Abstract
In this paper, I will suggest that the ideas of Uddyotakara, the 6th century author of the Nyāya-Vārttika, may have been largely overlooked as a result of Jitendra Nath Mohanty’s and Bimal Krishna Matilal’s influential works on Indian epistemology. Crucial to Mohanty’s and Matilal’s portrayals of Indian epistemology is the thesis that the pramāṇa theory incorporates a sort of causal theory of knowledge. The writers of pramāṇa-śastra, they argue, agreed that at the end of the day, knowledge comes down to an ‘inner’ occurrence, a temporally individuated cognitive episode, and that consequently—the pramāṇa—the most relevant factor affecting knowledge acquisition and the ultimate justification of knowledge acquisition—are “the cluster of phenomena that converge to bring such a cognitive episode about”. I will argue, on the other hand, based on a discussion Uddyotakara conducts at the beginning of the introductory chapter of his work, which I believe to be of crucial importance, that causal factors play only a marginal role in his theory of knowledge and that he claims the pramāṇa to be dependent on samartha-pravṛtti—the habitual, customary and expected procedures or ways of attaining a goal—rather than on their causal antecedents. I will moreover suggest a reading of the pramāṇa of sense-perception, inference and analogy as action-based.
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Schorr, J. Pramāṇa as Action: A New Look at Uddyotakara’s Theory of Knowledge. J Indian Philos 46, 65–82 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-017-9337-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-017-9337-z