Abstract
In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank María Eugenia Boza, Michael Coppedge, Rafael DiTella, John Griffin, Robert Fishman, Ricardo Hausmann, B.J. Lee, Scott Mainwaring, Alfonso Miranda, Daniel Ortega, Benjamin Radcliff, Dani Rodrik, John Roemer, Cameron Shelton, Jorge Vargas, Romain Wacziarg, Kathryn Vasilaky, the Associate Editor, an anonymous reviewer, and participants at seminars at IESA, the University of Notre Dame, Cal Poly and at conferences organized by the Public Choice Society, LACEA, the Game Theory Society and the Econometric Society for their suggestions. Adolfo De Lima, Giancarlo Bravo and Reyes Rodríguez Acevedo provided first-rate research assistance. All errors are our responsibility.
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Rodríguez, F., Zambrano, E. Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model. Econ Theory Bull 10, 105–116 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00220-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00220-8