Abstract
Every behaviourally responsive animal (including us) make decisions. These can be simple behavioural decisions such as where to feed, what to feed, how long to feed, decisions related to finding, choosing and competing for mates, or simply maintaining ones territory. All these are conflict situations between competing individuals, hence can be best understood using a game theory approach. Using some examples of classical games, we show how evolutionary game theory can help understand behavioural decisions of animals. Game theory (along with its cousin, optimality theory) continues to provide a strong conceptual and theoretical framework to ecologists for understanding the mechanisms by which species coexist.
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http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/ 1994/nash-lecture.pdf
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Jayanti Ray-Mukherjee is a faculty member in the School of Liberal Studies at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru. Jayanti is an experimental ecologist who studies mechanisms of species coexistence among plants. Her research interests also inlcude plant invasion ecology and habitat restoration.
Shomen Mukherjee is a faculty member in the School of Liberal Studies at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru. He uses field experiments to study animal behaviour and community ecology. In the past he has used game theoretic approaches to understand foraging games between predators and their prey.
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Ray-Mukherjee, J., Mukherjee, S. Evolutionary stable strategy. Reson 21, 803–814 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12045-016-0386-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12045-016-0386-5