This paper will address the behaviorism of George Herbert Mead. It will do so on the basis of Gary A. Cook’s take on Mead’s behaviorism in his 1993 book, George Herbert Mead: The Making of a Social Pragmatist. In that book, Cook makes three noteworthy points regarding Mead’s behaviorism: (1) it is a continuation of a functionalist position only in another name (p. 68, p. 71, p. 77), (2) Mead came to adopt a behaviorist position in 1922 (p. 72, p. 74), and (3) Mead should have but did not criticize Watson’s behaviorism for adopting a stimulus–response (S-R) model of behavior in Mind, Self & Society which was published posthumously in 1934 (p. 75).

Mead’s social psychology can be divided into two periods, an earlier period from 1908 until 1913 and a later period from the 1920s until his death in 1931. Mead’s early social psychology came out in a series of papers including “McDougall’s Social Psychology” (1908), “Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology” (1909), “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning” (1910a),“What Social Objects Must Social Psychology Presuppose?” (1910b), “Review of Individualism: Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations by Warner Fite” (1911), “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness” (1912), and “The Social Self” (1913). It also included lecture notes for social psychology in 1912 (Mead 1982a) that were incorrectly dated 1914 (Cook 1993, p. xviii). Mead’s later social psychology can be seen in, but was not limited to, “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922), “The Genesis of Self and Social Control” (1925), lecture notes for social psychology in 1927 (Mead 1982b) and 1930 (Mead 1934), and “Mind Approached Through Behavior – Can Its Study Be Made Scientific?” (henceforth “Mind Approached Through Behavior”) (Mead 1936).

Cook’s first point, that Mead’s behaviorism was essentially a continuation of his earlier functionalist position, follows from and reflects the more general belief that Mead’s later social psychology is essentially unchanged from his early social psychology, a belief first expressed by Charles W. Morris in the Introduction to Mind, Self & Society (Mead 1934). Regarding Mead’s behaviorism, it is correct in the sense that Mead addressed Watson’s behaviorism (Watson, 1913a, b, 1919) from the functionalist perspective of his early social psychology, adopting a form of behaviorism consistent with his earlier functionalism and agreeing with some aspects of Watsonian behaviorism while disagreeing with others. It is incorrect in the sense that Mead’s later behaviorism cannot simply be reduced to his earlier functionalism; it came about only by addressing Watsonian behaviorism which postdates Mead’s early social psychology and would have been unimaginable without Watsonian behaviorism which forced functionalists to confront methodological questions in a way and to an extent they had not done before (Heidbreder 1969). The belief that Mead’s later social psychology is unchanged from his early social psychology can only be held by reading retrospectively. Reading prospectively, the way we should read it (Heidbreder 1969), Mead’s early social psychology contains the pieces or building blocks of his later social psychology with Mead working out his approach to social psychology more thoroughly and more systematically in his later social psychology.

Cook’s second point, that Mead adopted a behavioristic position in 1922, is correct given what we know now. Mead came out as a behaviorist in two publications in the 1920s, “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” in 1922 and “The Genesis of the Self and Social Control” in 1925, working out his behaviorism more thoroughly and more systematically in his lectures on social psychology in 1927 (Mead 1982b) and 1930 (Mead 1934) and “Mind Approached Through Behavior” (Mead 1936). Taken together, these constitute Mead’s response to and an alternative form of behaviorism to that of John Watson.

Finally, the rejection of an S-R psychology was inherent in Chicago functionalism and was held all along by Mead, as Cook acknowledges (1993, p. 75). Contrary to Cook, Mind, Self & Society (1934) was no exception, as this paper will demonstrate. Additionally, Mead’s early and later social psychologies should be addressed as a whole rather than focusing on one particular publication or series of lectures, as Cook does; different publications and series of lectures developed aspects of Mead’s social psychology to various extents and in different ways.

Before working out Mead’s behaviorism, an additional difference with Cook should be mentioned. Cook does not believe that we can trust Mead’s posthumous publications because they do not only have Mead’s hand in them and because Mead did not get to carry them all the way to publication (1993, p. xvii, p. xix), a view also expressed by John Dewey (1936) and Ellsworth Faris (1936). Thus Cook largely does not use the posthumous publications, with notable exceptions like his criticism of Mind, Self & Society (1934) for not criticizing an S-R psychology, and would question their use.

The problem with not using the posthumous publications is that, regarding behaviorism for example, we do not have enough in “A Behaviorist Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922) and “The Genesis of Self and Social Control” (1925), the two publications in Mead’s lifetime that mention behaviorism, to fully work out the behaviorism of his later social psychology. The posthumous publications allow us to do so. Additionally, the fact that we are able to work out a consistent and coherent statement of the behaviorism of Mead’s later social psychology using all the above sources suggests that Cook’s reservations regarding the use of the posthumous publications, though reasonable in theory, do not appear in practice to be so much of a problem.

Mead’s Behaviorism

Mead agreed with Watson that behavior, rather than consciousness, should be the subject matter of psychology (Mead 1925, p. 251, p. 252, p. 254; Mead 1934, p. 2, pp. 7–8, p. 24, p. 35, pp. 40–41; Mead 1936, p. 387; Mead 1982b, p. 106). Despite this, Mead disagreed with Watson regarding what constitutes behavior. For Watson, behavior lies outside the organism (Mead 1934, p. 6) while, for Mead, behavior lies both inside and outside the organism (Mead 1934, pp. 7–8). Mead held that, if we can include the central nervous system, we can deal with many phenomena seen as constituting consciousness (Mead 1934, pp. 12–13).

Mead also agreed with Watson that the method of psychology should be observation, not introspection (Mead 1934, p. 105; Mead 1936, p. 399, p. 400; Mead 1982b, p. 106, p. 130). In the 1927 class lectures, Mead provides or points to three different types of arguments against introspection. The metaphysical argument is that introspection is irretrievably tied to dualism and parallelism, positions Mead rejected (Mead 1982b, p. 106). The epistemological argument is that the data of introspection are inextricably tied to dualism, leaving us in a form of solipsism from which there is no escape (Mead 1982b, p. 106). Finally, there are two methodological arguments against introspection: (1) introspective data are private, available only to the individual (Mead 1982b, p. 106) and (2) others tend to know us better than we know ourselves (Mead 1982b, p. 156).

In the 1930 class notes (Mead 1934, p. 83, p. 105, p. 106, p. 127) and “Mind Approached Through Behavior” (Mead 1936, p. 397, p. 400) Mead tells us that psychology need not consider metaphysical or epistemological issues, leaving only methodological arguments against introspection, parallel to how Watson addressed the matter. In the 1930 class notes Mead tells us that introspection is “not fruitful for psychology” (Mead 1934, p. 105) and in “Mind Approached Through Behavior” that observation is “much safer” than introspection (1936, p. 400). Methodological problems for introspection, according to Mead, are resolvable, at least in theory, as information that we can get through introspection can, instead and more reliably, be obtained through behavior, what people tell us and their behavior (Mead 1936).

In “Mind Approached Through Behavior” Mead tells us that there are two forms of behaviorism. The behaviorism of John Watson excludes consciousness while that of John Dewey includes consciousness (Mead 1936). Mead, in agreement with John Dewey, held that we cannot reduce consciousness to behavior, but can explain it behaviorally (Mead 1925, pp. 256–257, p. 268; Mead 1934, pp. 10–11). Nevertheless, we should use consciousness sparingly and only where overt behavior is not sufficient (Mead 1982b, p. 111).

Mead also disagreed with Watson’s S-R model of behavior. The 1927 class lectures held that (1) behavior cannot be broken down, except conceptually, into stimuli and responses and should, instead, be seen as a unified whole (Mead 1982b, p. 108); (2) the stimulus is the occasion for, not the cause of, behavior (Mead 1982b, p. 110, p. 124, p. 134, p. 135, p. 140); (3) behavior is purposive and teleological (Mead 1982b, p. 108); and (4) the same end can be attained through different forms of behavior (Mead 1982b, p. 128, p. 130). In the 1930 class lectures Mead held that, though he was onside with giving a behavioral account of consciousness, we cannot do so through conditioned reflexes (Mead 1934, p. 109). Conditioned reflexes cannot give an adequate account of consciousness (Mead 1934, pp. 101–102, p. 103, p. 104, pp. 121–122).

Mead and Watson also differed in how they conceived of thinking. For Watson, thinking is nothing more than vocalization (Mead 1934, p. 69). Mead held that Watson, in reducing thought to vocalization, was identifying thought with vocalization (Mead 1934, pp. 100–101), replacing and confusing thought with how we think. Mead, in contrast, had two different metaphors for thought, thought as an inner conversation (Mead 1925, p. 272; Mead 1934, p. 47; Mead 1982b, p. 154, p. 155, p. 161) and thought as internal trial and error (Mead 1934, p. 98, p. 99; Mead 1982b, p. 155).

John Dewey and James Rowland Angell, the Other Noteworthy Chicago Functionalists

Cook also mentions John Dewey and James Rowland Angell, the other noteworthy Chicago functionalists, telling us that Dewey’s influence on Mead was earlier (1993, p. 37, p. 43, p. 193) more so than later (1993, p. 57), presumably on Mead’s functionalism but not or not so much on his later behaviorism, and that a critical comment of Mead regarding other functionalists in “What Social Objects Must Social Psychology Presuppose?” (1910b) may have been about Angell (1993, p. 71). Cook’s take on Dewey’s influence is in need of correction; regarding Angell, Cook is correct, but what he tells us is in need of elaboration.

Cook is correct in telling us that Mead’s early functionalism was very much influenced by John Dewey and that Mead’s later behaviorism was very much a continuation of that functionalism, but Cook seems to be very much unaware of Dewey’s views regarding behaviorism (something he should not have been, given Mead’s “Mind Approached Through Behavior” (1936)) and, as a result, does not have it right regarding Dewey’s influence on Mead’s later behaviorism. Regarding Dewey, Cook seems to see no real difference between “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” in 1896 and “Conduct and Experience” in 1930 other than that both reject an S-R description and explanation of behavior (1993, p. 75).

Consequently, for Cook, Dewey’s position did not change significantly over the decades and Dewey would have had no influence on Mead’s later behaviorism other than through his earlier functionalism. In actuality, Dewey’s position was continually evolving (Parkovnick 2011). Pre-1913, Dewey was the leading advocate of functionalism, a position he worked out in a number of publications in the 1890s, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896) among them (Flower 1977/1992, p. 21). During the teens, Dewey wrote a number of articles supportive of behaviorism, among them “Psychological Doctrine and Philosophical Teaching” (Dewey 1914/1979). During the 1920s and 1930s, Dewey highlighted differences between his views and those of John Watson in publications such as “Conduct and Experience” (1930/1984). This is what Mead was referring to in “Mind Approached Through Behavior” (1936) which held that there were two forms of behaviorism, that of Watson and that of Dewey. Finally, in the 1940s, Dewey, while still wary of introspection, took a more conciliatory attitude towards introspection (Dewey 1942; Dewey et al. 1945).

Thus, pre-1913, both Dewey and Mead were functionalists, Dewey very much influencing Mead in this regard. Post-1913, both Dewey and Mead came to advocate behaviorism, Dewey in the teens and Mead in the 1920s. Cook tells us that Mead was during the teens very much involved in civic matters in Chicago, only turning back to social psychology in the 1920s (1993, p. 114). And the behaviorism of Dewey and Mead was very much one and the same, as Mead tells us in “Mind Approached Through Behavior” (1936).

Given the above, and unless evidence turns up to the contrary, the more plausible and probable take on the matter is that, contrary to Cook, Dewey influenced the later as well as the earlier Mead, with Mead following Dewey from functionalism to behaviorism. Cook is correct in telling us that the roots of Mead’s behaviorism and, this writer might add, those of Dewey as well, are to be found in their functionalism. In a 1913 article, James Rowland Angell wrote that functionalism predisposes one to behaviorism (pp. 258–259). Though the behaviorism of Dewey and Mead was defined in response to that of John Watson, it stayed very close to its functionalist roots. Perhaps the most significant change throughout all of this was Dewey adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards introspection in the 1940s, though he never gave up his earlier reservations regarding introspection. This happened following Mead’s death, leaving us to surmise whether and to what extent Mead would have gone along with it.

James Rowland Angell, the final Chicago functionalist to be addressed, tells us that functionalism predisposes one to behaviorism (1913, pp. 258–259). He also shows us through the position he himself took that functionalism does not necessarily lead one to become a behaviorist, as it did Dewey and Mead.

Angell responded to Watson in “Behavior as a Category of Psychology” (1913), An Introduction to Psychology (1918), and his autobiographical essay in A History of Psychology in Autobiography (1936). Angell was sympathetic to the program of behaviorism but critical of its excesses (1913). Angell was sympathetic to defining the subject matter of psychology in behavioral terms (1913, pp. 256–257) but could not agree with restricting the subject matter of psychology to behavior. Also, Angell was sympathetic to the development of observational research but could not agree with the rejection of introspection (Angell 1913, pp. 268–270; 1918, pp. 3–5; 1936, pp. 26–27). Thus Angell could not agree with the behaviorism of Watson, or that of Dewey and Mead for that matter, and thus did not come to define himself as a behaviorist.

Angell’s differences with Dewey and Mead predated their response to John Watson after 1913. Cook mentions a critical comment of Mead regarding other functionalists in “What Social Objects Must Social Psychology Presuppose?” (1910b), telling us that it might have been directed at Angell (1993, p. 71). In 1907, Angell pointed out differences among functionalists largely regarding the mind-body problem, though, like Mead, no names are mentioned, making our task as historians that much more difficult. Angell, as he would later write, adopted a psychophysical parallelism methodologically, as a working approach to psychology, not as a metaphysical position (1936, p. 23). Dewey and Mead, in contrast, saw mind as an emergent property and were not sympathetic to psychophysical parallelism as a methodological approach to psychology or as a metaphysical position, as can be seen in Mead’s comments previously mentioned in this paper.