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Introduction

The seventeen countries of East and Southeast Asia present exciting cases for the study of youth and religion today. Out of its over two billion inhabitants, a quarter are within the age of 10–24 years old (PRB 2013). The religious lives of these young people, however, have not been studied comprehensively. Buttressed by seminal empirical studies, this chapter attempts to map out the different trends concerning youth and religion in the region. Stated differently, this chapter asks: In what form does religiosity take shape among young people in East and Southeast Asia today? By asking this question, the chapter hopes too to stimulate interest in pursuing not only idiographic case studies but also comparative projects to comprehensively understand social change in the region. There are at least two compelling reasons for this question.

These young people, first and foremost, are experiencing unprecedented social change that will shape their worldview, not the least of which is religious (Anagnost et al. 2013). Such trends as demographic transition, democratization, and economic transformation are fostering new social conditions in which these young people are growing up. Indeed, the region continues to see economic growth led by the global economies of China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. But because of declining fertility, these societies are significantly aging. Alongside, there are the emerging economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines whose respective populations are considerably young, but are increasingly poised to take advantage of the demographic momentum. Paralleling economic growth and globalization in the region is the move towards democratization, although not all states have accepted this fully. Collectively then, the region’s young people are growing up in an environment increasingly different from that of their parents’.

Second, in the midst of its rapid modernization, the region is home to a variety of religious traditions, movements, and organizations, which, taken as a whole, seems to challenge the assumptions of the secularization thesis. In East Asia, the predominant religious affiliations are Buddhism (19.02 %), Chinese Universalism (26.76 %), and Agnosticism (29.67 %) (ARDA 2013). In Southeast Asia, these are Christianity (24.27 %), Islam (40.45 %), and Buddhism (29.4 %) (Todd 2007). As the rest of this chapter will show, the region’s youth are being exposed to a wide array of dynamic beliefs, practices, and experiences – within and across religions. Heightening this exposure are the processes of globalization, migration, and technological advancement. One can therefore speak of a thriving religious market in East and Southeast Asia.

All these conditions lead back to the question on the religious lives of young people in the region today. If religious socialization is about the maintenance of a chain of memory, the social character of religious belief, practice, and identity is necessarily contingent on social change (Hervieu-Leger 2000). Sociologically speaking, religious change is inseparable from social change. This, arguably, is tied to intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs and practices (Dillon 2007). In other words, developments in the area of youth and religion deserve closer attention if social change in the region were to be assessed more comprehensively.

Identifying Trends

One, however, would be hard-pressed to find a straightforward answer to the question posed above. Consolidated efforts and large-scale studies to document and characterize the trends and fortunes of religion in East and Southeast Asia as a whole are simply sparse. Recent ones that cover religion in the region do so in relation to what may be mainly considered pressing issues of governance such as religious freedom (Bailey and Autry 2013) and church-state relations (Bautista and Lim 2012). Other anthropological studies have also queried material religion in the region (Bautista 2012). But none of these deal with young people.

This is in contrast to extensive studies on the religious lives of youth in the USA (Smith and Denton 2005), the UK (Collins-Mayo et al. 2010), and Australia (Mason et al. 2007). That these studies are common in the West is perhaps not coincidental. In these societies, secularization in terms of decline in affiliation and practice has compelled observers to query whether religion is merely evolving or completely fading away. The emerging interest in the sociology of belief (Day 2011) and contemporary spirituality (Heelas and Woodhead 2005) attests to this. Some studies have also been carried out with pastoral motivations (Kinnaman 2011). In many parts of Asia, on the other hand, the attention given to young people is in view of the development issues they are faced with such as health care, human rights, and political participation (Gale and Fahey 2005).

There are nevertheless some studies that can help in assessing the condition of youth and religion in East and Southeast Asia. As the succeeding sections will show, the influence of religion in the lives of many young people seems to persist. In the wake of 9/11, however, the religious condition that often captures the attention of observers especially in Southeast Asia is revivalism or radicalism, which typically refers to militancy, active proselytization, and political control. The problem, of course, with this generalized depiction is that apart from unnecessarily emphasizing religious conflict, it tends to conceal the richness of religious experience among young people in East and Southeast Asia today. When Muslim youth, for example, are described, the emphasis is often on their radicalization and the social conditions that lead them in this direction (Bayat and Herrera 2010).

This chapter makes an intervention in the literature by mapping out the different trends and trajectories of the religious lives of young people in the region today. Instead of arguing for a linear progression that neatly captures religious change among youth, this chapter instead proposes what has elsewhere been called the coexistence thesis (Woodhead and Heelas 2000). In other words, the changes taking place across and within religions are diverse, and they are all taking place at the same time depending on social and historical conditions.

In the context of young people and religion in East and Southeast Asia, at least five discernible trends will be offered: conversion, intensification, identity construction, social engagement, and political participation. To be sure, these are neither exhaustive nor necessarily exclusive from each other. In fact, collectively, these trends all point to the ongoing reappropriation of religion in the lives of young people in East and Southeast Asia today. These trends will be individually spelt out in the ensuing subsections. Towards the end, the chapter will also discuss the various social conditions that could explain the diversity of religious expressions among young people.

As there are no transnational surveys of youth and religion in the region, this chapter draws instead from various case studies in identifying these trends. The studies, however, are limited in empirical scope so the countries covered are necessarily selective. Also, the definition of youth varies from country to country, although the range broadly covers early adolescence to late 20s. As a result of these limitations, the chapter does not attempt to paint a definitive picture. The chapter nevertheless hopes to demonstrate the richness of the religious lives of young people in the region today. In so doing, it also hopes to stimulate interest to carry out novel and comparative research in the area.

Conversion

In China, South Korea, and Singapore, observers have documented that many young people are undergoing conversion especially to Christianity and Buddhism. The perceived strict control of religion by the state in these societies does not seem to deter the conversion of its young people. In China alone, estimates show that there are already 70 million Christians, up from 2.2 million in 1982 (Lu 2013). Indeed, apart from the officially sanctioned churches in China, Christianity seems to take on various forms from Pentecostal groups in the rural to house churches and elite business circles in the urban (Cao 2013). Singapore, whose state has been characterized as co-opting religious organizations for its secular agenda, has seen the emergence of prominent Evangelical megachurches and reformist forms of Buddhism (Kuah-Pearce 2009; J. K. C. Tong 2011). Out of its five million residents, 18.2 % profess to be Christian and 33.9 % Buddhist (Pew Research Center 2012). In South Korea, Christianity has also become prominent especially in the twentieth century. 29.4 % of its population claim to be Christian (Pew Research Center 2012). Although Evangelical Christianity has been riddled with controversies, which could have affected its numerical stagnation, it remains to be publicly influential (Lee 2010). The Catholic Church in South Korea has seen some growth too from 4.6 % in 1985 to 10.9 % in 2005 (Cho 2011).

The phenomenon of conversion has been approached from different angles. But the common thread among these studies is that the conversions are taking place among youth and from nonreligious backgrounds or traditional Chinese religions. In Singapore, Chew (2008) offers a detailed depiction of adolescent switching through a survey carried out among secondary school students. Chew (2008, p. 383) prefers to use “switching” instead of “conversion” which, she argues, is a “heavily loaded term” involving a deep religious experience her study could not cover. Apparently, most switching has taken place from traditional Chinese religion, which is a syncretic form of Buddhist and Taoist practices. Conversions have taken place in favor of Christianity, Freethinking, or Soka Buddhism (see below) – alternatives perceived to be modern and rational in Singapore (Tong 2007).

Whereas Chew is hesitant to probe the religious aspect of conversion, Cho (2011) attempts to analyze the experience through narratives of his youth informants in South Korea. Highlighting the importance of friendships and personal crisis in fostering conversion, these youth mostly come from nonreligious backgrounds with considerably critical outlook of religion. Their positive experience with Christian friends has piqued their interest to join them at church, for example.

Drawing from ethnographic work in China, Ji (2006) argues that the interest of many young people in religion becomes possible as they are exposed to noninstitutional modes of religious socialization. Popular comic renditions of religious texts and Christmas festivals, for example, have stirred the interest among the youth Ji has followed. What this suggests is that the strict control of religion in places like China has in fact engendered interest in the novelty of religious encounters, which could also explain the conversion pattern among Chinese students studying abroad (Wang and Yang 2006). Supporting these observations is Yang’s (2010) recent work that traces the historical religious participation of young people in China.

Intensification

Conversion patterns are interesting to note not just because they point to active choices by individuals even in societies where religions are highly regulated. They also show the fortunes of religious traditions and organizations. The data above show that such religions as Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity are thriving in East and Southeast Asia. But conversion rates reveal, too, that some religious traditions suffer the casualty of losing their members. It has been noted above, for example, that traditional Chinese religion (also called Shenism) is perceived to be regressive and irrational especially by highly educated young people. As Kuah-Pearce (2009, p. 54) puts it, the young Chinese in Singapore, for example, “perceive Shenism as synonymous with an elaborate meaningless ritual system.” Defaulting into Freethinking or converting out is then an almost inevitable option.

But it may not be entirely hopeless for these traditions. The ethnographic work of Chew (2009) in Singapore shows that there are Chinese youth finding renewed interest in the Daoist religious practices of their parents and in temples. While statistically speaking the adherents of Daoism in Singapore have declined from 38.2 % in 1980 to 10.8 % in 2000, ethnographic data show that there are young people who have chosen to remain in the ritual practices of their ancestors, some of whom have even chosen to be religious leaders themselves. This phenomenon demonstrates intensification as a religious trend, which can be defined as the increase in the religiosity of adherents within a religious community (Woodhead and Heelas 2000). Intensification can be in terms of heightened commitment to beliefs, participation, or practice.

Indeed, the youth (17–29 years old) Chew (2009) has followed are different in that it is the elderly who typically attend Daoist temples. Nevertheless, they have remained active even in running the activities of their respective temples. For them, their religious participation offers what can be considered both a purpose in life and a way of life. Their purpose lies in finding and fostering a sense of community among friends and relatives around the rituals they have. But it is also a way of life in that the beliefs and rituals allow them to have a sense of control over their daily needs in such areas as studies, health, and finances. The performance of rituals such as burning incense and chanting at home and in temples is important in giving them this sense of certainty. In other words, they are finding rationality in what others may have already rendered irrational (Kuah-Pearce 2009). As young and highly educated individuals, the future of Daoism or traditional Chinese religion necessarily depends on how they can make it more relevant to a fast-changing society.

If intensification is the process by which nominal religionists become more active or committed, then it can also be argued that within Christianity, even if it may be flourishing as a whole, are churches or religious groups that can foster heightened religiosity. Megachurches in Singapore, for example, whose Sunday attendance can easily exceed 10,000, may be fulfilling this very role especially among young people. Indeed, 36.2 % of over 19,000 members of City Harvest Church, one of the most prominent megachurches in Singapore, are students (CHC 2013). And according to the landmark survey of Chong and Hui (2013), at least 18.2 % of the members of megachurches have converted to Christianity at another church. The top reason stated by megachurch respondents for attending church is that it gives them a “deeper experience of God,” a possible indicator of intensification (Chong and Hui 2013, p. 66).

Identity Construction

The studies above have so far focused on conversion and intensification patterns in terms of narratives and numbers. If conversion speaks of an individual taking on a new religious identity (Turner 2011) and intensification a form of deliberate commitment, then it is important to fundamentally assess how religion is first internalized and understood by young people. Indeed, Cornelio (2010) argues that religious identity should not be conceptualized just in terms of ascribed categories or religious affiliation but in terms of self-understanding, as in what people mean when they say they are Christian, for example. In the lives of young people, therefore, religion is not simply a category they are born into or deliberately choose or reject when friends invite them. Instead, religion becomes part of their identity. This can be characterized as a continuum with the totalization of one’s identity at one end and selective lifestyle construction at the other. Two cases of Muslim youth are offered here.

In Indonesia, Hasan (2010) shows that the attraction of Salafism among thousands of young people who are highly educated is not simply because of religious fanaticism. Salafism has been associated with irrationality and religious militancy because of its call for jihad and the seeming readiness of its youth for martyrdom. They have in fact been involved in conflicts with Christians in Moluccas, “displaying their determination and capacity to defend” the Muslims there (Hasan 2010, p. 61). Investigating their motivations, Hasan argues that Salafism has served as an alternative channel for these youth to find their identity and establish their place in Indonesian society whose modernization has left them alienated in poverty and unemployment. For them, wearing the prescribed outfit (jalabiyya and turban), growing a beard, and praying and reciting the Quran with the right accent are all part of internalizing a “total Muslim” identity (Hasan 2010, p. 59). Left with little options in life in Indonesian society, becoming a Salafi for these youth has given them the assurance that they are part of a community that can defend themselves while striving for what could still be an elusive future.

The pervasiveness of religion over one’s identity does not necessarily have to be total in terms of exclusivism and the prescription of specific physical appearance. Also in Indonesia, the experience of the young women Naafs (2010) has studied suggests that religion can help them interface with modernity and not reject it completely. Drawing from her ethnographic accounts, Naafs (2010) shows that young Muslim women, while evidently drawn to music videos common among them, filter the messages using their religious values. In a way that challenges the moral panic surrounding the sexualization of media, they do not subscribe, for example, to the sensual portrayals of female bodies. Instead, they find worthwhile the portrayed values of self-reliance, independence, cosmopolitanism, and technological competence. In this sense, religion helps in the construction of a modern lifestyle for these young women.

Social Engagement

Conversion, intensification, and identity construction are trends that by and large deal with the individual and the search for what can be considered personally authentic expressions of religiosity. While the cases cited above are clearly embedded in community formations, these trends are still about individual religious experience which is fundamentally embodied. The salience of emotionalism and piety is notable, for example. Having said that, the variety of religiosity among young people in East and Southeast Asia is not only about individual and congregational experiences. Another discernible trend is the social engagement of many youth groups to address the needs of the wider communities they are part of. This ethos aligns with what Flory and Miller (2010, p. 15) have described as young people’s “expressive communalism” in the USA. This, too, has been observed among Buddhist and Catholic youth.

One intriguing transformation taking place among Buddhist temples and organizations in Singapore is that they are becoming welfare centers caring for the marginalized. Kuah-Pearce (2009) considers this a distinctive of Reformist Buddhism. Apart from devoting time to meditation and to the study of scriptures (also indicative of intensification), Buddhist youth in these temples have also visited welfare homes to take care of the elderly, for example, and organize activities for them. Social engagement, however, is not limited to the needs of the marginalized segment. The youth of Soka Gakkai, a Nichiren Buddhist organization in Singapore, have also participated in many charity activities organized by the state. But they are known, too, for their well-choreographed cultural performances in such prominent events as the National Day Parade. For many of these young people, their cultural performances are a way for them to spread a message of goodwill to fellow Singaporeans (Cornelio 2013).

The active role of the state is not to be missed in this transformation. Such is arguably the result of the state’s attempt to co-opt religious organizations to provide the welfare that its meritocratic workfare system is hesitant to institutionalize (Kuah-Pearce 2008; Poh 2007). But at the same time, these activities are also carried out “to project themselves as socially relevant” especially to the state (Kuah-Pearce 2009, p. 246). Cornelio (2013) calls this alignment between the secular interests of the state and the activities of religious organizations as the nationalization of religion. Regardless, these young people are clearly drawing from Buddhist moral teachings in justifying their social engagement.

The same can be said about Catholic youth in the Philippines who are reinterpreting the relevance of their faith in terms of community engagement. For these youth, right living is more important than right believing. So even if they may not be attending mass or fully cognizant of doctrines, their Catholic faith, for them, is about doing good to other people. Many of them are then found in volunteer activities such as shelter-building projects in rural areas. This form of “Golden Rule Catholicism” reveals a strand of transformation insofar as lived religion is concerned within ostensibly conservative Catholicism in the Philippines (Cornelio 2014). Interestingly, this action-oriented ethos may also inform the interfaith efforts among religious youth in Singapore and in the Philippines (Cornelio and Salera 2012; Phua et al. 2008).

Political Participation

Religion, of course, has played an important role in supporting or contesting political regimes in the region: Christianity in the Philippines, Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia, and Buddhism in Thailand (Singh 2011). Studies, however, on the intersection of youth, religion, and politics in East and Southeast Asia have been admittedly limited. A few promising ones are foregrounded here.

Above it was mentioned that in the wake of 9/11, some discussions have in fact centered on radicalization, which may suggest irrationality and fanaticism. The youth, for example, may be presented as being co-opted into Islamism, an ideology that seeks to recast the state and society according to strict religious mores (see Bayat and Herrera 2010). In this sense, religion becomes politically charged to take over the government through the use of violence. This mode of politicization gains traction as a reaction to the failures of democracy, the economy, and public morality, as in the case of radical Islamism in post-Suharto Indonesia (Hefner 2012).

Other studies on youth and religion demonstrate that involvement in politics does not have to be in this radical manner. Drawing from her ethnographic work, Fisker-Nielsen (2012) shows why the youth of Soka have supported Komeito, a party associated with Soka Gakkai in Japan. In a way, this is not surprising since the teachings of Nichiren, which inform the Buddhist thought of Soka Gakkai, speak of the importance of placing influential people in political positions. This, however, does not mean that young people naively or are simply coerced to support Komeito. While others may have done so out of trust in the character of Komeito politicians (who are also Soka members), many others have actively canvassed for the party for its welfare and immigration policies. Clearly then, their Buddhist values have influenced their political choice.

Sociological Explanations

Admittedly, the picture depicted by the trends above is one of a thriving religious milieu. Indeed, from the point of view of the Religious Economies Model (Stark and Finke 2000), the presence of various religious activities and movements allows for young people to explore their own identity and the communities they can be part of. This in turn enhances the vibrancy of the overall religious terrain in East and Southeast Asia. This is not to deny, however, that a countertrend may be taking place in terms of noticeable decline in religious practice. Among young adults (18–35 years old) in South Korea, for example, the percentage of individuals who consider religion important in their lives has gone down (Cho 2011). Similarly, for many Filipino Catholic youth (13–39 years old), participating in sacraments seems to have become less important according to a representative survey (Episcopal Commission on Youth 2003). In Malaysia, there seems to be a geographic dimension to religiosity, too. Muslim youth (16–35 years old) in rural areas demonstrate stronger commitments to Islamic creeds, for example, than do their urban peers (Krauss et al. 2006).

Whether these trends automatically point to secularization in terms of the overall loss of religiosity among individuals is another question that needs probing. It could be that deinstitutionalization, for example, leads to the privatization of religious beliefs and practice (Woodhead and Heelas 2000). Whatever the answer might be, the fact remains that there are various trends that demonstrate the richness of the religious expressions of young people in the region.

This then begs the question concerning the social contexts allowing for the religious market to flourish. One of the weaknesses of the Religious Economies Model is that it assumes that religions will thrive as long as the supply meets the demand it considers relatively stable (Stark and Finke 2000). Indeed, the importance of regular fellowship, commitment to religious practice, and rational explanation of doctrines seem to explain the sustained vibrancy of Christian and Buddhist organizations in Singapore and South Korea, for example (Cho 2011; Tong 2007). These are clearly institutional efforts addressing the diverse religious needs of individuals.

Analytical attention, however, should be on particular conditions that account for certain religious expressions (and not others) to flourish, and these could be socially and historically contingent. Arguably, these conditions, as suggested at the onset, are readily discernible in the fast-changing societies of East and Southeast Asia. Like the trends enumerated above, these conditions are not exhaustive and are also drawn from the cases studies cited.

One salient theme from these cases is that many young people are feeling alienated in their own societies and, as a result, are finding certainty and a sense of community in religion. The case of youth being attracted to Salafism demonstrates that many of them have become disillusioned with the failures of modernization, exclusionary growth, and corruption in Indonesia (Hasan 2010). Similarly, rapid social change has left many young people looking for some moral certitude that religion can offer. The youth of Soka Singapore find it disturbing, for example, that the affluence and meritocracy in their society have led many to become self-serving (Cornelio 2013). Interestingly, this disillusionment with “materialism and money-seeking” in China is the same observation that Wang and Yang (2006, p. 185) make of Chinese students converting to Christianity in the USA.

Another social factor to consider in the diversity of religion in the region is the educational and social mobility of many of its young people. The aspirations for social mobility among young people in places like Singapore are matched by contemporary religious experience. For Tong (2007), the emergence of megachurches and Reformist Buddhism in Singapore points to the rationalization of religion in that these religious phenomena encourage independence, self-motivation, and intellectual treatment of sacred scriptures. Many highly educated young people who come from working-class backgrounds find the ethos appealing. Indeed, recent research shows that compared to mainline denominations, the members of megachurches in Singapore predominantly come from lower income households (Chong and Hui 2013). The religious innovations of Christianity and Reformist Buddhism, in other words, flourish (and are not contested) in an environment of increasing affluence. If there is any that suffers, it is the traditional forms of Chinese religion which are perceived to be regressive and irrational (Chew 2009; Tong 2008). This picture of vibrant religiosity is in remarkable contrast to the decline of religious affiliation and practice among young people in the affluent societies of the West.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This chapter has attempted to map out the different trends concerning the religious expressions of young people in East and Southeast Asia today. This is a welcome intervention since most studies on religion in the area have focused on its interface with states and with modernity. Alongside, interest in youth has been in line with development issues they are faced with. As a result, the chapter has inevitably drawn from idiographic case studies across the region.

Instead of subscribing to one narrative or linear account, the chapter has invoked the coexistence thesis to show that paralleling each other are various trajectories demonstrating the fortunes of religiosity among young people. At least five trends have been identified: conversion, intensification, identity construction, social engagement, and political participation. Since the cases have been selective based on the availability of literature, there is no claim that the list is exhaustive. Nor are these trends mutually exclusive. Processes of intensification and identity construction, for example, may cover the same phenomenon.

Towards the end the chapter has tried to identify the different social conditions that have made these trends possible. One can argue that the conditions identified are necessarily tied to the social change taking place in East and South East today brought about by economic growth, for example. On one hand, many young people are turning to religion because of the alienation they are experiencing in their respective societies. It could be a consequence of exclusionary development or corruption in government, for example. For other youth, the rapid increase in the affluence of some societies has engendered moral dilemmas involving selfishness and materialism. Religion, for these youth, provides the moral guidance they need. Additionally, the social mobility of young people in the region has given them more access to education, which in turn has fostered aspirationalism. Religion has given some of these youth the virtues of self-discipline and independence to ride the wave of increasing affluence.

The chapter can be considered an important intervention in the literature since there are no large-scale or even comparative studies that attempt to comprehend the state of youth and religion in the region. Large-scale studies can pursue analyses of specific cohorts or intergenerational differences. Comparative studies can also adopt the quantitative approach to identify general trends and deviations at the local and regional levels. Complementing these projects should be ethnographic studies to foreground local experiences of being young and religious. Hopefully, this chapter has implicitly raised the need for these studies.

But to carry out these studies is not going to be easy. Any attempt to do so will have to contend with the religious diversity within and across the different countries of East and Southeast Asia. This is not to mention the significance of Freethinking or Agnosticism as a religious identifier, which needs to be interrogated as well.

Also, whether quantitative or qualitative, future studies have to be cognizant that even within religions, there are different expressions that may suggest one trend or another. Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism are all being reappropriated in different ways by young people in different parts of the region.

Finally, as the region is undergoing significant social change, this is the most opportune time to commence a longitudinal study (by cohort or age group) in the hope of answering some critical questions: How sustainable is the vibrancy of religion in the lives of young people today? And which trends, if any, will prevail?

Cross-References