Responsibility to Protect in Libya or Regime Change? What We Have Learned?

Abstract

The implementation of R2P in Libya has sparked controversy over the past decade. Scholars are divided over the mission of the intervention forces. While one school of thought believes that Libya serves as a blueprint for R2P implementation, another one claims that what the intervention forces implemented in Libya was a regime change targeted at Ghedaffi due to his decades of anti-west policies which has strangled the political, economic and strategic interest of the west in North Africa. This paper demonstrates what we have learnt so far by deploying secondary information to examine the implementation of R2P three pillars (responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild) in Libya. It argues that the implementation of R2P was done in error because the intervention forces were not patient enough to allow the process take its full cause. First, the implementation did not pass the test of principle of “Just Cause” and as such the war was not ethically justified. Again, the implementation did not allow for the full application of the provisions of resolution 1970 especially the part that suggests the need to explore all the diplomatic processes to resolve the conflict before military action. The intervention forces didn’t allow diplomacy to take its full cause. Thus, to bypass diplomacy, the intervention forces horridly obtained resolution 1973 which gave them the access and permission to the declare a no-fly zone in Libya and the full-scale military action that followed. It concludes that the implementation of R2P in Libya is a misplaced priority if it is seen from the perspective of the prevent, react and rebuild pillars because none of these pillars were satisfactorily achieved. But, when viewed from the perspective of regime change, the intervention forces achieved their goal and have secured their political, economic and strategic goal in North Africa through Libya.