In the 1840s, Samuel Thompson would approach men on the streets of New York City and pretend to know them. Genteelly dressed and polite, Thompson would engage them in conversation. After gaining their trust, Thompson would ask, “Have you confidence in me to trust me with your watch until tomorrow?” These men often trusted Thompson—and lost their watches as a result. Until his arrest in 1849, Thomson—dubbed the “Confidence Man” by the New York Herald—profited from skillfully manipulating his emotions and those of his targets.

Deception pervades our interpersonal interactions in negotiations and organizations (Gaspar et al. 2015; Gneezy 2005; Grover 1993, 1997, 2005; Leavitt and Sluss 2015; Schweitzer 2001; Wasieleski and Hayibor 2008; Weber and Wasieleski 2001). Negotiators routinely lie to their counterparts (Gaspar and Schweitzer 2013), interviewees frequently mislead their prospective employers (e.g., Rosse et al. 1998), and executives often lie to regulators and stakeholders (e.g., Anand et al. 2004; Laufer 2008). As Adler (2007) remarked, “One of the enduring truths of humanity is that people lie…frequently” (p. 69).

An emerging literature has revealed a number of important relationships between emotion and deception. This research finds that people often engage in emotional deception by manipulating and misrepresenting their emotions (Barry 1999; Fulmer et al. 2009). This research also finds that emotions profoundly influence the use of deception (for a review see, Methasani et al. 2017), the detection of deception (e.g., Ekman 2009; Ruedy et al. 2013), and the consequences of deception (e.g., economic and relational; Allred 1999; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996) in negotiations and interpersonal interactions.

In this article, we integrate prior theory and research on emotions, emotional intelligence, and deception and introduce a theoretical model (see Fig. 1). Our model explores the interplay between emotional intelligence (the ability to perceive emotions, use emotions, understand emotions, and regulate emotions; Côté 2014; Mayer and Salovey 1997) and deception. We consider these relationships in the context of negotiation, a “breeding ground” for unethical behavior (Tenbrunsel 1998) that is “often strewn with falsehoods and deception” (Adler 2007, p. 69).

Fig. 1
figure 1

Theoretical model of emotional intelligence and deception

Full size image

In our theoretical model, we consider the influence of emotional intelligence on the ability to use and detect deception, as well as on the consequences of detected deception. We devote particular attention to trust, trust restoration, and retaliation in negotiation. We consider the emotional intelligence of both deceivers and targets, and we consider different forms of deception (informational deception, emotional deception, and monitoring-dependent deception). We also consider how characteristics of negotiators (Machiavellianism), their interaction, and the negotiation context (competition/cooperation and media richness) moderate these relationships. In all, our model advances our understanding of the relationship between emotional intelligence and deception in negotiation and provides a theoretical foundation for empirical research.

Importantly, in our model we consider how individuals higher in emotional intelligence might become more likely to engage in deception. In contrast to prior work that has focused on the beneficial effects of having and developing high emotional intelligence for individuals, negotiators, organizations, and societies (e.g., Côté and Miners 2006; Dong et al. 2014; Farh et al. 2012; George 2000; Goleman 1995, 1998; Salovey and Mayer 1990), we consider both the “light” and the “dark” sides of emotional intelligence. As managers and organizations seek to select for and develop the emotional intelligence of their employees, they should also recognize the potential costs of having colleagues with high emotional intelligence.

Theory and Research on Deception, Emotion, and Emotional Intelligence

In this section, we offer a brief review of theory and research on deception, emotional intelligence, and emotion.

Definition of Deception

We define deception as the intentional misrepresentation of information or emotions (Fulmer et al. 2009; Gaspar et al. 2015). In contrast to informational deception, which involves the intentional misrepresentation of information (e.g., Lewicki and Robinson 1998; Robinson et al. 2000), emotional deception involves the intentional misrepresentation of emotion (e.g., Barry 1999; Barry and Rehel 2014; Fulmer et al. 2009).

We focus on self-interested deception in the context of negotiations. In addition to being pervasive in negotiations, deception can profoundly influence negotiaton decisions and outcomes (O’Connor and Carnevale 1997; Olekalns and Smith 2007; Olekalns et al. 2014a, b; Olekalns et al. 2014a, b; Tenbrunsel 1998; Schweitzer et al. 2006).

Definition of Emotional Intelligence

In this article, we consider the relationship between emotional intelligence and deception in negotiation. We define emotional intelligence as the ability to perceive and express emotions, use emotions, understand emotions, and regulate emotions (e.g., Côté 2014; Mayer and Salovey 1997). Although people differ in their emotional intelligence, there is evidence that people can enhance their emotional intelligence through training and related interventions (for a discussion, see Côté 2014).

The first dimension of emotional intelligence, the perceiving and expressing emotions dimension, describes how quickly and effectively people can express and recognize emotions (Côté 2014). People high in this dimension can recognize the emotions that others’ experience (Côté 2014; Rubin et al. 2005), can detect authenticity in others’ emotions (Groth et al. 2009; Mayer and Salovey 1997), can appraise their own emotions, and can clearly express their emotions to others (Buck et al. 1980; Côté 2014).

The second dimension of emotional intelligence, the using emotions dimension, describes how effectively people can use their emotions to enhance their cognition (Côté 2014). People high on this dimension understand the effect of their emotions on their cognitive processes (Côté 2014). They also understand how to use their emotions to enhance their cognitions and to make better decisions (Mayer and Salovey 1997).

The third dimension of emotional intelligence, the understanding emotions dimension, describes how effectively people can “reason about various aspects of emotions” (Côté 2014, p. 466). People high on this dimension recognize the relationship between linguistics and emotions (Mayer and Salovey 1997) and the relationship between particular events and the emotions that these elicit (Côté 2014; MacCann and Roberts 2008; Yip and Côté 2013). They also recognize how basic emotions combine to form more complex emotions (Mayer and Salovey 1997).

The fourth dimension of emotional intelligence, the regulating emotions dimension, describes how effectively people can influence the intensity or duration of their own emotions and the emotions of others (Côté 2014). People high on this dimension can discern whether their emotions are optimal in a specific situation and can effectively modify their emotions accordingly (Mayer and Salovey 1997). They can also select regulation strategies and effectively implement these strategies (Côté 2014; Sheppes et al. 2014).

Emotions, Emotional Intelligence, and the Use of Deception

Gaspar and Schweitzer (2013) proposed that current and anticipated emotions will influence the decision to use deception, and a growing body of empirical work supports this thesis. For instance, feelings of envy (Moran and Schweitzer 2008) and feelings of anger, even those triggered by unrelated events (Yip and Schweitzer 2015), cause people to become more likely to engage in deception. Similarly, Kouchaki and Desai (2015) and Olekalns and Smith (2009) found that anxiety also makes people more likely to use deception.

In more recent work, Methasani et al. (2017) consider how a counterpart’s emotions might influence the decision to use deception in a negotiation. They conjecture that a counterpart’s emotions are likely to influence the deception decision process through inferential processes (i.e., by influencing the inferences negotiators make about the target) and contagion processes (i.e., negotiators “catch” the emotions of others). Consistent with their model, Van Dijk et al. (2008) found that expressing anger can increase the likelihood that targets of the anger engage in deception.

Though prior theoretical and empirical research provides important insights into the role of emotions in the deception decision process, this research is limited in several ways. First, prior research has disproportionately focused on informational deception (e.g., Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; O’Connor and Carnevale 1997; Steinel and De Dreu 2004; Steinel et al. 2010; Tenbrunsel 1998). As a result, our understanding of emotional deception—the misrepresentation of emotions—is surprisingly limited (Barry 1999; Barry et al. 2004; Fulmer and Barry 2009; Fulmer et al. 2009). This represents a striking omission, as the misrepresentation of emotion is prevalent in negotiations and strategic information exchanges (e.g., Andrade and Ho 2009; Barry 1999; Fulmer et al. 2009).

Second, prior research has failed to understand how people might manipulate others’ emotions to increase the effectiveness of their own deception. This gap in the literature is surprising because people routinely manipulate others’ emotions (Lewicki et al. 2015), and the emotions of targets are likely an important influence on the use and effectiveness of deception in negotiations (Methasani et al. 2017).

Third, prior research on deception in negotiations offers limited insights into the characteristics of people most likely to engage in emotional manipulation or emotional deception (Barry et al. 2004). This limits our understanding of deception, our ability to detect deception, and the prescriptions we might offer to negotiators who are likely to contend with the risk of being deceived.

In this article, we propose a theoretical model to advance our understanding of the relationship between emotions, emotional intelligence, and the use of deception in negotiation. We consider the use of informational deception, emotional deception, and monitoring-dependent deception, as well as the strategic manipulation and misrepresentation of emotions. We consider not only the decision to use deception, but also the effectiveness of deception. We also consider a characteristic of negotiators that is likely to strongly influence the use and effectiveness of deception in negotiation: emotional intelligence.

In developing our theoretical framework, we build on prior theory that has linked emotion with deception (Gaspar and Schweitzer 2013; Methasani et al. 2017). We also build upon Porter et al. ’s (2011) work, which found that emotional intelligence was positively associated with the effectiveness of emotional misrepresentation. In our investigation, we extend Porter et al. ’s (2011) initial finding and develop a broad, theoretical framework to consider antecedents, outcomes, and moderators.

In all, we break new ground by considering different constructs and processes related to the interplay between emotional intelligence and deception. We develop novel propositions, and we consider not only the decision to use deception, but also the effectiveness of deception and the consequences of detected deception (e.g., retaliation and trust restoration). We also consider characteristics of negotiators, their interaction, and the negotiation context that moderate these relationships.

Emotions, Emotional Intelligence, and the Detection of Deception

A substantial literature has explored deception detection. This work has found that although many deception cues exist, most people are poor lie detectors (Ekman and Friesen 1974; Ekman and O’Sullivan 1991). In a series of studies, Ekman and his colleagues (e.g., Ekman and O’Sullivan 1991; Ekman et al. (1991) found that though most people think they can effectively detect deception, few actually can.

Interestingly, many of the cues people exhibit when they engage in deception relate to emotions. For instance, people may experience and express emotions, such as guilt, anxiety (Ekman 2009), or happiness (e.g., “duper’s delight”; Ekman 2009; Ruedy et al. 2013) when they engage in deception. The “leakage” of these and other emotions can manifest through facial expression, body movements, or vocal cues (Ekman et al. 1991; Warren et al. 2009).

A few scholars have considered the relationship between emotional intelligence and deception. These scholars have both speculated (Fiori 2009; O’Sullivan 2005) and found that emotional intelligence facilitates lie detection (Wojciechowski et al. 2014)Footnote 1. In our theoretical model, we build on this work to consider the relationship between emotional intelligence and deception detection in negotiation. In contrast to prior research, we consider the influence of two specific dimensions of emotional intelligence: perceiving and understanding emotions (e.g., Côté 2014; Mayer and Salovey 1997). We also consider different forms of deception (emotional, informational, and monitoring-dependent deception), perspectives (both deceivers and their targets), and characteristics of negotiators, their interaction (i.e., the interplay between the emotional intelligence of deceivers and their targets), and the negotiation context that may moderate these relationships.

Emotions, Emotional Intelligence, and Consequences of Detected Deception

In addition to exploring antecedents of deception, a substantial literature has explored the consequences of detected deception. This research has found that detected deception harms interpersonal trust (Boles et al. 2000; Schweitzer et al. 2006) and increases retaliation and retribution (Boles et al. 2000) (for a recent discussion, see Lewicki and Hanke 2012). This research has also found that emotions are particularly important in these decisions. For instance, emotions such as gratitude (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005) and anxiety (Gino et al. 2009) increase interpersonal trust, and integral emotions such as anger increase the desire for retaliation and retribution (Allred 1999; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996).

In this article, we build upon this research to develop a broad understanding of the influence of emotions and emotional intelligence on the consequences of detected deception in negotiation. Though prior research has identified harmed trust and retaliation as common consequences of detected deception, this research has failed to consider the effect of emotions and emotional intelligence on these processes. In our model, we consider the effects of perceiving and expressing, understanding, and using emotions—three important dimensions of emotional intelligence (e.g., Côté 2014; Mayer and Salovey 1997)—on the restoration of harmed trust and retaliation in negotiation. We believe that this represents a particularly important contribution of our model.

A Theoretical Model of Emotional Intelligence and Deception

Although prior research has found that emotions influence the use of deception, the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception, prior research on emotional intelligence has focused on only the detection of deception (for an exception related to emotional misrepresentation, see Porter et al. 2011). This is a striking omission, as emotions are pervasive in negotiations and interpersonal interactions (e.g., Barsade and Gibson 2007; Keltner and Haidt 1999) and profoundly influence the perceptions and decisions of deceivers and their targets (Gaspar et al. 2019; Moran and Schweitzer 2008; Yip and Schweitzer 2016).

In this section, we propose a theoretical model to understand the relationships between emotional intelligence and the use of deception (the decision to use deception and the effectiveness of deception), the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception (retaliation and the restoration of trust). We develop our model in a series of propositions, and we depict our theoretical model in Fig. 1.

Interpersonal Deception Theory

In developing our model, we build upon Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996). This theory considers the relationships between individuals, their interactions, and their use and detection of deception. According to Interpersonal Deception Theory, emotions are important to understanding deception in interpersonal interactions (Buller and Burgoon 1996, 1998).

Interpersonal Deception Theory considers emotions in two ways. First, the theory assumes that emotions are integral to deception (Buller and Burgoon 1996; see also Gaspar and Schweitzer 2013) and that deception is associated with specific non-verbal, emotional cues (termed “leakage” by Ekman and Friesen 1969). Second, although the theory does not consider the emotional intelligence of the participants in the interaction, the theory does recognize the importance of “communication skills” (Buller and Burgoon 1996, p. 218). According to Interpersonal Deception Theory, communication skills include both verbal and non-verbal skills. The theory assumes that these skills influence the encoding and decoding of information in the interaction and, as a result, influence the use and detection of deception.

Although Interpersonal Deception Theory considers the importance of non-verbal communication skills, the theory falls short of offering any specific propositions that relate emotion and emotional intelligence to the use, the detection, or the consequences of deception. In this sense, Interpersonal Deception Theory provides an important, but limited, foundation for our theoretical framework. In this article, we address the limitations in Interpersonal Deception Theory and respond to calls to develop a theoretical understanding of deception (see, e.g., DePaulo et al. 1996).

Deceiver Emotional Intelligence and Deception

Deceiver Emotional Intelligence and Deception Effectiveness

We expect people high in emotional intelligence to more effectively engage in emotional deception (Barry 1999; Fulmer and Barry 2004, 2009; Fulmer et al. 2009) than people low in emotional intelligence. Prior research shows that people high in emotional intelligence can more effectively regulate their emotions than people low in emotional intelligence (Côté et al. 2006; Joseph and Newman 2010; Sheppes et al. 2014). As a result, we expect people high in emotional intelligence, compared to those low in emotional intelligence, to be better at expressing emotions that are different from those that they experience (Côté et al. 2006; Porter et al. 2011; Sheppes et al. 2014). This suggests that in negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence can, for example, more effectively feign positive emotions to increase the likelihood of closing a deal (e.g., Kopelman et al. 2006) or negative emotions to increase concessions from their counterpart (e.g., Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006).

Proposition 1

People high in emotional intelligence can more effectively use emotional deception than people low in emotional intelligence.

We also expect people high in emotional intelligence to more effectively engage in informational deception than people low in emotional intelligence. We expect this for three reasons.

First, when people engage in informational deception, they typically express emotion such as anxiety, guilt, or happiness (e.g., duping delight), and we expect people high in emotional intelligence to more effectively conceal the expression of these emotions than people low in emotional intelligence (Côté et al. 2006; Côté 2014; Fulmer and Barry 2004; Sheppes et al. 2014). Their heightened ability to regulate their emotions makes it more likely that their informational deception will be effective (e.g., deception is undetected and has the intended effect on targets).

Second, people high in emotional intelligence can express emotions to diminish the likelihood that targets will detect their informational deception. For instance, people high in emotional intelligence may understand that information delivered with high confidence is more likely to be believed than information delivered with low confidence (Sniezek and Van Swol 2001; Van Swol and Sniezek 2005) and, as a result, they can regulate their emotional expression to express feelings of confidence when engaging in deception (Buck et al. 1980; Côté 2014). Indeed, con artists routinely manipulate their emotions to build the trust of their targets. As Konnikova (2016) writes in The Confidence Game: Why We Fall for It … Every Time, “At a fundamental, psychological level, it’s all about confidence—or, rather, the taking advantage of somebody else” (p. 11).

Third, people high in emotional intelligence can monitor and manipulate the emotions of their targets to make it less likely that targets will detect the deception. Indeed, the emotions that people experience influence their decision to trust others (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005; Lewicki et al. 2006), and people high in emotional intelligence can use their understanding of emotions (e.g., anxiety; Gino et al. 2012; Gino and Schweitzer 2008) to enhance the effectiveness of their deception. For instance, people high in emotional intelligence can misrepresent information upon detecting that their counterpart experiences anxiety (for relevant discussions, see Gino et al. 2012; Gino and Schweitzer 2008) or after inducing gratitude in their targets (for a relevant discussion, see Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). As a result, compared to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence can time their deception around the emotions of their counterparts to make it more likely that their deception is effective.

Proposition 2

People high in emotional intelligence can more effectively use informational deception than people low in emotional intelligence.

Schweitzer et al. (2002) identified two forms of informational deception—monitoring-dependent deception and monitoring-independent deception—that differ in their capitulation risk. Capitulation risk is the risk that deception will lead the target of deception to make an unwanted concession. Monitoring-dependent deception involves capitulation risk. In this form of deception, deceivers benefit from monitoring their target’s reaction to their deception. In contrast, monitoring-independent deception does not involve capitulation risk, and deceivers derive few benefits from monitoring their target’s reaction to their deception.

Consider a homebuyer who strongly prefers an early closing date. A seller who also prefers an early closing date and recognizes that the buyer has a strong preference for an early closing might misrepresent their preference and request a late closing date. By misrepresenting their preference, the seller might extract a concession from the buyer (e.g., a higher price) in exchange for an early closing date. However, the seller’s decision to misrepresent his or her interest involves capitulation risk. If the seller over-states their preference and convinces the buyer that the late closing date is extremely important to the seller, the buyer might concede to the seller and agree to a late closing date which, in reality, neither party prefers. In this example, the seller can benefit from monitoring the buyer’s reaction to the deception.

We expect people high in emotional intelligence to more effectively use monitoring-dependent deception than people low in emotional intelligence. Indeed, the effective use of monitoring-dependent deception requires that people monitor their target’s behavior to manage the risk of capitulation (Schweitzer et al. 2002), and people high in emotional intelligence can more fully monitor their targets than people low in emotional intelligence (Côté 2014; Rubin et al. 2005). In particular, those high in emotional intelligence can recognize and understand their target’s facial expressions and other non-verbal emotional cues (Côté 2014; Mayer and Salovey 1997; Rubin et al. 2005), use this information (MacCann and Roberts 2008; Yip and Côté 2013) to inform their estimates of the risk of capitulation, and then adapt their deception strategy. In the prior example, sellers high in emotional intelligence can more fully monitor the non-verbal and other emotional cues of a buyer to reduce the risk that the buyer concedes to a late closing date.

Proposition 3

People high in emotional intelligence can more effectively use monitoring-dependent deception than people low in emotional intelligence.

Deceiver Emotional Intelligence, Negotiator and Negotiation Characteristics, and the Use of Deception

In our prior propositions, we predict that people high in emotional intelligence can more effectively use informational deception (Proposition 1), emotional deception (Propositions 2), and monitoring-dependent deception (Proposition 3) than people low in emotional intelligence. We now link these propositions with Lewicki’s (1983) cost–benefit model of deception, which postulates that perceptions of the effectiveness of deception (e.g., the perceived benefits of deception, likelihood of detection, and consequences of detected deception) are an important input in the decision to use deception. Integrating this theoretical work, we postulate that people are more likely to engage in deception when their use of deception is less likely to be detected. As a direct result, we expect that people high in emotional intelligence will be more likely to engage in deception than people low in emotional intelligence.

In practice, however, we expect the relationship between emotional intelligence and the use of deception to be more complex. Although we predict that people high in emotional intelligence can more effectively use deception than people low in emotional intelligence (Propositions 1, 2, and 3), emotional intelligence—in itself—may not fully motivate them to engage in deception.

We postulate that emotional intelligence and other negotiator characteristics interact to influence the use deception. We focus on a trait that is especially likely to influence the decision to engage in deception: Machiavellianism.

Machiavellianism is a personality trait inspired by the principles in Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1532/1950) The Prince. It is characterized by the manipulation and exploitation of others for personal gain (Christie and Geis 1970; Wilson et al. 1996). An emerging literature shows that individuals high in Machiavellianism are more likely to engage in unethical behavior and to exploit relationships and trust (Austin et al. 2007; Christie and Geis 1970; Kish-Gephart et al. 2010; Sakalaki et al. 2007). They are also more likely to both use deception (Austin et al. 2007; Jonason et al. 2014) and to use it effectively (Geis and Moon 1981).

Integrating prior research, we predict that emotional intelligence and Machiavellianism interact to influence deception. In particular, we expect that Machiavellianism provides the motivation for people high in emotional intelligence to exploit their ability to effectively use deception in negotiations (see Propositions 1, 2, and 3 for a discussion). That is, we predict that those high in both emotional intelligence and Machiavellianism are most likely to use deception. In support of this proposition, theoretical models predict that the decision to use deception reflects the combination of different factors (for a review, see Gaspar and Schweitzer 2013), and empirical studies show that Machiavellianism promotes the use of deception in interpersonal interactions (Jonason et al. 2014).

Proposition 4

Emotional intelligence and Machiavellianism interact to influence deception, such that those high in emotional intelligence and Machiavellianism are those most likely to use deception (informational, emotional, and monitoring-dependent).

We also postulate that emotional intelligence and the negotiation context interact to influence the use of deception. Indeed, empirical studies show that the deception decision process is interactive and powerfully influenced by characteristics of negotiators and the negotiation context (Gaspar and Schweitzer 2013). In our theoretical model, we consider a particularly important characteristic of the negotiation context: the competitiveness or cooperativeness of the negotiation.

Empirical research demonstrates that the competitiveness and cooperativeness of negotiations profoundly influence the perceptions of negotiators and their decision to use deception. For instance, in a series of studies, Steinel and De Dreu (2004) found that competitive negotiation contexts motivate negotiators to offer inaccurate information and conceal accurate information. Their results are consistent with related work that has found that competitive negotiators are more likely to engage in deception than cooperative negotiators (Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999; Schweitzer et al. 2005).

We propose that emotional intelligence and the competitiveness or cooperativeness of the negotiation context interact to influence the use of deception. In particular, we predict that in competitive negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are motivated to exploit their ability to effectively use deception (see Propositions 1, 2, and 3). In these negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to use deception than people low in emotional intelligence. This reasoning is supported in Lewicki’s cost–benefit model of deception. In this model, people are more likely to use deception if they believe that can use if effectively (i.e., the perceived costs of deception are lower; for empirical support, see, e.g., Gaspar and Schweitzer 2019).

In contrast, we propose that in cooperative negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are motivated to negotiate honestly. In these negotiations, we predict that people high in emotional intelligence are less likely to use deception than people low in emotional intelligence. We predict this reversal effect for two key reasons.

First, in cooperative negotiations, which invoke strong moral, prosocial, and benevolence norms (Biel and Thøgersen 2007), people high in emotional intelligence are likely to experience more empathy toward their partner than people low in emotional intelligence, and prior studies show that feelings of empathy curtail the use of deception in negotiation (Cohen 2010; Yip and Schweitzer 2016). Second, compared to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to understand the potentially negative emotional and relational consequences (i.e., costs) of using competitive, unethical tactics (such as self-interested deception; Lewicki and Robinson 1998) in cooperative interactions, and prior research reveals that negotiators are less likely to use deception as the perceived costs of deception increase (Gaspar and Schweitzer 2019; Lewicki 1983).

Integrating Propositions 1, 2, 3 and prior theory and research on emotional intelligence and deception, we postulate that whereas in competitive negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are motivated to exploit their ability to effectively use deception, in cooperative negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are motivated to negotiate truthfully.

Proposition 5

Emotional intelligence and the competitiveness and cooperativeness of negotiations interact to influence the use of deception (informational, emotional, and monitoring-dependent), such that in competitive negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to use deception than people low in emotional intelligence, but in cooperative negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are less likely to use deception than people low in emotional intelligence.

Target Emotional Intelligence and Deception Detection

We postulate that targets high in emotional intelligence are more likely to detect the use of informational deception than targets low in emotional intelligence. We expect this for two reasons.

First, in contrast to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to anticipate and detect the emotions that deceivers express (Ekman and O’Sullivan 1991; Frank and Ekman 1997). For example, compared to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence will be more likely to recognize if a potential deceiver is anxious (Côté 2014; Rubin et al. 2005) and infer that this person may have engaged in deception (MacCann and Roberts 2008; Yip and Côté 2013). That is, we expect that compared to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to understand that the use of informational deception is associated with emotion and also more likely to detect this emotion.

Second, compared to people low in emotional intelligence, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to recognize the relationship between linguistic cues and emotion (Côté 2014). This is a critical skill, as language (e.g., the questions that people ask and the responses that others provide; Minson et al. 2018) provides the foundation for the communication of private and asymmetric information in strategic interactions, and targets high in emotional intelligence can recognize a mismatch between the statements that people make (e.g., “Your offer is much lower than I expected”) and the emotions that people express (e.g., the negotiator appears content and fails to express frustration). The ability to recognize this inconsistency enables targets to detect deception more effectively.

Proposition 6

Targets high on the (a) perceiving and expressing and (b) understanding emotions dimensions of emotional intelligence are more likely to detect the use of informational deception than targets low on these dimensions of emotional intelligence.

We also predict that targets high in emotional intelligence are more likely to detect the use of emotional deception than targets low in emotional intelligence. We expect this relationship to be true for two reasons.

First, people high in emotional intelligence tend to focus on the emotions of others and emotion-related information (Côté 2014; Fulmer and Barry 2004; Mayer and Salovey 1997). They are also more likely to understand the meaning of emotions (Côté 2014; Mayer and Salovey 1997). This is particularly important, as attending to and understanding emotions are important to the effective detection of emotional deception.

Second, people high in emotional intelligence can more fully recognize the strategic use of emotions in negotiations and interpersonal interactions (Groth et al. 2009; Mayer and Salovey 1997). In particular, people high in emotional intelligence can understand that people (e.g., senior managers, negotiators, politicians) often manipulate their emotions in interpersonal interactions, and they may be particularly adept at recognizing the use of “inauthentic emotions” or “surface acting.” For example, in negotiations, people high in emotional intelligence are more likely to recognize that their counterpart’s expression of anger is merely strategic (i.e., their counterpart is “gaming” his or her emotions; Andrade and Ho 2009; Fulmer et al. 2009). In support of our prediction, Wojciechowski et al. (2014) found that people high in emotional intelligence perform better on facial emotion recognition tasks.

Proposition 7

Targets high on the (a) perceiving and expressing and (b) understanding emotions dimensions of emotional intelligence are more likely to detect the use of emotional deception than targets low on these dimensions of emotional intelligence.

Emotional Intelligence and Retaliation

Target Emotional Intelligence and Retaliation

We expect the emotional intelligence of targets to influence their retaliation decisions. Emotions are integral to understanding the retaliation process: targets of deception often experience negative emotions when they detect deception (e.g.; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Xiao and Houser 2005; Yamagishi et al. 2009), and the emotions that targets experience (e.g., moral outrage) profoundly influence their decision to punish deceivers (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Xiao and Houser 2005).

We predict that targets high in emotional intelligence are less likely to engage in retaliation that is costly to themselves than targets low in emotional intelligence. Our prediction reflects a core finding in theory and research on punishment: that the decision to punish others—especially when it is personally costly—is driven by “hot” emotions. Indeed, empirical studies show that personally costly retaliation is strongly motivated by emotions such as anger and spite (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Xiao and Houser 2005; Yamagishi et al. 2009). As people high in emotional intelligence can more effectively regulate their emotions than people low in emotional intelligence (Côté 2014), we expect people high in emotional intelligence to be less motivated by anger and spite and, consequently, less likely to engage in personally costly retaliation against deceivers.

Proposition 8

Targets of deception who are high on the (a) understanding, (b) regulating, and (c) using emotion dimensions of emotional intelligence are less likely to engage in retaliation that is costly to themselves than targets of deception who are low on these dimensions of emotional intelligence.

Deceiver Emotional Intelligence and Retaliation

As we discussed earlier, targets of deception consistently punish deceivers when the deception is revealed (Boles et al. 2000; Croson et al. 2003; Schweitzer and Croson 1999)—even if punishment is personally costly (Brandts and Charness 2003), and emotional reactions to deception are an integral part of the retaliation process. In particular, targets often experience negative emotions in response to self-interested deception and opportunism (e.g.; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Xiao and Houser 2005; Yamagishi et al. 2009), and these emotions strongly influence their decision to punish deceivers (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Xiao and Houser 2005).

We expect the emotional intelligence of deceivers to influence the retaliation decisions of targets. In particular, we predict that deceivers high in emotional intelligence will be more effective in reducing the likelihood and magnitude of punishment in response to detected deception than deceivers low in emotional intelligence. Deceivers high in emotional intelligence understand the importance of emotions in the retaliation process and can regulate both their own emotions and those of their targets more effectively than deceivers low in emotional intelligence. For instance, deceivers high in emotional intelligence may be able to effectively respond to detected deception with emotions (e.g., expressions of guilt or regret) and actions that demonstrate remorse and mollify the deceived target. They may also be able to regulate their targets’ emotions (e.g., use tactics to reduce the anger, moral outrage, or moral disgust of targets) to curtail the likelihood and magnitude of retaliation.

Proposition 9

Deceivers high in emotional intelligence can more effectively reduce the likelihood and magnitude of retaliation in response to detected deception than deceivers low in emotional intelligence.

Deceiver Emotional Intelligence and the Restoration of Trust

Detected self-interested deception harms interpersonal trust. In empirical studies, Boles et al. (2000) and Rogers et al. (2017) found that self-interested informational deception diminishes trust, and Côté et al. (2013) and Campagna et al. (2016) found that self-interested emotional misrepresentation diminishes trust (for a recent review on negotiation, see Lewicki and Hanke 2012). Schweitzer et al. (2006) also found that trust that is harmed by detected self-interested deception is never fully restored—even if the target of deception receives an apology, a promise to change, and observes a series of trustworthy actions.

Although interpersonal trust is difficult to repair—particularly when it is harmed by detected deception (Lewicki and Hanke 2012; Schweitzer et al. 2006)—we predict deceivers high in emotional intelligence can more effectively restore interpersonal trust than deceivers low in emotional intelligence. Importantly, deceivers high in emotional intelligence are more likely to understand the importance of emotions in the trust restoration process and to use their emotions—and those of their counterparts—to effectively respond to detected deception (e.g., Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). For instance, deceivers high in emotional intelligence can respond to detected deception with the appropriate emotions (e.g., expressions of guilt, regret), as well as manipulate their targets’ emotions (e.g., use tactics to reduce anger or moral outrage) to restore interpersonal trust.

Proposition 10

Deceivers high in emotional intelligence can more effectively restore trust that is harmed by detected deception than deceivers low in emotional intelligence.

The Interaction of Deceiver and Target Emotional Intelligence

In our prior propositions, we considered the effects of the emotional intelligence of deceivers or their targets. However, we postulate that the deception detection process is interactive and reflects the influence of both deceivers and their targets. In our theoretical model, we consider the interaction between the emotional intelligence of deceivers and the emotional intelligence of targets and the influence of this interaction on the detection and effectiveness of deception in negotiations.

We expect that the emotional intelligence of targets moderates the relationships in Propositions 1, 2, and 3. In particular, we predict that the emotional intelligence of targets moderates the relationships between the emotional intelligence of deceivers and the effectiveness of deception, such that the relationship is stronger when targets are low in emotional intelligence than when targets are high in emotional intelligence.

In Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we argue that deceivers high in emotional intelligence can regulate their emotions to conceal their use of deception and manipulate emotions (their emotions and those of their targets) to mislead their targets. However, targets high in emotional intelligence can more effectively detect the use of emotional and informational deception than targets low in emotional intelligence (see Propositions 6 and 7). They can also more effectively regulate their emotions. As a result, we propose that the relationship between the emotional intelligence of deceivers and the effectiveness of deception is stronger when targets are low in emotional intelligence than when targets are high in emotional intelligence.

Proposition 11

The emotional intelligence of targets moderates the relationship between the emotional intelligence of deceivers and the effectiveness of deception (Propositions 1, 2, and 3), such that the relationship between the emotional intelligence of deceivers and the effectiveness of deception is stronger when targets are low in emotional intelligence than when targets are high in emotional intelligence.

We also expect that the emotional intelligence of deceivers moderates the relationships in Propositions 6 and 7. In particular, we predict that the emotional intelligence of deceivers moderates the relationship between the emotional intelligence of targets and the detection of informational and emotional deception, such that the relationship is stronger when deceivers are low in emotional intelligence than when deceivers are high in emotional intelligence.

In Propositions 6 and 7, we argued that targets high in emotional intelligence can use the emotions of others to detect their use of informational and emotional deception. However, deceivers high in emotional intelligence can regulate their emotions to conceal their use of deception (e.g., conceal their anxiety). They can also effectively manipulate their emotions to mislead others (see Propositions 1, 2, and 3). As a result, we propose that the relationship between the emotional intelligence of targets and the detection of deception is stronger when deceivers are low in emotional intelligence than when deceivers are high in emotional intelligence.

Proposition 12

The emotional intelligence of deceivers moderates the relationship between the emotional intelligence of targets and the detection of deception (Propositions 6 and 7), such that the relationship is stronger when deceivers are low in emotional intelligence than when deceivers are high in emotional intelligence.

Media Richness

Media Richness Theory proposes that communication media differ in their richness, such that some media (e.g., face-to-face) are richer than other media (e.g., email) (Daft and Lengel 1986). According to this theory, richness refers to the ability of a medium to transmit different types and amounts of information. In general, emotions are communicated more effectively in richer media than leaner media (e.g., Daft and Lengel 1986; Treviño et al. 1987).

Media richness is particularly important to our theoretical model for three reasons. First, media richness explicitly considers the communication of emotion and emotion-related information in interpersonal interactions (Daft and Lengel 1986; Daft et al. 1987; Treviño et al. 1987). The communication of this information underlies all of our propositions and theoretical model. Second, in contrast to many other constructs in the emotion literature, media richness is grounded in management and organizational theory (e.g., Carlson and Zmud 1999; Daft et al. 1987). Third, empirical research supports the assumptions underlying media richness theory and the influence of media richness in strategic information exchanges (e.g., Daft et al. 1987; Rice 1992; Rockmann and Northcraft 2008).

We expect media richness to moderate the relationships we describe between emotional intelligence and deception. In particular, we expect media richness to strengthen the relationships because media richness enables emotion-rich communication. First, we expect media richness to moderate the relationships between emotional intelligence and the detection of deception (Propositions 6, 7, and 12), as richer media allow for more accurate perceptions of emotions (which are critical to deception detection; Ekman and Friesen 1969) than leaner media (Daft and Lengel 1986; Treviño et al. 1990). As people high in emotional intelligence use the emotions of others to detect deception (see our discussion in Propositions 6, 7, and 12), we expect media richness to strengthen the relationships between emotional intelligence and the detection of deception described in Propositions 6, 7, and 12.

Proposition 13

Media richness moderates the relationship between emotional intelligence and the detection of deception (Propositions 6, 7, and 12), such that the richer the media the stronger the relationships.

Second, we expect media richness to moderate the relationships between emotional intelligence and the effectiveness of deception (Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 11), the use of deception (Propositions 4 and 5), and the consequences of detected deception (Propositions 9 and 10). Indeed, richer media allow for the more effective communication of emotions than leaner media (Daft and Lengel 1986; Treviño et al. 1990), and the manipulation and expressions of emotions influence the use, the effectiveness, and the consequences of detected deception (see our prior discussion ). As deceivers high in emotional intelligence use their emotions and those of others in the deception process, we expect media richness to strengthen the relationships that we propose in Propositions 1 through 5, and 9 through 11.

Proposition 14

Media richness moderates the relationship between emotional intelligence and the effectiveness of deception (Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 11), such that the richer the media the stronger the relationships.

Proposition 15

Media richness moderates the relationship between emotional intelligence and the use of deception (Propositions 4 and 5), such that the richer the media the stronger the relationships.

Proposition 16

Media richness moderates the relationship between emotional intelligence and the consequences of detected deception (Propositions 9 and 10), such that the richer the media the stronger the relationships.

In summary, in contexts that are not media rich, there is minimal emotion and emotion-related information and, thus, the relationships in our theoretical model are likely to be weaker. In fact, these contexts provide a minimal strategic advantage to those high in emotional intelligence. In contrast, in contexts that are media rich, there is emotion and emotion-related information that those high in emotional intelligence can glean and use to their strategic advantage. In media-rich contexts, our propositions are likely to be stronger. As a result, we believe that media richness is an important moderator in our theoretical model.

Discussion

Deception is pervasive in negotiations, organizations, and everyday life. In this article, we introduce a theoretical model that explores the interplay between the ability to perceive and express, understand, regulate, and use emotions—emotional intelligence—and deception. Although emotions are critical to the use of deception, the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception, prior research has failed to integrate emotions and emotional intelligence into theoretical models and empirical studies on deception in negotiations and organizations. In this article, we integrate these and related literatures and build an important theoretical foundation for empirical research on emotions, emotional intelligence, and deception.

In this article, we propose that emotional intelligence influences the use of deception (in particular, the decision to use deception and the effectiveness of deception), the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception (including retaliation and the restoration of harmed trust). We also propose that characteristics of negotiators (Machiavellianism), their interaction, and the negotiation context (competition/cooperation and media richness) moderate these relationships. In our model, we consider the emotional intelligence of both deceivers and targets, and we consider different forms of self-interested deception (informational, emotional, and monitoring-dependent), which is particularly pervasive and problematic in negotiations, organizations, and markets (Erat and Gneezy 2012; Gneezy 2005; Tenbrunsel 1998).

Theoretical Contributions

Our model advances our understanding of emotional intelligence and deception and makes several theoretical contributions. First, though prior research on emotional intelligence has focused on the positive effects of emotional intelligence, our work highlights the “dark” side of emotional intelligence. In our theoretical model, we extend prior theoretical and empirical research and consider the full range of benefits and costs of negotiating with individuals who are high in emotional intelligence. We postulate that the people most likely to deceive us may be those highest in emotional intelligence. This conjecture is consistent with prior work that has conceptualized emotional intelligence as a tool for “getting ahead” in organizations (Kilduff et al. 2010).

Second, our model provides a theoretical foundation for empirical research. In our work, we introduce new directions for both theory development and empirical research to investigate the important relationships between emotional intelligence and deception. In contrast to prior research that has focused on emotional intelligence and deception detection (e.g., Baker et al. 2013; O’Sullivan 2005; Wojciechowski et al. 2014), our model links emotional intelligence to the use of deception (in particular, the decision to use deception and the effectiveness of deception), the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception (in particular, the restoration of trust and retaliation). Our model also considers moderators of the relationships between emotional intelligence and deception. In this sense, our model advances the literature on emotional intelligence and deception and contributes to a broader understanding of the influence of emotional intelligence on deception in negotiations and organizations.

Third, our model extends Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996). Although this theory assumes that emotions are integral to interpersonal deception and recognizes the importance of the verbal and non-verbal “communication skills” of participants in the interaction, Interpersonal Deception Theory does not offer propositions that relate these skills to the use, the effectiveness, the detection, or the consequences of detected deception. Interpersonal Deception Theory also considers only some forms of deception and only some of the important components of the interaction. In our model, we extend Interpersonal Deception Theory to understand the influence of a particularly important “communication skill”—emotional intelligence—on the use of deception, the effectiveness of deception, the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception. We develop theory to understand how emotional intelligence influences deceivers and their targets, and we consider different forms of deception such as emotional, informational, and monitoring-dependent. We also respond to calls to consider moderators of these relationships.

Fourth, our model highlights the importance of emotional deception (the intentional misrepresentation of emotions) in interpersonal interactions. Our emphasis on emotional deception addresses a significant gap in our understanding of deception. Although people routinely deceive others both at work and at home, prior research has devoted scant attention to the manipulation of emotions as both a strategic tactic and a unique form of deception. In our model, we postulate that people high in emotional intelligence can manipulate both their own emotions and those of their targets and, as a result, may be particularly effective in misleading others.

Finally, our model advances theory and research on trust repair and punishment. Although prior research finds that detected deception has negative consequences (e.g., harmed trust, and retaliation; Boles et al. 2000; Croson et al. 2003), this research offers limited insights into the tactics that people can use to reduce these effects. For instance, Schweitzer et al. (2006) found that even after receiving a promise to change, an apology, and observing a consistent series of trustworthy actions, targets of deception never completely restored their trust in the deceiver. Our model offers insights into the importance of emotions in the trust restoration process. 

We believe that our propositions related to the repair of trust and punishment represent a particularly important contribution, as negotiators, managers, and organizations often fail to effectively manage the short-term and long-term consequences of detected deception and related forms of unethical behavior (e.g., self-interested lies, fraud, and corruption). Interestingly, in a recent article in Fortune, Grier (2015) criticized the “tepid and less than sincere” response issued by Michael Horn, the CEO of Volkswagen America at the time of the VW emission scandal (n.p.). As Grier (2015) writes, “More often than not, CEO apologies are similar to Horn's; they lack emotion [emphasis added]…” (n.p.).

Future Research

Our theoretical framework affords a generative foundation for future research. First, we call for empirical research to explore our theoretical model and propositions in both negotiation and organizations. This research should explore both the “light” and the “dark” side of emotional intelligence. Our work challenges the ubiquitous assertion that higher emotional intelligence is uniformly better for individuals, organizations, and society. As Goleman (1995) proclaims, “If EI were to become as widespread as IQ has become, and as ingrained in society as a measure of human qualities, then, I believe, our families, schools, and jobs, and communities would be all the more humane and nourishing [emphasis added]” (p.p., xvii–xviii). We challenge his claim and call for future work to explore both the benefits and the hazards of boosting emotional intelligence.

We also call for future work to develop new measures of emotional intelligence (Brackett and Mayer 2003; Brackett et al. 2006) and deception. In addition to self-report measures, future work should develop performance-based measures to assess emotional intelligence. Future work should also develop new tasks to assess deception in negotiations.

The deception literature offers different negotiation tasks that researchers could use to  assess our propositions. We recommend that researchers focus on tasks that entail interpersonal interactions with monetary stakes (e.g., Gaspar and Schweitzer 2019; Moran and Schweitzer 2008). Many of these tasks can be rather easily modified so that researchers can also assess the detection of deception. The literatures on trust violations (e.g., Schweitzer et al. 2006) and retribution (e.g., Boles et al. 2000) also offer different tasks that can be used or modified to assess deception. These literatures are especially relevant to the study of emotional intelligence and the consequences of deception.

Importantly, empirical research should consider the effects of emotional intelligence on deception in both non-repeated (i.e., “one shot”) and repeated interactions. The vast majority of studies on deception in negotiation have focused on non-repeated designs (for exceptions, see, e.g., Boles et al. 2000; Schweitzer et al. 2006; Hart and Schweitzer 2020). However, negotiations often entail multiple rounds of interaction, and future research is needed to understand the role of emotional intelligence in these interactions. For instance, it is possible that emotions and emotional intelligence are more important and impactful at some points in the negotiation process than in others.

In the lab, researchers should also dedicate attention to exploring our theoretical model in negotiation contexts that differ in media richness. Negotiations are increasingly technology mediated, and these contexts (e.g., phone versus videoconference) differ in their media richness (especially from in-person interactions). Scholars have devoted some attention to the role of media in influencing deception (e.g., Rockmann and Northcraft 2008; Schweitzer et al. 2002), but much more research is needed. This research should explore the interaction between media richness and emotional intelligence and the  effects of this interaction on deception.

Importantly, in the broader deception literature, there is a dearth of field research. This is as unacceptable as it is understandable. However, some scholars have conducted empirical research on deception in the field, and their studies offer important insights that are unavailable to researchers in the lab (e.g., Warren and Schweitzer 2018). We believe that field studies using different measures and manipulations (to the extent possible) and conducted in different contexts are likely to offer some of the most important insights into deception in negotiations and organizations.

We also call for future empirical work to expand our investigation into other strategic information exchanges. For example, scholars could conduct studies in call centers at collection companies, a context in which some debtors may engage in deception. Researchers could administer emotional intelligence tests to call center employees and then determine if they can detect or deter deception by guiding the conversation. Researchers could transcribe actual conversations between employees and debtors or participate in training sessions using confederates (e.g., use a planned script, manipulate whether the call is conducted via phone or video) to assess deception detection.

Second, research should also explore our model in different cultural contexts. Exploring our model in different cultural contexts is especially important, as cultural values and norms may influence the strength of our propositions. The cross-cultural behavioral business ethics and negotiation literatures can offer much to scholars interested in the cross-cultural power, limitations, and implications of our model (e.g., Chen et al. 2017; Glac et al. 2014).

Third, we call for future research to more fully explore the extent to which the different dimensions of emotional intelligence influence the use of deception (both the decision to use deception and the effectiveness of deception), the detection of deception, and the consequences of detected deception. This research could explore which of the many dimensions discussed in our theoretical model and propositions are most important to these processes. For instance, does the ability to understand emotions matter more than the ability to regulate emotions in the deception decision process?

Fourth, we call for future research to explore the individual, organizational, and institutional factors that may moderate the effects in our theoretical model. Future research should consider the relevant literature in the field of business ethics for insights into these factors (Wasieleski and Weber 2009; Weber 1990, 1996; Weber and Wasieleski 2001, 2013). This research could, for example, consider characteristics of targets (other than emotional intelligence) that may moderate the effects in our theoretical model.

Fifth, we call for future research to consider how other forms of intelligence influence deception. It is important to understand, for instance, whether not only emotional intelligence, but also IQ, influences the use, effectiveness, detection, and consequences of deception. IQ may exert a main effect on deception or interact with emotional intelligence or other individual or situational characteristics to influence deception. It is possible that those highest in emotional intelligence and IQ are particularly cunning and highly effective in using deception. This research will need to consider both the independent and interdependent effects of these constructs in the deception decision process.

Sixth, we call for the broader literature on emotional intelligence to consider whether the effects of emotional intelligence on deception (e.g., emotional misrepresentation) are, to some extent, emotion-specific. Currently, the literature treats emotional intelligence as broad in its influence. We believe that exploring the question, “Does the type of emotion matter?” is likely to require significant theoretical and empirical efforts on the part of scholars. We believe that scholars will need to use multiple measures for emotional intelligence, multiple measures and manipulations for specific emotions, different methods, and studies (field and lab) across different contexts and cultures.

Finally, we call for future research to explore other individual characteristics that influence deception. In recent years, the field has shifted its focus to the situational characteristics that influence deception. We call for research to also consider individual characteristics (other than emotional intelligence and Machiavellianism) that may influence deception. This research should consider not only general characteristics, but also those characteristics specific to negotiation (i.e., negotiator self-efficacy; Gaspar and Schweitzer 2019).

Practical Implications

Our theoretical framework offers several practical implications for negotiators, managers, and organizations. First, our model suggests that individuals should be particularly wary when confronting counterparts who are high in emotional intelligence (and especially if they are also high in Machiavellianism). Our model indicates that the people we are most likely to trust—those high in emotional intelligence—may also be the people most likely to deceive us. In this sense, it is important to recognize the “two faces” of emotional intelligence.

Second, our propositions indicate that people high in emotional intelligence are likely to be particularly effective deceivers in face-to-face interactions (e.g., negotiations). For this reason, it is important for people to carefully consider their negotiation strategy in these interactions. This might include recording interactions (e.g., recorded video conference interactions) or using written communication to maintain a careful record of the interaction and protect themselves from the influence of emotionally intelligent others.

Third, corporations, medical schools, and parents often strive to develop the emotional intelligence of their employees, students, and children. Although these efforts (e.g., in the form of training programs) offer many benefits, they may also create potential costs. For instance, training programs in corporations that increase the emotional intelligence of employees may (unintentionally) increase the likelihood that these employees will lie in a negotiation. Our model indicates that managers and organizations need to recognize these moral costs as they develop and implement emotional intelligence training programs.

Fourth, our model indicates the importance of concurrently instilling a strong moral compass (e.g., in the form of strong ethics codes, ethical cultures, ethics training programs; e.g., Warren et al. 2014) in those high in emotional intelligence. Ethics training programs are particularly important, and ethics training should be integrated into emotional intelligence and negotiation training. Employees should understand not only how to harness the power of their emotions, as is taught in emotional intelligence training programs, but also the importance of using their emotions for the “right” reasons. Employees need to understand when (and to what extent) it is moral and permissible to manipulate their emotions (and those of others; e.g., counterparts or teammates), and when it is not. Unfortunately, a persistent challenge for organizations is that those most likely to use deception (e.g., those high in Machiavellianism) are quite possibly the least likely to respond to ethics training and related interventions.

Fifth, our model suggests that negotiators should consider not only their emotional intelligence and that of their counterparts, but also characteristics of the negotiation context. In our theoretical model, we consider an important characteristic of the negotiation context: the competitiveness or cooperativeness of the negotiation. We offer two related recommendations to negotiators.

One is to recognize that people high in emotional intelligence may be more likely to use deception in competitive negotiations than they are in cooperative negotiations. As a result, negotiators should be especially vigilant in competitive negotiations. If they suspect that their counterpart is high in emotional intelligence, they should monitor their counterpart especially closely and verify their claims (e.g., Schweitzer and Ho, 2005).

In addition, we advise negotiators to shift their counterparts’ perception of the negotiation to view their interaction as less competitive and more cooperative. Negotiators can use language (Galinsky and Schweitzer 2015) and engage in symbolic acts, such as drinking, eating, and shaking hands (Schroeder et al. 2019; Schweitzer and Gomberg 2001; Schweitzer and Kerr 2000) to promote a cooperative frame.

Sixth, the recent proliferation of corruption, deception, and dishonesty in industry, government, and academia has led to repeated apologies from senior managers and leaders. Often, these apologies fail: they neither demonstrate remorse nor restore public trust (Schweitzer et al. 2015). Our model highlights the potentially important role for people high in emotional intelligence in the trust restoration process. In particular, it suggests that people high in emotional intelligence should contribute to the content and delivery of apologies. It also suggests that training programs should target these individuals to further develop their capacity to deliver effective apologies.

Seventh, our model suggests that negotiation teams and organizations can benefit from members both high and low in emotional intelligence. For instance, we posit that though team members high in emotional intelligence can more effectively detect the use of deception in a negotiation, team members low in emotional intelligence will curtail the risk that their team uses deception. In this sense, our model indicates that managers and organizations should consider the emotional intelligence and related traits of their team members and the potential costs and benefits of these interactions on moral and amoral outcomes.

Finally, employees, managers, and negotiators should consider the broader consequences of high emotional intelligence. This may be particularly important if those high in emotional intelligence are those most likely to rise to powerful positions in their organizations. Future work should explore how emotionally intelligent leaders use and detect deception in organizational contexts and how they effectively apologize (e.g., to their employees, shareholders) when their deception has been detected. Quite possibly, the strategies that enable individuals to climb a status hierarchy may become more—or less—effective as they gain power.