Introduction

For recent years, the issue of whether and how religion influences politics has aroused a heated debate. Moreover, the interactive influence between religion and politics has attracted more and more attention from scholars in the fields of politics, religion, management, and economics (Ayubi 2003; Campbell 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Djupe and Grant 2001; Gilbert 1993; Harris 1994, 1999; Hougland and Christenson 1983; Huckfeldt et al. 1993; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Laitin 1978; Milbrath 1965; Miller et al. 1981; Phiri 2001; Shi 1997; Scheufele et al. 2003; Smidt 1999; Verba et al. 1995; Wald et al. 2005; Wald et al. 1988; Wickham 2002). As a result, a new interdisciplinary field of “the political science of religion,” which focuses on the relation between religion and politics, has emerged because of demand.

In previous literature, scholars address the concerns about religious influence on politics from theoretical viewpoints (Campbell 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Gilbert 1993; Harris 1994, 1999; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Wald et al. 1988), the influence of religious activities on country-specific political participation (e.g., Islam countries, American countries, and Egypt, etc.) (Djupe, and Grant 2001; Ayubi 2003; Wickham 2002), and the empirical relations between religion and political involvement. However, these extant studies provide little evidence on the influence of religion on political involvement in the context of China or the impacts of Chinese religions on political participation. In this regard, scholars know little about whether and how religion influences political involvement and further whether and how different religions such as Chinese (Eastern) religions (Buddhism and Taoism) and foreign (monotheism) religions (e.g., Catholicism, Christianism, Islam, etc.) asymmetrically or similarly impact political involvement in the context of China, the largest emerging developing country and the second largest economy. As the response, using data on religious beliefs of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms from the 2008 national survey, this study fills above gaps by empirically examining the association between an entrepreneur’s religious belief and his/her political involvement.

In this study, I perform a set of empirical tests using a sample of 2779 Chinese family firms from the 2008 national survey. Specifically, I document strong and systematic evidence to show that an entrepreneur’s religious belief is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of political involvement. This finding suggests that religious entrepreneurs have more chances to acquire civic skills through their associational memberships and experience in religious activities (Verba et al. 1995), and thus are more likely to become deputies of the People’s Congress or/and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee. Moreover, my findings reveal that corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between religious belief and political involvement. Furthermore, above conclusions are robust to the rank of political involvement, but my findings are only valid for Chinese religions rather than foreign religions. After using the “propensity score-matching” approach to control for the potential endogeneity between political involvement and religious belief, my conclusions are still valid.

This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this study firstly investigates whether religious belief influences political involvement of entrepreneurs in family firms using the context of China, an old traditional country with a typical socialist system in which political participation is very different from that in Western countries. Second, this study is one of very few studies to use the survey data to investigate religious influence on individual behavior in China. Third, this study explores the moderating role of corporate philanthropy in the positive association between religious belief and political involvement. Finally, as additional tests show, this study finds that religious influence on political involvement of entrepreneurs is asymmetric for different religions, especially between Chinese religions and foreign religions. The above contributions help researchers understand the miracle of China’s rapid and continuous economic growth because political involvement as an important informal system can reduce policy or political uncertainties confronted with Chinese family firms (Chaney et al. 2009).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, I introduce institutional background and develop research hypotheses. The third section reports empirical model specifications and variable definitions. In the fourth section, I introduce research sample and data source, and then report descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation analyses. The fifth section reports empirical results. The sixth section conducts a variety of additional tests and discusses the endogeneity between political involvement and religious belief. In the seventh section, I discuss my findings, including theoretical contributions, managerial implications, and limitations and future research. Finally, I summarize conclusions of my study.

Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development

Religion in China

Traditionally, it is believed that the proportion of religious population in China is relatively low and is even negligible because China is a typically socialist country and the Communist Party of China is a staunch atheist. Indeed, for a long time, especially from the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the execution of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, religious activities were compelled to be at standstill. However, maybe scholars should gradually change their inherent perspectives on the current status of religion in contemporary China. In fact, as shown in the Chinese Spirit Life Survey (CSLS) conducted by the Center on Religion and Chinese Society at Purdue University (CRCSPU 2007),Footnote 1 85 % of Chinese people believe in a religion or have some sort of religious experience, and only 15 % of Chinese people are thorough atheists. With regard to the specific proportion of religious population in China, CRCSPU (2007) documents that about 18 % and 1.69 % of Chinese people believe in Buddhism and Taoism, respectively. In addition, about 2.54 % (about 33 millions) of Chinese people choose Catholicism or Christianism as their religious beliefs. As the mutual corroboration, an investigation on the Spirit Life of Contemporary Chinese People (Sun 2007) reports that the number of religious population in China is about 300 millions and thus the percentage of religious population is about 23.08 %. Among religious population, about 67.4 % of them believe in Buddhism or Taoism and 12 % of them have Catholic or Christian faith. Based on the aforementioned two investigations, one can draw a conclusion that the most influential religions are Buddhism and Taoism in China. Moreover, in contemporary China, Catholicism and Christianism also attract a large number of believers although these proportions are relatively lower.

Since the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, religious atmosphere in China has been gradually improved. First, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China endues people with the freedom of religious belief, and thus Chinese citizens have the right to believe in or not a religion in accordance with the law. Second, in the past 35 years since 1978, religious activities and the number of religious population have been flourishing beyond expectation (Du 2013). Finally, in the recent years, the world has witnessed increasing interactions between Chinese leaders and religious personages. For example, in February 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Master Hsing Yun, one of the famous Buddhist personages (Ifeng 2014). It is believed that, in this way, religion in China will receive new life and vigor. Moreover, for the first time, on August 13, 2014, the Pope was allowed to fly over China’s airspace on his flight to Korea (Zhang 2014).

Overall, religious influence in contemporary China is never trivial accompanying with the increasing proportion of religious population, legal recognition, and interactions between national leaders and religious figures. In this regard, one can rationally infer that religion may have important impacts on organization and corporate behavior in China. In Particular, extending the existing literature about religious influence on corporate finance, accounting, and ethics, this study focuses on the influence of religious belief on an entrepreneur’s political involvement.

Political Involvement of Entrepreneurs in Chinese Family Firms

Since the 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China (NCCPC) in 2002, increasing entrepreneurs in private-owned or family firms have entered Chinese political arena. Very vividly, these entrepreneurs who take participation in politics are called as “red-hat entrepreneurs” (Tian et al. 2008). In fact, political involvement of entrepreneurs in family firms can be viewed as the response to political and economic environment in contemporary China.

On the one hand, the policies in China provide entrepreneurs in family firms with the chances to take participation in politics. Over the past 35 years, the private economy has contributed to quite a proportion of economic miracle in China’s average annual growth of about 8–9 %, accompanying with the decline of state-owned enterprises and the rise of non-state-owned enterprises (Anderson et al. 2003; Ding et al. 2008; Du 2014b). Referring to findings in the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce survey, McGregor (2004) argues that China is relying on private firms for driving its sustainable economic growth and thus the Chinese leaders have gradually been conscious of the importance of the private economy. Considering the increasing importance of the private economy, China has reactively acknowledged the political status of entrepreneurs of family firms since 2002. In this regard, the public witness that more and more entrepreneurs of family firms (one of important constituents of the private or non-state economy) enter into the political arena.

On the other hand, entrepreneurs in family firms also have sufficient motivations to enter into politics. In China, although the degree of the recognition of the private sector and economy is increasing, national macro-industrial policies explicitly or implicitly favor the state-owned economy and discriminate against the private economy (Du 2014b). As a result, the majority of private-owned or family firms are concentrated into highly competitive industries but state-owned enterprises always centralize in various monopolized industries. In this regard, some entrepreneurs of Chinese family firms wish that political involvement can help their corporations enter into industries that are monopolized by state economy previously and thus grab fat profit. Moreover, entrepreneurs of Chinese family firms pin their hopes that political involvement can reduce policy or political uncertainties confronted with their firms (Fan et al. 2007). In some cases, political involvement may give political asylum to Chinese family firms and thus they undergo less or lower penalty due to wrongdoings (Chaney et al. 2009).

In China, the majority of political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms is to become deputies of the People’s Congress (PC) or members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at different levels, including nation-level, province-level, city-level, county-level, and town-level. Since the 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China in 2002, more and more entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms have been directly (county-level and town-level) or indirectly elected as deputies of the People’s Congress or members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. According to my investigation and Tian et al. (2008), there are 21 and 55 deputies of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or members of CPPCC are from the private sector in 1993 and 1998, respectively, but the figures are 230 in 2003 and even more in 2008. After relaxing the level of political involvement, the proportion of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms who enter into politics is higher. In my sample, the likelihood of political involvement (nation-, province-, city-, county-, and town-level) of entrepreneurs in family firms accounts for 55.45 %, an amazing proportion.

Overall, in China, macro-policies and the survival ecology motivate entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms to take part in politics and appear in the political arena.

Literature Review

A branch of extant literature emphasizes that one’s social and economic status (SES) is associated with his/her political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Nie et al. 1969; Verba and Nie 1972; Uhlaner et al. 1989; Verba et al. 1978). Another stream of extant studies argue that religion influences a believer’s political participation (e.g., Djupe and Grant 2001; Harris 1994, 1999; Hougland and Christenson 1983; Laitin 1978; etc.). Moreover, Diaz (1996), Verba et al. (1995), and Putnam (1993a, b) argue that religion can play its crucial role in political engagement, and thus one’s political involvement should be positively related with the extent of his/her engagement in religious activities.

According to Verba et al. (1995, p. 17), political involvement is closely related with institutions, “including the family in which one is born, the schools one attends, the family one forms as an adult, the jobs one takes, the non-political organizations and religious institutions with which one becomes afflicted.” Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) argue that the researchers should focus on religion to explain one’s political participation and provide the supplementary evidence to the social and economic status (SES) model. Overall, the framework for interpreting one’s political involvement in Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) and Verba et al. (1995) is greatly improved, compared with early literature, and specifically, religion is introduced into the framework. Following Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) and Verba et al. (1995) and focusing on Christianism or Islam, prior studies (e.g., Ayubi 2003; Scheufele et al. 2003; Wald et al. 2005; Wickham 2002) validate religious influences on believers’ political involvement.

Using a sample of Hispanic Americans, Greenberg (2000) examines the influence of religious culture on the extent of political participation in specific communities and finds a significantly positive relation between religious believers and political involvement. Using a sample of US Residents who are Asian descendants, Wong et al. (2005) find that the vote rate is significantly positively associated with the frequency of church attendance. Focusing on Muslims, Jamal (2005) finds that religious attendance is significantly related with political involvement after controlling for education level, marital status, birthplace, and other determinants. Based on the social capital theory, Gerber et al. (2008) document that a resident’s enthusiasm about voting for/against Congress and President is positively associated with his/her frequency of church attendance.

Based on previous literature (Verba et al. 1995, p. 17, 18, 310, 523) and above arguments, one can predict the positive association between religion and political involvement. However, previous studies leave several voids that need to be further explored (Verba et al. 1995). The first would be to check whether the findings based on Catholics or Christian, i.e., the positive association between religion and political involvement, can fit in well with Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Taoism. And further, the second would be to examine whether all religions have similar or asymmetric impacts on believers’ political involvement in a specific country or economy. The third test would be to examine whether conclusions in extant studies can be well applied to international setting, not just the country-specific setting. However, the existing literature provides little evidence in the above-mentioned three aspects.

Using a sample of Chinese family firms, this study tries to fill the above gaps by examining whether religion as a whole influences a believer’s political involvement. Moreover, I further investigate whether different religions impact political involvement asymmetrically or similarly. In this regard, my study extends previous literature on the association between religion and political involvement.

Religious Influence on Political Involvement in China (Hypothesis 1)

The existing theories and previous literature have validated the association between religion (religious belief) and political involvement, but there are several different characteristics of religion and political involvement in China, respectively.

First, religion in China distinguishes itself from that in other countries. In China, people have the right to believe in a religion, including Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianism, and Islam, etc. In the era of religious diversity in China, Catholicism, Christianism, and other religions attract more and more believers, but the most influential religions are still Buddhism and Taoism and 66.1 % of religious populations believe in Buddhism and Taoism. Because Buddhism and Taoism do not have their respective weekly ceremonies and rituals, a Buddhist or a Taoist does not go to Buddhist monasteries or Taoist temples regularly (Du 2013) except for occasional and important festivals based on the Chinese lunar calendar. Moreover, quite a few Buddhists or Taoists are very conservative and discreet (Du 2013, 2014a). Therefore, it is very difficult for researchers to obtain accurate statistics on the numbers of the religious believers and/or the attendance at religious sites (Du et al. 2014a, b).

Second, in China, the conduits of political involvement are very different from other countries. In Western countries, scholars measure political involvement as “vote for president and/or congress.” However, in China, because direct election only exists in lower level of political systems such as county-level and town-level, but higher-level political systems adopt indirect election, it is very difficult for researchers to obtain sufficient and reliable data on whether a religious believer has the motivation to vote for/against deputies of the People’s Congress (PC) or/and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC). In this regard, as an alternative, researchers measure political involvement as being elected as a deputy of PC or/and a member of CPPCC (Tian et al. 2008).

Based on the aforementioned discussions, it is necessary for researchers to separately investigate the influence of religion (religious belief) on political involvement in the context of China.

Political skills can be learned through engaging in voluntary activities in non-political settings and different institutions may bring out asymmetrically political skills (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Verba et al. 1995, p. 310). In addition, religious institutions can play a crucial and unique role in political system because religion may attenuate the asymmetric impacts of unbalance resources, educational levels, and income levels on political skills, and thus ensure resource-poor individuals with religious beliefs to build civic skills and take participation in politics (Verba et al. 1995, p. 18). Furthermore, besides the association between religion and civic skills, Ammerman (1997), Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) and Wald et al. (1988) argue that religion can serve as a very important channel of political information and recruitment and thus facilitate a believer’s political involvement.

Based on the social capital theory of religion (Greenberg 2000), religion can help believers share common knowledge and social value. As a result, the common religious belief bonds believers together, and thus religion can motivate believers’ political involvement. Moreover, according to the resource sharing theory of religion (Greenberg 2000), with the help of religious sites like churches, religion provides believers with conduits in which they share political resources, political information, and the chance of political participation, as well as they have dibs on the shared-value of political involvement. As the supplement, Gerber et al. (2008) argue that church attendance can bring out more information-sharing and social compliance. Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) find that religion can upgrade the awareness of citizens and strengthen the awareness of participation and collaboration in religious believers, and thus religion positively impacts political involvement of believers.

Under the context of China, the social capital theory and the resource sharing theory (Greenberg 2000) can be applied to Catholicism, Christianism, and Islam. For Buddhism and Taoism, the social capital theory works better than the resource sharing theory because there are not weekly ceremonies and rituals for Buddhists and Taoists. Therefore, religion can play its important role in social capital through sharing common value. As a result, one can rationally predict the positive association between religion and political involvement.

Moreover, to ensure wide representation in Chinese political system, the Communist Party of China, as the sole political party in power, is inclined to incorporate people from all circles and from all walks of life, including religious figures and business people from the upper strata (both the state and private sector). In this regard, if entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms believe in a religion, then they will cater to three features: (1) religious figures; (2) business people from the upper strata; and (3) the private sector. In this regard, the political party in power can achieve the widest representation with relatively fewer seats, which means the effective utilization of political resources. Thus, one can rationally predict that entrepreneurs with religious beliefs in Chinese family firms are more likely to be elected as deputies of the People’s Congress or/and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee. That is, religious belief upgrades their chances of political involvement.

Based on above discussions, I formulate Hypothesis 1 in an alternative form:

Hypothesis 1

Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of political involvement is higher for entrepreneurs with religious beliefs than for their counterparts.

The Moderating Role of Corporate Philanthropy (Hypothesis 2)

Hypothesis 1 predicts the positive association between entrepreneurs’ religious beliefs and the likelihood of political involvement. Next, I focus on China’s unique institutional setting and further address the moderating role of corporate philanthropy for the following reasons: First, corporate philanthropy has been validated to be linked with political connections/involvement (Claessens et al. 2008; Gu et al. 2013). In fact, as the response to political uncertainty and for the purpose of protecting property rights, Chinese family firms are always inclined to build political connections or take participation in political affairs through corporate philanthropy (Du 2014b; Su and He 2010). My study extends this finding by examining the interactive effect between religious beliefs and corporate philanthropy on political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms.

Second, as noted in the subsection of “political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms,” entrepreneurs in family firms also have sufficient motivations to take part in political affairs because political involvement is a crucial form of guanxi in China and entrepreneurs in family firms pin their hope on political involvement to build political connections with government officials to hedge against policy uncertainties (Du 2014b; Fan et al. 2007).

Finally, relevant to this study, considering religion and corporate philanthropy are two channels or conduits of political involvement, this study further addresses the interactive effect between religion and corporate philanthropy on political involvement. In this regard, this study refers to the framework in Williamson (2000) to theoretically analyse whether the moderating effect between religion and corporate philanthropy on political involvement is substitutive or reciprocally reinforced.

In the framework of Williamson (2000), there are four levels, in which religion lies in the first level. Religion, as an informal system, is generally accepted as ex ante factor and has spontaneous origin, and thus is extremely stable and even keeps unchanged for centuries or millennia (Du et al. 2014c; Williamson 2000). However, corporate philanthropy is reactive and may serve as different objectives, such as strategic, political, altruistic, and managerial self-interest motivation (Campbell et al. 2002; Du 2014b; Seifert et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 2010). In other words, corporate philanthropy should be classified as the fourth (lowest) level (i.e., resource allocation and employment), and thus is ex post, dynamic, and “partly the result of evolutionary processes.” Therefore, as noted by Williamson (2000) and validated by Du et al. (2014c), when the element in the lower level (corporate philanthropy) is responsive and hysteretic, informal institutions in higher levels (religion) can serve as an alternative mechanism to play a subsidiary role in shaping corporate and social activities. As a result, I predict that the interaction between religion and corporate philanthropy on political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms is more likely to be substitutive, rather than reciprocally reinforced.

Based on the above discussion, I formulate Hypothesis 2 in an alternative form as below:

Hypothesis 2

Ceteris paribus, corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between entrepreneurs’ religious beliefs and the likelihood of political involvement.

Model Specifications and Variables

Multivariate Model Specification for Hypothesis 1

To test Hypothesis 1 that predicts the positive association between religious belief (REL) and political involvement (POL), I follow extant studies (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Du 2014b) and estimate Eq. (1) to link political involvement (POL) and religion (REL), entrepreneur-specific variables, firm-specific determinants, and industry and province dummies:

$$\begin{aligned} POL = \;& \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1} REL + \alpha_{2} GENDER + \alpha_{3} EDU + \alpha_{4} AGE\\ &+ \alpha_{5} GOV\_EXP + \alpha_{6} WORK + \alpha_{7} EMPLOYEE \\ & +\alpha_{8} SIZE + \alpha_{9} LEV + \alpha_{10} ROS + \alpha_{11} FIRMAGE\\ &+\alpha_{12} GDP\_PC + \left( {Industry \, Dummies} \right) \\ & + \left( {Province \, Dummies} \right) + \varepsilon \\ \end{aligned}.$$
(1)

In Eq. (1 ), the dependent variable is political involvement, labeled as POL. POL is an indicator variable, equaling 1 if the entrepreneur of a family firm is a deputy of the People’s Congress (PC) or/and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) and 0 otherwise. Moreover, in Eq. (1), the main independent variable is religious belief with the label of REL. REL is a dummy variable, equaling 1 if the entrepreneur of a family firm believes in a religion (Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianism, Islam, or other religions) and 0 otherwise. Therefore, in Eq. (1), a significantly positive coefficient on REL (α 1 ) is consistent with Hypothesis 1.

In the section of robustness checks, I also introduce an ordered variable for the rank of political involvement (POL_RANK) as the alternative dependent variable and Chinese religions (REL_CH) and foreign religions (REL_FOR) as alternative independent variables to conduct robustness tests.

To isolate the impacts of religious belief on political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms, I include a set of control variables into Eq. (1). First, Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) argue that individual characteristics affect their political participation, and thus I include five variables, i.e., GENDER, EDU, AGE, GOV_EXP, and WORK, that outline some important characteristics of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms. GENDER is an indicator variable, equaling 1 if a family firm’s entrepreneur is woman and 0 otherwise (Du et al. 2014a; Wang and Coffey 1992). EDU is the ordered variable for educational level of a family firm’s entrepreneur, measured as 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 for postgraduate or above, bachelor, college, senior high school, junior high school, and primary school, respectively (Du 2014b). AGE is the age of a firm’s entrepreneur (Du 2014b). GOV_EXP is an indicator variable for government experience, equaling 1 if the entrepreneur served as an official in a (central or local) government before he/she became the founder of a family firm and 0 otherwise (Du 2014b; Gao et al. 2012). WORK is work time per day of the entrepreneur, measured as the average work time that the entrepreneur spends on a daily operation and management.

Second, in addition to entrepreneur-specific characteristics, I also introduce five firm-specific variables that exposit some important characteristics of Chinese family firms, i.e., EMPLOYEE, SIZE, LEV, ROS, and FIRMAGE, into Eq. (1) (Du 2014b; Gao et al. 2012). Specifically, EMPLOYEE denotes employee relation, measured as the total amount of wages and bonuses paid to all workers scaled by sales revenue. SIZE denotes firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of sales revenue (Du 2014b; Gao et al. 2012). LEV is financial leverage, measured as the amount of a family firm’s bank loans scaled by sales revenue (Gao et al. 2012; Gao and Hafsi 2014). ROS denotes returns on sales, measured as net income scaled by sales revenue in the year (Du 2014b; Gao et al. 2012). FIRMAGE is firm age, measured as the number of years since a family firm’s foundation (Du 2014b).

Third, extant studies find that economic development level in a region, where a firm is located, influences entrepreneurs’ political involvement (Harris 1994, 1999), and thus I add an additional variable of GDP_PC, measured as GDP per capita (in thousand RMB) at the province level (Du 2014b; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001).

Finally, I also add a set of industry and province dummy variables to control industry and province fixed effects.

Multivariate Model Specification for Hypothesis 2

To test Hypothesis 2, i.e., corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between an entrepreneur’s religious belief and political involvement, I estimate Eq. (2) to link political involvement (POL) and religion (REL), corporate philanthropic giving (CPG), the interaction of REL × CPG, entrepreneur-specific variables, firm-specific determinants, and industry and province dummies:

$$\begin{aligned} POL = \;& \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} REL + \beta_{2} CPG + \beta_{3} REL \times CPG \\&+\beta_{4} GENDER + \beta_{5} EDU + \beta_{6} AGE + \beta_{7} GOV\_EXP \\ & +\beta_{8} WORK + \beta_{9} EMPLOYEE \, + \beta_{10} SIZE + \beta_{11} LEV \\ & + \beta_{12} ROS + \beta_{13} FIRMAGE + \beta_{14} GDP\_PC \\&+\left( {Industry \, Dummies} \right) + \left( {Province \, Dummies} \right) + \zeta \\ \end{aligned}$$
(2)

In Eq. (2), the dependent variable and the main independent variable are still POL and REL, respectively. The moderating variable is corporate philanthropy with a label of CPG, measured as the natural logarithm of the total amount of philanthropic giving since the foundation of a family firm. In Eq. (2), if the coefficient on REL × CPG (β 3 ) is negative and significant, Hypothesis 2 is supported by empirical evidence. Also, consistent with Hypothesis 1 and extant studies, both the coefficients on REL and CPG should be significantly positive. In Eq. (2), control variables are the same as those in Eq. (1).

Sample, Data, and Descriptive Statistics

Sample

The initial list in the sample includes all Chinese family firms in the 2008 national survey. A branch of very thin but growing literature (Du 2014b; Gao et al. 2012; Gao and Hafsi 2014; Su and He 2010; Zhou 2013) has employed the same database from the 2008 national survey or similar surveys in years before 2008 to conduct their respective studies. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. First, I eliminate firms pertaining to the banking, insurance, and other financial industries. Second, I delete firms whose data on entrepreneurs’ religious belief and political involvement are unavailable. Third, I exclude firms whose data on entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics are unavailable. Finally, I eliminate firms whose data on firm-specific control variables are unavailable. Finally, I obtain a sample of 2,779 firms. Then, to alleviate the potential influence of extreme observations, I winsorize the top and bottom 1 % of each variable’s distribution.Footnote 2

Table 1 Sample selection

Panel B of Table 1 exhibits the sample distribution by geography (i.e., province) and by industry. As Section A of Panel B shows, Chinese family firms from all 31 provinces in Mainland China distribute fairly evenly. Most provinces house less than 10 % except for Jiangsu and only five provinces have more than 5 % of family firms in the sample. In addition, as Section B shows, most Chinese family firms belong to manufacturing (44.44 %) and wholesale and retail (16.95 %).

Data Source

Data sources for variables are as below. First, I obtain data on entrepreneur-specific characteristics such as political involvement (POL), religious beliefs (REL), entrepreneurs’ gender (GENDER), education level (EDU), entrepreneur’s age (AGE), government experience (GOV_EXP), and work time (WORK) from the 2008 Chinese survey conducted jointly by (Jiang et al. 2013): (1) the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee; (2) the All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce; (3) the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China; and (4) the Private Economy Research Institute of China. The survey respondents are private entrepreneurs chosen randomly from 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in Mainland China. Second, the 2008 Chinese survey also provides firm-specific information about Chinese family firms such as corporate philanthropy (CPG), employee relation (EMPLOYEE), firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), financial performance (ROS), and firm age (FIRMAGE). Third, I obtain the data on province-level GDP per capita (GDP_PC) from the 2008 China Statistical Yearbook and match them to each firm. Finally, all variables used in the subsection of “Discussion on the Potential Endogeneity between Political Involvement and Religious Belief” are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook.

Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Analysis

Section A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics results of variables used in this study. As shown in Section A of Table 2, the mean value of POL, the dependent variable, is 0.5545, revealing that about 55.45 % of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms are deputies of the People’s Congress or/and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee. This finding echoes views in previous literature (Adhikari et al. 2006; Du 2014b; Faccio et al. 2006; Fan et al. 2007; Khwaja and Mian 2005) that political involvement, as well as political connections, has been an important channel for firms to build Guanxi with government officials to hedge against policy uncertainties. Moreover, the mean value of REL, the main independent variable, is 0.1403, revealing that about 14.03 % of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms believe in one of the religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianism, Islam, etc. The mean value of CPG is 9.6865, meaning that the average amount of corporate philanthropic giving in Chinese family firms is about 16098.80 RMB.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix

As for control variables, results in Section A of Table 2 reveal the following aspects: (1) For entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms, women entrepreneurs (GENDER) account for about 14.83 %, the average education level (EDU) is college-level, the average age for entrepreneurs (AGE) is about 45.69, about 18.17 % of entrepreneurs served as officials in (central or local) governments before they became the founders of family firms (GOV_EXP), and the average work time per day for entrepreneurs (WORK) is about 7.2496 h. (2) For Chinese family firms, on average, the total amount of wages and bonuses paid to all workers scaled by annual sales revenue (EMPLOYEE) is about 15.18 %, firm size (sales revenue per year, SIZE) is about 11.07 millions RMB, financial leverage (LEV) is about 21.24 %, returns on sales (ROS) is about 9.26 %, and firm age (FIRMAGE) is about 8.6006 years. (3) The average GDP per capita (GDP_PC) is about 28414.2 RMB.

Section B of Table 2 reports Pearson correlation analysis of variables used in this study. The p value is in parentheses below the coefficient. Results in Section B of Table 2 reveal the following aspects: (1) POL is significantly positively related with REL (0.0516 with p value = 0.0065), suggesting that entrepreneurs with religious beliefs are more likely to go into politics and thus have a significantly higher likelihood of political involvement. This result preliminarily validates Hypothesis 1. (2) There is a significantly positive correlation coefficient between POL and CPG (0.4157, p value <0.0001), echoing findings in extant studies (Claessens et al. 2008; Gu et al. 2013; Du 2014b; Su and He 2010). The above results, when taken together, suggest that this study should further address the interactive effects between religion and corporate philanthropy on political involvement.

As for Pearson correlation of control variables in Section B of Table 2, POL displays significantly positive correlations with EDU, AGE, GOV_EXP, SIZE, LEV, and FIRMAGE, suggesting that education level, an entrepreneur’s age, government experience, firm size, financial leverage, and firm age positively impact an entrepreneur’s political involvement, respectively. Moreover, significantly negative correlations between POL and GENDER, WORK, EMPLOYEE, ROS, and GDP_PC, reveal that female entrepreneur, work time per day of the entrepreneur, employee relation, returns on sales, and GDP per capita at the province level have negative influence on entrepreneurs’ political involvement, respectively. The above results, when taken together, suggest the necessity to incorporate these variables into regressions when I examine the influence of religious belief on political involvement. Moreover, the coefficients of pair-wise correlation among control variables are generally low, implying no serious multicollinearity problem when these variables are included in regressions simultaneously.

Empirical Results and Analyses

Multivariate Test of Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 predicts that an entrepreneur’s religious belief is positively associated with political involvement. Table 3 presents the Logistic regression results and all reported t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering (Petersen 2009) at industry level. In addition to the signs and significances of the main independent variable and control variables, I also report their marginal effects on the likelihood of political involvement.

Table 3 Regression result of political involvement on religion and other determinants

As shown in Table 3, the coefficient on REL is positive and significant at the 1 % level (0.2930 with t = 4.17) with a marginal effect of 7.01 %, providing strong support to Hypothesis 1. Moreover, this coefficient estimate also reveals the following aspects: First, an entrepreneur’s religious belief is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of political involvement, suggesting that religious entrepreneurs are more likely to become deputies of the People’s Congress or/and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee. This finding echoes the view that religious believers acquire civic skills through their associational memberships and their experience in involving religious activities (Verba et al. 1995). Second, according to Wooldridge (2009), I further calculate the marginal effect of religion (REL) on political involvement (POL), and find that the probability of political involvement is about 7.01 % higher for religious entrepreneurs than for their counterparts.

As for the signs and significances of control variables in Table 3, it is worthy noting the following aspects: (1) The coefficient on EDU is positive and significant at the 1 % level (0.2170 with t = 2.94) with a marginal effect of 5.30 %, suggesting that entrepreneurs with higher education level have a significantly higher likelihood of political involvement than entrepreneurs with lower education level. This finding is consistent with those in Jones-Correa and Leal (2001). (2) AGE has a significantly positive coefficient (0.0272 with t = 8.76 and a marginal effect of 0.66 %), revealing that elder entrepreneurs are more likely to go into politics than younger entrepreneurs. This result echoes the finding in Jones-Correa and Leal (2001). (3) The coefficient on EMPLOYEE is positive and significant at the 1 % level, indicating that entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms with better employee relation have a significantly higher likelihood of political involvement. (4) SIZE has a positive and significant coefficient with a marginal effect of 11.68 %, implying that the likelihood of political involvement is higher for entrepreneurs from large-scale family firms than for entrepreneurs from small and medium-sized family firms. (5) LEV has a significantly positive coefficient (0.3484 with t = 5.72), revealing the positive relation between financial leverage and political involvement of entrepreneurs. (6) The coefficient on ROS is positive and significant at the 5 % level (0.4029 with t = 2.44), suggesting that entrepreneurs from Chinese family firms with better accounting performance are more likely to go into politics. (7) FIRMAGE has a positive and significant coefficient (0.0879 with t = 8.11) with a marginal effect of 2.15 %, meaning that the likelihood of political involvement for entrepreneurs from elder family firms is significantly higher than for those from younger family firms. Except for above variables, I do not find significant coefficients on other control variables.

Multivariate Test of Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 predicts that corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between religion and political involvement. Table 4 reports the Logistic regression results with marginal effects of all variables on the likelihood of political involvement.

Table 4 Regression result of political involvement on religion, corporate philanthropy, and other determinants

As Table 4 shows, REL has a significantly positive coefficient (0.3274 with t = 5.61) with a marginal effect of 7.85 %, validating Hypothesis 1 again. Also, the marginal effect of religious belief on political involvement (7.85 %) is higher than that in Table 4 (7.01 %). Moreover, CPG has a positive and significant coefficient (0.1597 with t = 12.72) with a marginal effect of 3.91 %, which is consistent with theoretical expectation and findings in extant literature (Du 2014b; Su and He 2010).

More importantly, in Table 4, the coefficient on REL × CPG is negative and significant at the 1 % level (−0.0656 with t = −2.89) with a marginal effect of −1.61 %, providing strong support to Hypothesis 2. This finding recognizes that corporate philanthropy does attenuate the positive association between religious belief and political involvement of entrepreneurs from Chinese family firms.

As for the signs and significances of the control variables in Table 4, I find that they are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 except for WORK. Specifically, POL is significantly negatively related with WORK (−0.0360 with t = −2.23) with a marginal effect of -0.88 %, suggesting that hard working entrepreneurs are less likely to go into politics.

Additional Tests and Discussion on the Potential Endogeneity

Additional Tests Using the Rank of Political Involvement

In China, political involvement, i.e., the deputy of the People’s Congress (PC) or/and the member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC), includes five levels: town-level, county-level, city-level, province-level, and nation-level. Therefore, I construct and introduce an additional variable of POL_RANK to further test Hypotheses 1 and 2. POL_RANK is an ordered variable for the rank of political involvement, measured as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for none, town-level, county-level, city-level, province-level, and nation-level deputy of PC or/and member of CPPCC, respectively. Table 5 reports the Ordered Logistic regression results.

Table 5 Additional tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 using the rank of political involvement

As shown in Column (1) of Table 5, the coefficient on REL is positive and significant at the 1 % level (0.2348 with t = 4.74), suggesting that religious entrepreneurs of Chinese family firms are more likely to become higher level of PC and CPPCC. This result provides additional support to Hypothesis 1. As presented in Column (2) of Table 5, the coefficient on REL × CPG is negative and significant at the 1 % level (−0.0833 with t = −4.70), lending important and strong support to Hypothesis 2. Moreover, both REL and CPG have significantly positive coefficients (0.3375 with t = 6.24 and 0.1593 with t = 11.75, respectively), validating Hypothesis 1 again and consistent with the finding in Table 4.

Additional Tests with the Distinction between Chinese Religions and Foreign Religions

To address the concern about whether different religions such as Chinese religions and foreign religions have similar or asymmetric influences on political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms, I distinguish Chinese religions (Buddhism and Taoism) from foreign religions (Catholicism, Christianism, Islam, etc.) and then re-estimate Eqs. (1) and (2). In doing so, I include two additional variables, i.e., REL_CH and REL_FOR, to denote Chinese religions and foreign religions, respectively. REL_CH is a dummy variable of Chinese Religion, equaling 1 if the entrepreneur of a family firm believes in a Chinese religion (Buddhism or Taoism) and 0 otherwise. REL_FOR is an indicator variable for foreign religion, equaling 1 if the entrepreneur of a family firm believes in a foreign religion (Catholicism, Christianism, Islam, or other religions) and 0 otherwise. Table 6 reports the Logistic regression results.

Table 6 Additional tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 with the distinction between Chinese religion and foreign religions

As shown in Column (1) of Table 6, the coefficient on REL_CH is positive and significant at the 1 % level (0.4031 with t = 5.54), suggesting that entrepreneurs of Chinese family firms who believe in Chinese religions (Buddhism or Taoism) have a significantly higher likelihood of political involvement, compared with their counterparts. However, REL_FOR has an insignificant coefficient, revealing that there is no significant relation between foreign religions and political involvement. The above results, taken together, show that Hypothesis 1 is valid only for Chinese religions, but not for foreign religions. Column (2) of Table 6 presents regression results of Hypothesis 2. As shown in Column (2) of Panel B, the coefficient on REL_CH × CPG is negative and significant at the 1 % level (−0.0646 with t = −2.87) but REL_FOR × CPG has an insignificant coefficient, revealing that Hypothesis 2 is supported by empirical evidence only for the case of Chinese religions.

Discussion on the Potential Endogeneity between Political Involvement and Religious Belief

It is very difficult for researchers to rule out the potential endogeneity between political involvement and religious belief. Because of data limitation in my study (only one year data), I cannot identify the relative timing of political involvement and religious belief. Therefore, it is impossible for me to test whether political involvement comes before or after an entrepreneur’s religious belief. Nevertheless, I still try to control for the potential endogeneity between political involvement and religion using the “propensity score-matching” approach because the dependent variable in the first stage or the main independent variable in the second stage, i.e., REL, is an indicator variable (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). In doing so, the aim of propensity score matching is to choose a subsample whose characteristics more closely resembles the REL subsample (Dehejia and Wahba 2002).

In the first stage, I refer to extant literature (e.g., Du et al. 2014a, b; El Ghoul et al. 2012; etc.) and then choose a set of variables to conduct the propensity score-matching process. These variables used in the first stage include three classifications: (1) Macro-level variables that potentially influence individual religious belief, including TRANS, TAX, POP, INC_PC, MKT, CONS_PC, UNEM, and FIN_DEF. TRANS is the natural logarithm of the total mileage of highway and railway at the province level (in kilometer). TAX is the natural logarithm of total provincial tax (in million RMB). POP is the natural logarithm of the number of populations in a province (in million). INC_PC is the natural logarithm of provincial income per capita. MKT is Fan et al.’s Marketization Index (Fan et al. 2011), which measures the whole institution development of each province in China and the investor protection of each region. CONS_PC is the total amount of provincial consumption per capita. UNEM is the provincial unemployment rate. FIN_DEF is the natural logarithm of financial deficit in a province. (2) Entrepreneur-specific variables, including GENDER, EDU, and AGE. (3) Firm-specific variables, including SIZE and LEV.

To examine whether variables in the first stage are appropriate for the propensity score-matching process, I conduct t tests for differences in the mean value between the REL subsample (REL = 1) and the non-REL subsample (REL = 0) in Table 7. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, for the full sample, there are significant differences in TRANS, INC_PC, MKT, FIN_DEF, EDU, and SIZE between the REL subsample and the non-REL subsample. However, after conducting the propensity score-matching process, for all variables used in the first stage, no significant difference exists. The above results suggest that variables in the first stage are appropriate and a good matching work is done.

Table 7 Additional tests considering the potential endogeneity between political involvement and religion

Panel B of Table 7 reports results using the propensity score-matching sample, which consists of 768 firms. As shown in Column (1) of Panel B that presents results of the first stage, REL is significantly negatively associated with TRANS, TAX, EDU, and AGE. Moreover, POP, INC_PC, GENDER, and SIZE significantly positively influence REL.

Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B in Table 7 reports regression results of Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. As shown in Column (2), the coefficient on REL is significantly positive (0.3832 with t = 4.92), consistent with Hypothesis 1. As Column (3) presents, the coefficients on REL and CPG are both significant and positive (0.4498 with t = 5.13 and 0.1926 with t = 13.08), validating Hypothesis 1 again and echoing the findings in prior literature (Du 2014b; Su and He 2010), respectively. Moreover, the coefficient on REL×CPG is negative and significant at the 1 % level (−0.1021 with t = −4.02), providing strong and additional support to Hypothesis 2.

Overall, results in Table 7 based on the propensity score-matching sample produce statistically indistinguishable results compared with findings in Tables 3 and 4, validating that an entrepreneur’s religious belief is significantly positively associated with political involvement, and corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between religious belief and political involvement.

Discussion

This study investigates the influence of religious belief on political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms and further explores the moderating role of corporate philanthropy, adding to the existing literature on the association between religion and corporate or individual behavior. My study makes several theoretical contributions and managerial implications as below.

Theoretical Contributions

First, to my knowledge and literature in hand, this study is the first to explore and investigate whether religion (religious belief) influences political involvement of entrepreneurs using the context of China. Prior studies (e.g., Ayubi 2003; Djupe and Grant 2001; Harris 1994, 1999; Hougland and Christenson 1983; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Laitin 1978; Scheufele et al. 2003; Wald et al. 2005; Wickham 2002) focus on Christianism or Islam and then examine their influences on believers’ political involvement such as “vote for president” and “vote for congress,” but provide little evidence on: (1) whether Eastern religions or Chinese religions influence a believer’s political involvement; (2) whether different religions (e.g., Western religions V.S. Eastern religions) have similar or asymmetric impacts on political involvement in the country-specific setting; (3) whether religion affects political involvement of entrepreneurs. This study fills the above gaps by using the Chinese context to investigate the influence of religious beliefs of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms on political involvement, and further explore the asymmetric impacts of different religions on political involvement.

Moreover, different from political participation in Western countries that embodies the vote for president or congress, political involvement in China is more direct and dominant as being elected as deputies of the People’s Congress (PC) or/and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC). In this regard, my study provides additional evidence on religious influence on political involvement using the context of China, a socialist country with a unique electoral system.

Second, this study is one of very few studies to use the survey data to investigate religious influence in China. Religion-based studies in China are at an early stage and have brought out a very thin but growing literature (Chen et al. 2013; Du 2013, 2014a). However, unlike extant Western-religion-based studies using religiosity or religious piety, most extant religion-based studies in China employ religion variables based on the geographic distance between a firm and religious sites (Du 2013, 2014a; Du et al. 2014a, b, c; Chen et al. 2013) because it is very difficult for researchers to obtain data on individual religiosity. Fortunately, I could obtain a set of unique data on religious beliefs of entrepreneurs from the 2008 national survey of Chinese family firms, which ensures that my study distinguishes itself from previous religion-based literature using geographic-proximity-based religion variables in China. Although geographic-proximity-based religion variables are relatively objective, they always fail to capture people’s actual thoughts (Du 2013). Therefore, my study provides important complementarities to previous religion-based studies using geographic-proximity-based religion variables in China. At least, this study is expected to motivate the integrated use of data on religiosity from surveys and data on geographic-proximity-based religion variables in future research.

Third, this study adds to the existing Chinese-religions-based literature by examining religious influence on entrepreneurs’ political involvement. For a long time, because of the limitation of data on individual religiosity, the existing Chinese-religions-based studies focus on the association between religion and corporate decisions/behavior, and few studies address the impacts of religion on individual behavior. In fact, as Du (2013; 2014a) and Chen et al. (2013) argue, relatively friendly religious atmosphere (climate) in contemporary China ensures that religion is viewed as a set of social norms to influence believers and others in the same community which is surrounded by religious people, employee, customers, and suppliers (Du 2014b; El Ghoul et al. 2012). As the response to the aforementioned gap, my study employs the survey data on an entrepreneur’s religious belief to explore the influence of religion on his/her political involvement.

Fourth, this study recognizes the positive association between corporate philanthropy and political connections and further explores the moderating role of corporate philanthropy in the association between religious belief and political involvement, adding to the existing literature on the relations between religion and politics. Extant studies have documented systematic evidence to show that political involvement is positively linked with corporate philanthropy (Claessens et al. 2008; Gu et al. 2013; Du 2014b; Su and He 2010), suggesting that firms act philanthropically to establish political connections to better protect their property rights. However, previous literature pays little attention to the interactive effects between religious belief and corporate philanthropy on political involvement. In this regard, my study fills the above void by documenting strong evidence to show that corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between religious belief and political involvement.

Finally, this study finds that religious influence on political involvement in China is asymmetric for different religions, especially between Chinese religions (Buddhism and Taoism) and foreign religions (Christianism, Catholicism, Islam, etc.). Most extant studies (e.g., El Ghoul et al. 2012; Du et al. 2014a, b, c; Chen et al. 2013; Hilary and Hui 2009; McGuire et al. 2012; Dyreng et al. 2012; etc.) focus on a specific religion (in a country or international setting) and thus provide little evidence on the asymmetric influence of different religions in a specific country. Using the Chinese context, my study fills the above gap by investigating the influence of different religious beliefs on political involvement of entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms.

Managerial Implications

In addition to theoretical contributions, my findings also have several managerial implications. First, using the Chinese context and a sample of Chinese family firms, this study finds that religious belief positively influences political involvement of entrepreneurs. Some scholars oppugn the current status of religion and religious influence in China (Townsend 1967), but findings in this study, as well as in previous religion-based literature (Chen et al. 2013; Du 2013, 2014b) suggest that religion, as a set of social norms, does exert important influence on individual behavior and corporate decisions in the context of China. In this regard, religion-based studies using the Chinese context are necessary, urgent, and meaningful, and further findings related with religious influence can provide top managers in Chinese enterprises with important illumination that religion or religious belief is important for individual behavior and corporate decisions.

Second, this study finds that religious belief increases the likelihood of an entrepreneur’s political involvement and thus validates the social capital theory of religion (Greenberg 2000), which emphasizes the role of religion in motivating believers to share common social value. This finding can provide entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms with important inspiration that they may go into politics via engagement in religious activities and becoming religious believers because religious believers can acquire civic skills and have more chances and conduits to share political resources, information, and the chance of political participation. Moreover, considering the unique feature of political system in China that applauds the effective allocation of political resources and the widest possible representation with relatively fewer seats, this finding suggests the important opportunities and higher chance of political involvement for an entrepreneur with religious belief.

Finally, the substitutive effect between religion and corporate philanthropy on political involvement in this study motivates entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms who wish to go into politics to make a trade-off between being religious believers and consuming enterprise resources to act philanthropically. Moreover, because the motivations of corporate philanthropy are diverse including strategic, political, altruistic, and managerial self-interest motivation (Campbell et al. 2002; Seifert et al. 2003), entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms cannot arbitrarily chuck in becoming religious believers and only wish to enter into politics by acting philanthropically.

Limitations and Future Research

My study has its limitations that may suggest for future research. First, because of data limitation, I only use data from the 2008 national survey of Chinese family firms to conduct this study, and thus findings in my study need additional support from future research. Second, my study only uses an indicator variable, i.e., whether an entrepreneur believes in a religion or not, to investigate the influence of religious belief on political involvement because of the difficulty for researchers to obtain data on religious piety in China (Du 2013), and thus I cannot further examine whether different extents of religious pieties similarly or asymmetrically impact political involvement. Finally, we focus on the context of China, so conclusions in this study may not fit well in with other countries and/or economies.

My study can motivate three branches of future studies. First, future studies should pay close attention to the asymmetric influence of (the same) religion on individual political involvement in different ethnic groups. Second, researchers should address the competitive impacts of different religions on individual political involvement under the international setting. Finally, because religion-based research is in its early stage and China has no generally accepted database on religiosity, future research, at least religion-based studies in China, should focus on the integrated use of data on religiosity from the surveys and data on geographic-proximity-based religion variables employed and suggested in Du (2013, 2014a), which ensures more robust findings and undergoes less sample selection bias derived from the surveyed respondents.

Conclusion

Extant studies focus on the contexts of Western countries and examine religious influence on corporate decisions and individual behavior, and thus provide insufficient evidence on religious influence in China, the largest developing country. Considering the unique characteristic of political involvement in China and the increasing influence of religion in China, this study explores the impacts of religious belief on political involvement of entrepreneurs. Using a sample of Chinese family firms, this study addresses whether and how an entrepreneur’s religious belief influences his/her political involvement and further explores the moderating effect of corporate philanthropy on the association between religious belief and political involvement. I provide strong and robust evidence to show that religious entrepreneurs in Chinese family firms have significantly higher likelihood of political involvement. Moreover, corporate philanthropy attenuates the positive association between religious belief and political involvement. My study suggests and validates the close association between religion and politics because religious believers are inclined to acquire civic skills through their associational memberships and their experience in involving religious activities (Verba et al. 1995). This finding provides important support to the existing literature on worldwide religious influence.