational purpose of habituation (NE II.1 1104^a11–27).²⁶

Ciulla’s definition of the good leader seems to suggest a causation between virtue and virtuousness as well as between virtuousness and effectiveness. The former ignores practical wisdom which can address politicians’ obsession with ‘good/bad optics’ that prohibits virtuousness from being the typical result of, or a reliable testimony for, a virtuous character.²⁷ Similarly, were there a causation between virtuousness and effectiveness, as social sciences are keen to establish empirically,²⁸ it would be absurd to assume that external factors play no role whatsoever, since there is a variety of external constraints that could prohibit its actualisation (cf. ‘Moral Luck and Effectiveness’).²⁹ Finally, the absence of the architectonic component of practical wisdom, which brings together the different instances of virtuous behaviour into the coherent unity of virtues, will effect negatively virtuousness by reducing it to either instrumental cleverness of the particular without ethical significance or, in the absence of sensitive to the situation, to enslavement to universal rule-following; the former would be effective but not ethical, while the latter could hardly be typical of an inspiring leader.

The aretaic approach, on the other hand, grounds virtuous action on character-traits, but insists that the reverse direction from actions to character is not a safe diagnosis of the ethical and effective nature of the good leader. Only the phronimos who reaches on the political domain can give ethical meaning to the action and make its effectiveness meaningful with reference to the ethical perception of the situation and its motivational power on others. Even the odd unfortunate and ineffective action would be excused, by recognising as fallacious the identification of the ethical and the effective and, more crucially, acknowledging with humility that the unfortunate external conditions, which are beyond our control, can compromise the consequences. The good leaders have architectonic and instrumental functions of practical and political wisdom, due to ethical perception and co-deliberation, and aim towards ethical effectiveness, rather than prudentially instrumentality. The phronimos would be able to perceive ethical significance even in the odd ineffective action.

Moral Luck and Effectiveness

But what is the role of external goods (Aristotle’s label for moral luck) within the aretaic approach? Surely, the impact of moral luck on virtue is neither irrelevant, since it would entail the deontic reduction of actions to dispositions, nor decisive, since it would attribute ethical significance to what is beyond the agent’s control (NE I.9 1099^b21–25). Aristotle claims that the character-trait of ‘full virtue’ can be obstructed, rather than annihilated, by external conditions like being asleep or suffering severe misfortunes (NE I.5 1065^b32-1096^a2). But, if external goods can affect happiness,³⁰ our summum bonum and the architectonic confirmation of virtue by the phronimos would be at stake.

An appeal to the lyre-playing analogy (Pol. VII.13 1332^a19–27) can settle the issue: as the possession of a lyre cannot cause a good performance without the musical skill, so the ownership of external goods cannot lead to happiness without virtue. So, the external goods provide the necessary domain of application of the agent’s character-traits (NE IV.3 1120^a4-^b2): the virtuous agent will use them ethically and effectively, the vicious agent unethically and ineffectively. In parallel with the phronimos, the architectonic component imposes a coherent unity to virtuous behaviour with the external goods confirming what is good in being human (a.k.a. happiness). The external goods in themselves cannot signify anything crucial, since they get ethical value from the virtues that are aiming at. Aristotle takes the insignificance of external goods to its extremes, by claiming that even their absence or rarity can be compensated by virtue to prevent misery in the ineffective situations where the actualisation of happiness is not feasible (NE I.10 1100^b33-1101^a13). So, external goods (on par with instrumental cleverness) are the amplifier of whatever ethical value the architectonic ‘full virtue’ of practical wisdom and the teleological excellence2 of political wisdom brings.

We can conclude that the virtuous leaders prove themselves in the challenging cases of unfavourable external conditions by sticking to their ethical attitude (the honorific conception) and by amplifying their ethical message to the rest and work with them towards a solution (the socio-political conception). The sophisticated ethical psychology that sets up the act at the point of the intention (nullifying deontic virtuousness) reveals the ethical component of the Aristotelian account. At the same time, the effective component of the Aristotelian virtuous leadership is revealed in the ethical domain by inspiring and educating others and in the political domain by encouraging co-deliberation and co-operation in changing the world accordingly. The Aristotelian alteration of Ciulla’s equation of the ethical and effective components would insist on the value-attribution priority of the ethical over the effective by broadening the content of the latter. To the illusory appearance of virtuousness, Aristotle juxtaposes the ethical perception of the phronimos in choosing the virtuous action because it is the mean, motivationally as well as practically, and in recognising how every virtue is a constituent of happiness. To the insistence of the social scientists for quantified criteria of deciding about virtuousness, Aristotle juxtaposes the co-deliberation and co-operation based on our partial perspectives.

The Aristotelian Criterion

The Aristotelian scepticism towards a behaviour-oriented criterion of the good leader, which is presented in ‘Conjunction of Ethical and Effective’, would disappoint the social scientists. Such an account of the phronimos, however, points towards a criterion that is based on the character-traits of the good leaders: since their instrumental cleverness and effectiveness get ethical value from their architectonic component of practical wisdom, we have to look at the Aristotelian action which (as footnote 6 argues) starts with choice. Thus, I propose an Aristotelian Criterion that is isomorphic to the doctrine of the mean: as (in the ethical domain) virtue is to vices rooted to desires and calculation, so (in the political domain) the good leader is to the tyrant and the bureaucrat.

Such an Aristotelian Criterion, I claim, enriches Ciulla’s account of the good leader with the motivational psychology that grounds action and it cannot be compromised by external constraints on effectiveness due to moral luck. Moreover, due to the common character disposition of practical and political wisdom and the architectonic attribution of ethical value to the instrumental cleverness, the Aristotelian good leaders would typically be effective because of being ethical. In the worst-case scenario of non-agreeable external conditions, their ethical goal that is motivated by the virtuous character-trait will still maintain the ethical choice, albeit in the domain of potentiality; if such an unfavourable scenario persists, it is the ethical perception of the phronimos that will typically discover an alternative path which will still be motivated by virtue and it will be confirmed by eudaimonistic happiness.

Ciulla (1995: 13) uses the Hitler Problem to test her definition of the good leader and argues that, due to his unethical behaviour, Hitler cannot be described as a good leader regardless of his effectiveness. I think that the Aristotelian proposal passes with flying colours and allows for a more sophisticated evaluation, based on the conviction that the virtuous leader’s motivation (an appropriate feeling accompanied by reason) is ethical and, assuming that the external conditions are favourable, effective (NE VII.8 1151^a15–28).

The person who is motivated by calculative reasoning without any desire to influence the communal decisions manifests a vicious character-trait of deficiency,³¹ since the agent fails to feel self- and other-regarded feelings. The lack of an internal motivation transforms the individual into a heteronomous agent and results into a bureaucratic attitude with solely productive goals.³² To illustrate, if Eichmann was simply a pawn in Hitler’s game, he would be driven by external motivation (i.e. Hitler’s orders that he slavishly implemented) and in a calculative manner would intensify Hitler’s intentions.

The person who is motivated by an unmoderated (thus, irrational) desire to command and conquest others manifests a vicious character-trait of excess that results to a tyrannical obsession with power which eventually prohibits the rational evaluation of their lives.³³ To illustrate, due to his passionate love for the Aryan race and the correlative hate for anyone else, Hitler is transformed into a tyrant who aims to eliminate the ‘enemy’ and to disregard any opposing rational voices, even when they come from his fellows. The results are unethical and ineffective actions, like the unjustifiable elimination of non-Aryans and the imperilment of Aryans in the pursuit of a hysterical goal. If the external conditions are agreeable the unethical effects will be intense, while if they are unfavourable the unethical impact would, at best, be constrained.

The person who is motivated by the wrong feelings is also unethical, because he is steered towards the wrong ends and is capable of effectively reaching them. In a sense, this is a worse case than the person who is fully surrender to his passions, since now pleasure or pain corrupts the architectonic part of practical and political wisdom by distorting the conception of the end (NE VI.5 1140^b17–18; VI.13 1144^a34), while the instrumental part is capable of pursuing effectively the wrong final end, since the twofold nature of cleverness of that part can produce the wrong results when the end is vicious (NE VI.12 1144^a24–27; cf. ‘Practical Wisdom’). To illustrate, Himmler, who showed ingenuity to carry out Hitler’s plan, even under unfavourable external conditions, was both passionately motivated by the Nazi cause and calculative in carrying it through effectively, reaching a perverted sense of creativity. But, even if Himmler is responsive to both bureaucratic calculation and tyrannical emotions, his leadership cannot be described as good, since his architectonic goal-setting is vicious and, consequently, his instrumental effectiveness was disastrous by aiming to the wrong end.

Several types of leadership have been proposed in the contemporary bibliography. Before closing, I would like to evaluate some of them ethically with reference to the Aristotelian Criterion. My aim is to explore whether an agent with the corresponding virtuous character-traits would choose to assume a position of a leader in each of these contexts.

Transactional Leadership

Leadership scholars describe transactional leaders as ethically neutral observers of an agreement. By observing a beneficial transaction, the motivation of the leader is prudential (Burns 1978: 19).³⁴ Prudential fairness is enough to make redundant the egotistic attitude towards ruling or the altruistic behaviour towards self-sacrifice. We can still be sensible enough as ethical egoists to realise that someone must rule, so if we can reach an agreeable distribution of burdens, either by having everyone performing a task or by rotating the performance of the same task, we have prudential reasons to observe such an agreement.

Regardless of the appeal of transactional leadership due to prudential fairness, it is still unsatisfactory since if the transaction is granted for contractual parts who are obliged to observe and protect it, a better description would be bureaucrats, rather than leaders, who believe that the means justify the ends (Kanungo 2001: 263) and implement principles, instead of acting ethically, and such a transactional leadership would be motivated by calculative reasoning.

Charismatic Leadership

Some hold that leaders should be those who, through their charisma, can deal heroically with challenges and steer their followers to safe and prosperous lands (cf. Conger and Kanungo 1998).³⁵ I distinguish between two types of charismatic leader, an epistemic and an emotional, which I examine separately.

The epistemically charismatic leaders enjoy a privileged epistemic status, like Plato’s depiction of his philosopher-kings as the best to lead (cf. footnote 15). Still, such leaders are vindicated for several reasons. Apart from being rare,³⁶ such a qualitatively superlative knowledge would had been irrelevant for the practicalities of human affairs, since (as ‘Ethical and Effective Co-deliberation’ concludes) Aristotle expediently points out that there are different types of knowledge that apply to different types of inquiry, so Plato was wrong to assume the same type of transcendental knowledge of the Forms would suffice for the practical affairs of human association by addressing only the rational part and fail to appeal to the motivational force of the emotions.

The emotionally charismatic leaders focus on the followers’ emotions and they aspire to ignite loyalty and motivation in their followers (cf. Conger and Kanungo 1998: 14). Due to their resemblance with the fourth socio-political constituent of the ethical leaders of the opening of ‘The Co-deliberative Leader’, we may think that they are compatible with the Aristotelian account; still, the Aristotelian ethical action is authentically grounded on the ethical agent as the three constituents of virtue necessitate, while the emotionally charismatic leaders are grounded on the enslavement of their followers to their irrational emotions, a possibility that is vindicated forcefully as sophistry (cf. Plato’s Gorgias and Aristotle’s Rhetoric). Moreover, the emotionally charismatic leaders become problematic when they are associated with the philosophers’ motivation to rule in Republic VII, since those who have the charisma to rule don’t necessarily also have the motivation to do it and they would have to be coerced to it.³⁷ If they do it out of altruism, they resemble moral saints of supererogatory character disposition, who are not in abundance, so such a scenario is not realistic, while if they do it due to egoistic motivation, our evaluation of their ethical stand is compromised.

Transformative Leadership

Transformative leadership could be described as the counterpart of charismatic leadership, since (according to Cardwell et al. 2012) the latter is about the cause (i.e. leaders’ transformational charisma) while the former is about the result (i.e. followers’ transformation). A plain transformative version can be rejected straightforwardly because of the slavish submission of the followers, but Burns (1978: 20, 43–44) offers an improved version of reciprocal transformation between leaders and followers that aim to the effective fulfilment of the needs of both groups within the constraints of appropriate ethical values. This latter version shares some ground with the Aristotelian account, due to its recognition of reciprocity and the existence of ethical values.³⁸

Still, transformative followers become emotionally fixated to ‘salvationist or messianic in nature’ transformational leaders (Tucker 1970: 80–81), a tension that is rightly criticised as paternalistic by MacIntyre (1981: ch. 3; cf. Keeley 1995). Since, charisma affects followers by arousing strong emotions and facilitating their identification with the leaders (Bass and Stedlmeier 1999: 182), it does not come as a surprise that tyrannical rulers appeal to their followers’ passions to gain loyalty and retain their power (Sendjaya 2005: 77). Thus, even the transformative leaders, because of their insistence on emotional manipulation, come short of the Aristotelian Criterion.

Aristotelian Participatory Leadership

On top of the Aristotelian reasons I mentioned in favour of co-deliberation at the end of ‘Ethical and Effective Co-deliberation’, a seminal passage in Pol. VI.2 highlights two significant reasons: equal participation (1317^b2–11) and self-determination (1317^b11–17). The combination of the two assures the dignity of the citizens, both in reality and in their self-perception: due to the rotation of power based on excellence1, people retain a fair recognition of their contributions to the polis through ruling and being ruled (Pol. VII.14 1332^b25–29), while due to excellence2, the collective ownership of the political project warrants their freedom from suppression.

Locke and Schweiger (1979) argues that participators whose contributions are not recognised sufficiently can feel inferior and Kelley (1995) offers as remedy to such systematic inferiority the equal treatment and recognition, even when different participants exercise different roles at different times. Still, by insisting exclusively on the contributors’ emotional impulses, this remedy lacks the additional precautious mechanism that the second Aristotelian reason (i.e. self-determination) provides.

Responsible leadership, due to the relation between leaders and followers and its reliance to stakeholder theory (Pless 2007: 439), could approximate the participatory element of the Aristotelian account. Still, its insistence on virtuousness as an attribute of responsible leadership (Pless 2007: 438) compromises the scheme since it resembles the deontic approach with its problems of fallacious reduction (cf. ‘Virtuousness is not Virtue’) and insistence on prudential motivation (cf. the end of ‘Practical Wisdom’).

In a different context, Kort (2008: 415–416) discusses the role of self-determination in participatory leadership. She distinguishes between two types of plural action, which could be associated with the two types of Aristotelian excellence (alongside the joint virtue interpretation of Cammack 2013). On the one hand, excellence2 can give rise to collective plural actions that are ‘joint and participatory’ in virtue of the common intention to work together. On the other, excellence1 can give rise to distributive plural actions that are ‘disjoint and contributory’ actions due to the lack of such a common intention. Eventually, Kort (2008: 418–420) suggests that only collective plural actions can be associated with properly speaking leadership, while references to leadership in the case of distributive plural actions are made loosely.

‘The Co-deliberative Leader’ reaches independently a similar conclusion about co-deliberation and co-operation. Still, the Aristotelian proposal has an additional element, which is missing from Kort’s proposal: due to self-determination, Aristotle concedes stronger communal ties. As Constant’s (1819) classical analysis shows, the identity of ancient persons is substantially determined by their collective identity which, in turn, they determine significantly. To that aim, the condition of self-determination (identified as excellence2) strengthens communal ties and makes the identity of individuals (based on excellence1) posterior to their common identity (based on excellence2). Thus, instead of Kort’s participatory leadership due to the stakeholders’ shared values, the Aristotelian scheme, republican in its essence, suggests that due to excellence2 stakeholders would share common intentions qua members of the same community, so the Aristotelian scheme is even more committed to participation.

Conclusion

By applying the Aristotelian Criterion to the alternative contemporary conceptions of leadership, we can conclude that from the available alternatives we examined the virtuous leaders can flourish only within the participatory scheme of leadership.

Let us take stock of my analysis so far. I argued that what distinguishes virtuous leaders in the private and the public domains are the two manifestations of practical wisdom. The honorific ethical evaluation insists on the three constituents of virtue (virtuous action which relies on the mean and is constituted by practical wisdom), while the political brings forward a fourth constituent (the socio-political ability to engage and motivate others to the ethical goals) within a context of co-deliberation and co-operation.

The normative standards of the good leader as ethical and effective, interpreted within the aretaic approach of virtue ethics, attribute exegetical power to the virtuous character-traits rather than virtuousness, to motivation rather than results. The aretaic approach acknowledges that, apart from the virtuous character, moral luck also plays a role, so to save Ciulla’s definition of the good leader as ethical and effective, we should define instrumental cleverness as it is ethically signified by architectonic practical wisdom and to define the action as all the stages (from choice to completion) that are up to the control of the agent. Of course, I acknowledge the odd cases where the external conditions are unfavourable to carry out the leaders’ choice and ethical values, but (as ‘Moral Luck and Effectiveness’ suggests) such cases would be rare since the virtuous leaders would be able to use their sensitive to the situation ethical perception to find alternative paths of action that can promote their happiness and remain ethical and effective. But even when it is impossible to change the world according to the ethical principles, the ethical impact of the virtuous leaders is manifested in the humility with which they deal with the situation; even though they do not exercise Stoic apathy, they can still lead by example and convince others about the significance of the architectonic ethical goals (as ‘Conjunction of Ethical and Effective’ suggests with reference to King Leonidas of Sparta).

This isomorphic (in the ethical and political domains) Aristotelian Criterion is used to review some dominant types of leadership and eventually to vindicate some of them for presupposing vicious leaders who are either too calculative, a trend that comes closer to bureaucracy, or too emotional, a trend that resembles tyranny. I conclude that, according to the Aristotelian Criterion, the good leaders are those who are ethically motivated and who aim to influence others through co-deliberation and co-operation, regardless of the perception of their actions and the results that they produce.

I do not reject Ciulla’s definition of the good leader as the ethical and effective, but I call our attention on (and, hopefully, improve) some of its weaknesses. On the internal level, I propose a more detailed account of motivational psychology that allow us to evaluate them ethically and with reference to what is up to their control. On the external level, by moderating the impact of moral luck on the leader’s effectiveness.³⁹