Keywords

8.1 Introduction

Generally speaking, “cosmopolitanism” is a concept that sees problems and issues from the perspective of a global citizen. Etymologically, the word “cosmos” refers to “world” or “universe,” and “cosmos” is seen as the universe with a harmonious system. In the West, cosmopolitanism originated from ideologies of Greece and Rome. It was said that when Socrates was asked of his place of origin, his answer was “cosmos” instead of Athens. The Grecian concept of order in Stoicism is transcendence over differences of laws in different places. It is a comprehensible natural order rooted in reason. In the subsequent centuries, it was combined with the Christian doctrine of universal equality. The Stoic doctrine of natural law inspires the Christian ideal of the city of God and eventually finds its way into the natural law theories of modern political thought.“[A]kosmopolites is one who distances him- or herself either in thought or in practice from the habits or laws of his city and judges them from the standpoint of a higher order….”Footnote 1 Some scholars argue that cosmopolitanism in Western history of philosophy refers to the building of an inclusive and singular community in which all ethnic and individual members are equally treated.Footnote 2 Whether or not this definition is accurate or not may be open to discussion, but cosmopolitanism is certainly a “universally minded” ideological concept that sees the world from a holistic perspective.

In this sense, China has its own cosmopolitanism that has developed for a long time and fully embodied the Chinese view of Tianxia. Thus, Chinese cosmopolitanism is largely Tianxiaism.

Tianxia is a widely used term that, like many other terms, is not used on the basis of common cognition and consistent understanding. As a polysemy, it commands close scrutiny from the researcher. To a considerable degree, owing to the publishing in 2005 of philosopher Zhao Tingyang’s book Tianxia System—Introduction to World System PhilosophyFootnote 3 and his elaboration on the theory of Tianxia, the Tianxia issue has drawn a lot of attention in the academia of international relations and has aroused heated discussions. Historian Wang Gengwu discussed similar issues at the Tsai Lecture in 2006.Footnote 4 Thereafter, multiple scholars in China discussed related issues.Footnote 5 Among them, Feng Weijiang explored the “Tianxia system” from the competition and cooperation perspectives in economics, although he missed out on discussing Tianxia from historical and ideological perspectives and failed to define the “Tianxia system.” Other scholars, mainly foreign, seriously misunderstood the topic of discussion by connecting this academic development with governmental policies and thinking, misconceiving this discussion as China’s attempt to seek hegemony.Footnote 6 Zhao’s elaboration on Tianxia on the philosophical and ideological platform and his failure to back up with historical facts have been criticized as “idealistic.” Despite that, the value of his research has been widely acknowledged.

The thoughts above originate from people’s reflection on major issues in the world today. We live in a world of turmoil and multiple problems, where Western ideologies are bottlenecked and inadequate in finding solutions. When the Cold War was over, Francis Fukuyama declared that history would see its end in liberal democracy. Several years later, Samuel P. Huntington observed the phantom of cultural conflicts in world politics.Footnote 7 The September 11 attacks in 2001 shocked the world and seemed to have put the conflict between different civilizations in reality show. Next, the US waged the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq that produced results other than it had hoped for and had to end them in a dim light. Confronted with a complicated Islamic world, the US and other Western powers appear to be at the end of their tether. During the first half of 2014, the world was shocked by the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. Actually, the fragile balance originally existing between the east and the west of Ukraine is also a fragile balance between Russia and the West and that balance was broken when Yanukovych was overthrown. Next, Russia took immediate action to annex Crimea, and the Ukrainian government in Kiev took military action against the eastern region under backing from the West. Instead of solving problems of the world, more often than not, Western-style “freedom and democracy” have only made things worse. Facts show that Western-style, simplistic thinking cannot solve any complex issue in the world.

In this context, China can and should make contributions to the world with her ideology, and that has been recognized by many thinkers in the world. Fei Xiaotong’s view that “countries should respect each other’s interests and advance the common interests of all while pursuing their own” has been impressively sensational.Footnote 8 The problem is that ideological resources in this regard need deep delving and creative transformation. As Lin Yusheng, a visiting scholar in the US has pointed out, “we must redefine the modern significance of the essence of China’s civic tradition.”Footnote 9 The profound and rich thought of Tianxia is deposited with such “excellent and beautiful qualities.” The Chinese-style thinking grows out of the soil of Chinese culture dating back a long time ago and extending far into the future. This paper argues that, through creative transformation or transformative creation, China’s cosmopolitanism featuring Tianxiaism may provide the future world with a new alternative and present a constructive prospect. In this paper, the author will first probe into the concept of Tianxia, the Tianxia point of view and Tianxiaism before looking into the global significance of Tianxiaism through comparative analysis.

8.2 What is Tianxia?

Tianxia originates with Tian (literally heaven). For ancient Chinese, Tian is something faraway and, unknowable but nonetheless indubitably in existence. It inspires in people a sense of awe and sacredness. In agricultural civilization, people offer sacrifices to Heaven and pray for good weather conditions, bumper harvests and other blessings. Intangible as it is, tian is formless, but also animate, judgmental and ubiquitous in the thinking of the Chinese people and maintains the order of nature and of our lives. For this reason, occurrences of natural disasters are often interpreted as precursors of shift of sovereign power.Footnote 10 In order to establish their authority, rulers often cite the name and authority of Heaven, just as emperors would call themselves “sons of Heaven” and their empires “heavenly empires.”

During the long period of the Zhou Dynasty, referred to as “Pax Chou-ica” (peace under the Zhou Dynasty) by Benjamin I. Schwartz,Footnote 11 relative order and stability were created in the vast “civilized” world.

According to research done by some scholars, the words “China” and Tianxia first appeared in the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty. Tianxia’s first written record was in the Book of Zhou: Duke Zhao’s Letter. “If this Tao is adopted across the world, the king’s virtues will be revealed.” Tianxia here refers to all states that were paying tribute to the emperor. By the end of Western Zhou Dynasty, Tianxia began to take on broad and narrow meanings. In its broad sense, it refers to wherever the sun shines and wherever human beings are. In its narrow sense, it refers to “China.”Footnote 12 One important concept that the people of Zhou Dynasty inherited from the Shang Dynasty is the idea of internal and external levels developed from the service system. The service system included dukes at the outer level and ministers and other officials at the inner level. Thus, a structure took shape in which the emperor in the center is surrounded by dukes. Consequently, there gradually emerged a multi-level defense structure with the emperor in the center surrounded by dukes and foreign countries at the outer rings.Footnote 13 This is the prototype and basic form of the Chinese concept of Tianxia which includes concepts of direction and level.

However, a concept more important than direction and level and having a more profound impact is something cultural. An important feature of this concept is that Zhou Dynasty people call themselves Xia or Zhuxia (China), but call the culturally inferior or less developed surrounding foreign tribes as Yi, Man, Rong and Di. Furthermore, in their efforts to depict the loftiness and beauty of their culture, the Zhou people coined the new term Huaxia (China). According to Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Period in the 10th year of the reign of Duke Ding of Lu, “China is known as Xia for its great etiquette and as China for the beauty of her service system.Footnote 14 Thus, Tianxia with its cultural connotations was now made up of the more culturally developed Huaxia region and the less culturally developed “barbarian” tribes.

In other words, people in the Zhou Dynasty built up a cultural confidence that enabled them to distinguish themselves and others through cultural differences. Similar to people in the culturally precocious Axial Age Civilizations, Ancient Greeks also regarded those surrounding them as “barbarians.”Footnote 15 Schwartz holds that “culture” is an independent field in which the undefined individual organism born as a man can be transformed into a member of the human race.Footnote 16

This difference or sense of superiority on the part of the Zhou people naturally originates from the different degrees of productivity development and lifestyle differences.

Book of Rites: The Royal Regulations reflects this cognizance and a cohesive view of Tianxia: “The people of the five regions, the central states and the “barbarian” tribes surrounding them all had immutable natures of their own. The tribes in the east were tattooed yi who wore their hair loose and ate uncooked food. Those in the south were called man who tattooed their foreheads, had their feet turned in towards each other and also had the habit of eating raw food. Those in the west were called rong who wore animal skins and preferred loose hair styles and some of them did not eat grains. Those in the north were called di people who wore bird feathers and dwelt in caves and some of them did not eat grains either.”Footnote 17 From the above we see that those who “ate uncooked food,” those who “did not eat grains,” and those who wore animal skins and bird feathers were obviously aliens and “barbarians” following eating and clothing habits different from the Huaxia people. They had a culture inferior to that of Huaxia. As Chinese rulers administered the country through “poetry, books, rites, music and laws and regulation, alien and “barbarian” tribes in the outer rings of China were hardly any match for her. Evidently, the ancestors of the Chinese people had in the early ages seen themselves as a cultural entity with a set of implemented ritual system and a symbol of civilization, while their concepts of political boundaries were comparatively weaker.

What is noteworthy is that the Xia and Yi cultures were different and had different levels of development, but other than diametrically dichotomous, they were instead absorbable and transformative. Huaxia’s peripheral tribes were naturally less developed culturally, but they could become more civilized by learning from Huaxia. On the other hand, despite its high level of civilization, Huxia did not stop learning from other tribes, as evidenced by its acquisition of alien fashion style and the arts of horsemanship and archery and further evidenced by its absorbing of Buddhism and the localization of Buddhism in China.

The historian Xing Yitian has summarized Tianxia as “a framework of positioning, stratum and culture.” He pointed out that “China’s view of Tianxia gradually evolved from the Spring and Autumn Period to the Warring States Period and became systemized or stimulated more imaginations by the thinkers of the pre-Qin period.”Footnote 18 This framework is interwoven with irrelevant views of positioning, hierarchy and cultural blending of xia and yi. Tianxia is composed of Zhuxia and surrounding tribes including man, yi, rong and di. As a country administered with poetry, books, rites and music, China or Zhuxia was part of the internal service system and occupied a central position. By contrast, man, yi, rong and di were part of the external service system and they were located in the remoter regions. With China as the center, the azimuth and location of Tianxia can extend indefinitely and Huaxia culture featuring poetry, calligraphy, ritual and music can also expand indefinitely. The ultimate ideal is that the hegemon always sees Tianxia as one family and tries to achieve common prosperity. This great insight is an important basis for further exploring the doctrine of Tianxiaism.

According to Chen Lai’s study of Zhou Dynasty ideologies and their transformation, China’s humanistic ideologies found their origin in the ritual and music culture of Western Zhou Dynasty and saw further development in the Spring and Autumn Period. Chinese thought and culture in the Spring and Autumn Period is featured by the clear decline of deity-oriented concepts and the sweeping emergence of people-oriented ideologies. Western Zhou’s ritual and music culture is essentially not the law of the deity, but that of ceremony based on human organizational structure. The spiritual activities that took place in such remote civilized eras have influenced a tradition that would later become our starting point.Footnote 19 Social changes that took place in the middle and latter half of the recent 300 years during the Spring and Autumn Period reinforced the development of practical reason since the Western Zhou Dynasty, which accelerated the transformation of the ritual and music culture to a new spiritual world, whether political, moral or cosmic. In the Spring and Autumn Period, people shifted their focus on ritual from formality to rationality. Formalistic ritual systems were still to be kept, but what the literati cared more about was the practical embodiment of ritual as a principle of rationality. The literati and officialdom all saw the political and administrative significance of ritual as greater than its courtesy or ritualistic significance. This has caused the focus of ritualistic culture to shift from “ritual and music” to “ritual and politics.” The development of ritualistic culture causes ritual to become a norm and an important form of China’s cosmopolitanism. This change in the meaning of ritual is extremely important. From this point forth, ritual is no longer seen as the cultural sum total of system and ritual—what stands out now is the core principle of ritual as a political order and the meaning of principle as ethical standards.Footnote 20

Taiwanese scholar Bih-Jaw Lin holds that Tianxia represents the concept of “great unity” or universal harmony without national borders and dominated by culture and civilization.Footnote 21 This is very important because it is essentially an “advanced cultural” consciousness that from inside out extends farther and farther away indefinitely in its relations to the outside world. Because it looks at the outside world from within itself, it is actually placing itself in a central position from which it sees relationship with others. Under that concept, what’s “inside” becomes relative and malleable in a way that resembles rippling when a rock is thrown into a pond. And that’s when “the world as one family” becomes possible. Of course, the ripples die down as they spread farther and farther away from the center. For instance, the sovereign-subject relationship in which “the minister is at the beck and call of the sovereign” is no longer realistic in external affairs or has become out of reach. Thus, the concept of a “unified world” is either the self-satisfaction of the founder of a dynasty after he has defeated other warlords or simply a conceptual existence. What is even more noteworthy today is the idea of “the world as one family.”

This is still a culture-based concept. As Mencius put it in Mencius: Duke Wen of Teng: “I have heard of the conversion of barbarians into Xia and not the other way round. Chen Liang was a native of Chu who was pleased with the principles of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius and came north to the Central Plains to learn.” Thus, the relationship between huaxia and yi is not immutable but mutable and The Analects: Zi Han chronicled that Confucius had wanted to “inhabit among the nine barbarian tribes.” Someone asked, “What if they were vulgar?” Confucius said, “How can you call it vulgar when a gentleman lives there?” That means yi would be changed or transformed whenever a true gentleman lives in their midst.” So the difference between huaxia and yi lies in culture rather than ethnic groups. After Shang was overthrown by Zhou, Jizi who could not stand being a minister in the new dynasty went to Korea and King Wu “enfeoffed Jizi as ruler of Korea, but did not regard him as his subject.” After arriving in Korea, Jizi “taught the people there eight principles and transformed the yi into xia.”Footnote 22 Zhao Tingyang holds that “in general, when the view of Tianxia prevails, the huaxia-centered mentality would be weakened; and when the latter prevails, the former will weaken. China-centered mentality is in prevail, the view of Tianxia will be weakened. In a further sense, the concept of Tianxia stands directly opposite the huaxia-centered mentality.”Footnote 23 That statement is rather questionable. Although the view of Tianxia and the huaxia-oriented mentality are not one and the same, the two are actually inseparable and we have no need to deny that. Making a distinction through cultural differences is an inherent part of Tianxiaism, although it could be discarded by people today. What we need to value is the convertibility therein. Schwartz the historian holds that “throughout history, China had not been challenged by any surrounding great power, and no country’s propositions could cause China to give it any serious cultural consideration.Footnote 24 The first half of this judgment does not agree with the facts. For instance, the Han Dynasty was challenged by the Huns for real and the Song Dynasty met with such huge challenges from Liao that it had to sign a humble treaty of truce under duress and later it had to shift itself in the severed dynasty of Southern Song. Further after that, there came establishment of the Mongolian Yuan Empire etc. So the second half is true and accurate. This cultural confidence did not waver until modern times, when Western powers started attacking and invading China militarily.

Schwartz notes that the Chinese people are no different from other agricultural nations in that they see their own culture as the best. Therefore, he says, Chinese neglect of the universal proposition of the chiefs of the Huns or Turkic Khans does not indicate that the Chinese are any particularly arrogant.Footnote 25 Similar cases existed in other parts of the world as well. “For the Greeks, Persians and Egyptians “barbarians,” while Greek city-states are the most advanced form of human organization.Footnote 26 This is an interesting phenomenon. This sense of superiority complex and self-centeredness among ancient people may well be universal given their very limited knowledge in geography and other aspects. Culturally precocious or developed nations are more likely to develop such a view. That makes sense, but with the passage of time, it can turn into something negative, out of which could grow arrogance and a flimsy, imaginary and self-centered mindset of a “celestial empire.”

In the concept of Tianxia, what is internal is not entirely separate from what is external. The handling of “foreign” relations marking the extension of domestic social political principles and order is something highly ethical that is reminiscent of what Liang Shuming had termed “ethics-oriented society.”Footnote 27 Ethical relations are characterized by equi-distance and order as well as friendship and compassion. Thus, in a society denominated by such relationships, the guiding principle is friendship and love rather than love and obligations rather than rights and interests.Footnote 28 China is ethics-oriented both in terms of internal and external relations, while foreign relations are in itself extension of internal affairs. External ethics-oriented relations are reflected in the external party’s “contribution for the sake of thirst for righteousness” and in etiquette and courtesy. Due to the fact that China’s Tianxia order is in essence ethical rather than legal, no legislation typical of Europe’s rule of international law have ever coming into being. Huang Zhilian believes that Huaxia Peace under the Imperial Rule of Rites System is not established by force, but through the other party’s cultural identification and acceptance of Huaxia culture and civilization. That’s why Wang Gengwu said, “Tianxia is the ideal world view of Confucian thinkers and officials and a realm of universal value that determines what is civilized and what is not.”Footnote 29

Accepting and encouraging foreign “tributes” and the enfeoffment of foreign kings were products of concepts of then Chinese such as “oneness,” “fulfillment of oneness,” “unity,” and ideologies such as “clarity,” “pacification,” and “peace,” and were things needed to sustain certain world views or views of the universe. According to these views, what lies underneath this “Heavenly God” is a rather broad “cosmic system” centered on this “innate sage” who is the sustainer of all things.Footnote 30 Based on that, Chinese rulers further developed the philosophy of treating people from afar with softness and control. The focus of Tianxia order has always been “a soft approach towards those from afar” or “softening those far away.” What does that mean? It means nothing more than giving them political recognition and economic benefits so that the Chinese emperors’ graciousness and kindness would be revealed so as to touch any potential opponents. As for “control,” it can be explained as “currying favor with and buying over surrounding tribes and fiefs so that the parties concerned would remain loyal.”

Hence it follows that China’s view of the world is quite introspective. “If the people of far-off lands do not submit, the ruler must attract them by enhancing the prestige of his culture; and when they have been duly attracted, he contents them. And where there is contentment there will be no upheavals.” (The Analects: Jishi). The word “attract” here means to cause the alien party to come to terms with China’s ritual culture and the status of her emperors (Whether or not that it is true is quite another matter). Once the aliens are here, they will need to go through certain arrangements so that they may experience the cultural superiority, abundance of abundant resources and the “magnanimity and graciousness” of the emperor. This thought is also embodied in works of literature such as Luo Guanzhong’s depiction (in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms) of Zhuge Liang’s winning over Meng Huo who had been captured seven times and released seven times, until he finally “submitted” without reservations.Footnote 31

All that happened fall within the system of the Tianxia system.

8.3 Key Components of Tianxiaism

The mainstream ideology of Tianxiaism is Confucian, with no strong original influence from religion. Is Confucianism is the Confucian school of philosophy or a religion? Is there such a thing as Confucian religion at all? Such questions have always been controversial. When Max Weber wrote Confucianism and Taoism, he did not seem to have clarified what Confucianism is all about. As a matter of fact, Weber holds that “Confucianism (according to its intention) is a kind of rational ethics that minimizes the tensions of the world, whether in terms of religious repudiation or actual rejection of it. To the Confucians, this world is the best of all possible worlds. Human nature and temperament are good from an ethical point of view. People and things may be different by different degrees, but they all share the same nature and can reach their infinite potential and practice moral principles to their full extent.Footnote 32 Thus, Weber also sees Confucianism as essentially ethical rather than divine. It is characterized by public social edification rather than deity-oriented religion.

In contrast, Western ideologies are deeply influenced by religion. Christianity is a one-God religion that regulates people’s behavior through heaven and hell—the former being for the noble ones who do good and the latter for the vulgar ones who do evil. On the other hand, all solutions are also through a monotheist approach. In other words, all other religions are cults. Things differ in China in that their people and ideologies are always secular, disbelieving in any humane God or doctrines of secular prodigies, feats of strength, disorder, or spirits. All they care about are things of the world. As Gu Hongming who had lived in different parts of the world declared, Confucian doctrine yokes together the sacrificial rites of ancestor-worship with the Divine duty of loyalty. The ones who are alive give the dead a sense of eternal existence, in the same way that they give comfort to the dying. This is no different from the kind of comfort given to the religious in other countries. This is no different from the kind of comfort given to the religious in other countries. In other words, different spiritual pillars on different sides of the world are giving the same kind of comfort to people. Gu Hongming referred to this power as the “Religion of Good People:” “In China, this Religion of Good Citizenship is one that creates order without resorting to pastors, cops or soldiers.”Footnote 33 “The Chinese have actually been able to keep in peace and order a huge empire on the Asian Continent.”Footnote 34 Gu calls this “a signature success for China.” In contrast, Europeans resort to the instruments of religion and law to maintain civic order.

Chinese have no lack of reverence for “heaven, and Chinese rulers see that as the origin of their legitimacy or the “will of Heaven.” What is Heaven then? It’s probably easier to understand than to explain. It partly comes from the ancient people’s reverence for nature. The Book of Poetry: Major Odes: Lord Wen describes the “will of Heaven” as “short-lived.” In the long run, the will of Heaven will not always stay with a certain dynasty. Heaven’s attitude toward the monarchs is built upon objective and “universal” behavior standards. The Shang Dynasty’s loss of the will of Heaven is due to its failure en masse in rites and doctrines.Footnote 35,Footnote 36 In replacing the Shang Dynasty, the Zhou Dynasty learned and absorbed many lessons and experiences from Shang’s fall. Heaven deliberately shifted its support to the Zhou because it proved its power and capacity and virtue to rule over the “world” or Tianxia. For better or worse, Heaven is something that inspires awe and there is something holy and irreversible about it. One can only submit to it. Even a rise in rebellion could be an act of Heaven’s will through which one can justify oneself.

All things of the world must be under proper principle and order, which start with blood relationship and “home” and extends from there to the state and further to the outer world. Chinese ideology is actually so accommodating that it can accept modified Buddhism which originally came from India. Thereafter, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism managed to coexist in peace. Chinese thought is inclusive, so China introduces Buddhism from India, and transforms and accepts it. In the West, there has always been an omnipotent and supreme deity, while China could only discover “universal principles through interpersonal coexisting relationships,” which means human problems can only find solution in the human world and not in God or certain natural rights.”Footnote 37 For this reason, by the end of the day, China’s Tianxia is secular and earthly and determines the connotations and nature of cosmopolitanism.

After careful analysis, we can conclude that the view of Order of Tianxiaism includes four elements: concentric circular structure, name-based order, culture-based distance and peace of the world as one family.

(I) Concentric circular structure

Chinese cosmopolitanism is an ethics-based concentric circular structure that starts off from blood relationship. This structure seems like family structure on the basis of blood relationship. As explained in Fei Xiaotong’s Rural China, “jia” (home) can be flexibly used and understood in China. “Jialide” (the one at home) can refer to one’s wife, “jiamen” (family clan) can refer to a group of people like uncles and nephews, and “zijiaren” (people on one’s own side) can include anyone who would like to be part of a certain circle and show goodwill. The scope of “zijiaren” can vary by time and place and the count thereof can be innumerable, which means the world can be one family.Footnote 38 Like ripples produced by a rock cast into water that form rings after rings of concentric circles and stretch thin further and further away, they would form a kind of “differential pattern” referred to by Fei Xiaotong. Xu Daoyun also holds that the Confucian circle of social relations is a concentric circle that stretches off from the self to others, and from relatives to strangers. “This social relation circle, cast on China’s relations to her neighbors, is the ideal “attraction of the near and the approach of the remote (The Analects: Zilu). There is no absolute “other party,” but only relative “me and others.”Footnote 39 And that is very important. In Chinese ideology, there is no absolute other party because the relationship between “me” and others are changeable. The way of change is willing rather than forced acceptance by the other party. This reflects a confidence of the Chinese culture. In actual practice, that confidence is translated into an accommodating attitude whenever allegiance, respect or submission is shown. In history, China has paid high prices for that.

Based on the study of the Sui and Tang dynasties, Gao Mingshi proposed a three-layered concentric circular structure including the neichen, waichen, and zanbuchen regions. The neichen region refers to China’s native land, while the waichen region is divided into controlled prefectural region and admired region. The former includes conferral of titles and payment of tributes, while the latter includes payment of tributes. Because Chinese emperors do not directly govern their people, the people in the waichen region had no obligation to pay taxes and fees. In contrast, the zanbuchen region includes brotherhood regions, hostile regions and remote and deserted regions.Footnote 40 China’s Tianxia order follows the same pattern of going from inside to outside, from near to far, and pushing forward from layer to layer. This applies both to five generations and the distribution of neichen, waichen and buchen regions. Takeshi Hamashita holds the same view in his book titled International Opportunities of Modern China, but does not explain the reason behind it.Footnote 41 This reason is none other than a family-state structure beginning with blood relationship. Put it more plainly, it is an ethical relationship and a corresponding structure formed therefrom, hence the differences between affinity and aloofness and between proximity and distance. That’s how we would deal with layers and layers of relationships or world order, which are ethics-based.

Politically, this order is embodied as a sovereign-subject relationship. Confucius said, “Let the prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father and the son a son.” (The Analects: Yanyuan). The rulers who call themselves “sons of Heaven” try to regulate their relations with people living in their frontier areas and in remote regions through the doctrine of relationship between sovereigns and subjects. As long as the party regards the Chinese ruler as the sovereign and itself its obedient and respectful subject, the subject will then be safe and sound without being subjugated. That’s how the Chinese idiom “fu shou cheng chen” (kowtowing to show allegiance) came about. “Fu shou” (kowtowing) means to salute, while “cheng chen” means to show allegiance as a subject. This is the extension and expansion of the sovereign-subject relationship in foreign relations. As a matter of fact, what China gets out of this relationship is honor, and what the other party gets are benefits.

In the eyes of the “son of Heaven” and the imperial court, the foreign party’s sending of envoys and payment of tributes are a reflection of this relationship. “Chao” means to show respect, while “gong” means to submit and obey with respect. However, the key issue is that the parties diverge in their understanding of the same issue. The “son of Heaven” may see that as homage and tribute from the aliens, while the aliens may be able to obtain political or economic benefits or both by way of diplomatic exchanges. Thus, what is seen as homage and tribute will in reality undergo many discounts and become an unequal relationship on the surface and a relationship based on a materially equal interchange in which the alien party’s actual benefits are the substance. In this sense, China at that time provided regional public goods mostly in a bilateral manner.Footnote 42 Thus, in times when China finds it hard to sustain provision of the benefits, China’s imperial court will be forced to reduce the frequency and count of tribute-paying visits from the alien party, thus showing in reverse order the substance of this homage-tribute relationship.

Just because of that, some scholars point out that in the Tianxia order, relations between the countries are basically non-competitive and therefore non-slavery-related. Of course, this is not an equality-based contractual relationship either, but a role-based ethic relationship.Footnote 43 That is quite enlightening. In essence, this is an ethic relationship in which the key is to find the parties’ proper roles in the relationship of variance. The “lun” in ethics (lun li) focusing on differences is an order of varying degrees, such as the difference between the monarch and his subjects, the father and son, between the noble and the humble, the old and the young, and the close and the distant. It comes from the secular world and reflects human circumstances. Just because it is ethical, it’s also basically peaceful, and there exists a symbiotic relationship among different acting subjects.

(II) Name-derived order

Mingfen is important for ethical relations, and for cosmopolitanism, too. Ming refers to “name,” while “fen” refers to “status.” The monarch and his subjects and the father and the son all have their respective status and proper positions. China’s Tianxia order has proper names for proper things. “If names are incorrect, speech will not follow its natural sequence. If speech does not follow its natural sequence, nothing will be established.” In the Tianxia order, the rulers of vassal states can only call themselves kings in official documents, but will call Chinese emperors. In rare circumstances, Chinese emperors also showed their allegiance to outside rulers. A major way for the “sovereign” to his virtues and kindness is the giving of gifts. The magnanimity and generosity of the emperor is revealed through valued giving rather than receiving. Names in Tianxia order are indispensable big deals because names are the foundation on which order is established. Order will be set once names are established. In the official documents delivered to a Chinese emperor, use of his reign title was use of his name. When rulers of tributary states call themselves emperors and use their own calendars, Chinese rulers would turn a blind eye to them, as in the case of Annam’s relations with Champa Kingdom and Chenla Kingdom.

In cosmopolitanism, order would be upset when names are not properly used. In some circumstances, the righting of a name may even be cause for war. The killing of rulers in tributary states is the destruction of name order. The sons or officials of previous empires or emperors may ask Chinese emperors to intervene, while China’s rulers would try to find out what was truly happening before opting cautiously for intervention, but would most likely accept the status quo.

This is quite different from the relations principles of the West. Western order is in essence legal order that regulates relations and behaviors among different countries according to law. Thus, under this order, equality would naturally exist among the subjects because it’s contract-based and all people are equal before the contract. On top of that, subsequent premarital contracts were later developed. The court will determine and judge by law whether clear and rigid contracts have been performed. Contract terms will be well-defined laws however tight interpersonal relations are. Lord George Macartney sent by the British king to China refused flatly to kneel before Emperor Qianlong on both knees on account of Britain’s cultural principles. Macartney said that he would not kneel to the Chinese emperor unless Chinese officials knelt before the portrait of his King. As the science historian Joseph Needham said, “Europeans have spiritual superiority in law and legal principles. However, China has the tradition of opposing codification. In the trial of cases, China respects facts and emphasizes compromise and harmony.”Footnote 44

The name and status order and the contract order are obviously different. The former focuses clearly on “name,” but does not look deeply into the essence of relationships, hence it’s all blurred. The ambiguity here maintains a peace among various subjects. Under normal circumstances, the parties just mind their own business without bothering others. Compared with legal order, the name and status order emphasizes social relations more. And since that comes from guanxi, the tighter the guanxi is, the closer social relations there will be and the more elasticity there will be. This is a subtle yet profound difference between different cultures.Footnote 45 The thing that embodies the name and status order is rite, which is a ritual and ceremony system. Basic rituals in the Tianxia system embody a sovereign-subject relationship manifested as foreign “submission.”

The letters of the parties also embody rituals. Rituals are also embodied in foreign envoys’ homage to Chinese emperors, which has evolved into a set of rules over time. For the Chinese imperial court, rites are very important they represent relationship at the core and the foreigners’ respect and admiration for Chinese rulers.

This relationship is the extension of domestic sovereign-subject relationship, whose principles of composition are all interconnected and shared. Specifically, ministers are supposed to respect and be loyal to the monarch; the monarch is supposed to show love and care for the ministers; frequent contacts with and abundant economic benefits for the tributary states so that they would stay grateful and mindful of the Chinese party’s virtues and generosity and not even think about rebellion.

Thus, everything terminates here. If names and status are made right, everything else would seem to be easy. In general, the Chinese emperors seldom intervened in the tributary states’ affairs, while such states would be enjoying independence and autonomy in addition to obtaining actual benefits. That’s the reality of the name status order.

(III) Culture-based order

The difference between yi and xia in Tianxiaism lies in the different levels of cultural development rather than anything else. For the well-dressed Chinese, the barbarians who live the life of a savage are not yet civilized or cultivated by “a more advanced culture,” while Zhuxia was that advanced and developed culture that was taking the lead.

However, the mystery and wonder of Tianxia order are that such distinction is not absolute, but rather subject to change. Through education and edification, the barbarians can acquire rites that draw them closer to Huaxia or Zhuxia and establish proper relations with her. In Tianxia order, “attitude” has a lot to day. A “correct” attitude will translate into cultural equality in lieu of distinction. Even a true desire or yearning for Zhuxia culture would be commended, and “full-hearted veneration and aspiration for it would be even better. This change is voluntary too. Tianxiaism heralds the principle of attracting others through cultural prestige instead of imposing systems and concepts on others. It’s a cultural “route” of voluntary acceptance.

In contrast, Western Christian culture emphasizes preaching aimed at having people believe in Christianity, which is otherwise called missionary work. Missionaries travel overseas far away from their home country for purposes of a clear mission, which is to turn all people in the world into Christians overnight. This can also be seen as Christianity’s external expansion. The crusade in history is a typical case in this regard, and the US-launched contemporary Wars on Iraq are reminiscent of that.

By contrast, non-missionary Chinese cosmopolitanism is defensive rather than aggressive. If “people from afar do not come,” they would not be held to account. Rather, the Chinese ruler would examine and cultivate himself to “attract” the aliens. Once they are here, they would be treated with pacification. Means of pacification used to “shock and awe” or impress the tributary states include the showing off of the empire’s abundant resources, sound rituals and etiquette and the showering of economic benefits. Zhu Xi once said: “People from far-off lands will submit when internal governance is improved. If people of far-off lands do not submit, the ruler must attract them by enhancing the prestige of his culture instead of frequently waging war against the distant people.”Footnote 46 Thus, Tianxiaism attaches great importance to “virtue,” which is an individual and social concept. For the individual, “virtue” is an excellent quality; for the state, virtue can moralize people in the world. “To govern with virtue” is to apply good inner qualities to political practice. As a reflection of the human heart, “virtue” points to the human heart and has nothing to do with gods and ghosts.

(IV) All under heaven are of one family

The tianxia order includes everyone and the king excludes no one. As it says in Biography of Gong Yang in Spring and Autumn Annals: “The king who wants to unify the world should not distinguish the internal and external people, and only the woman attendant at court distinguish them.” For the ruler with virtues, authority and prestige, the world is the unity what’s inside and outside. Through education with ritual and music, people get together from afar and become one family. The so-called “world as one family” is in essence something cultural. Various components from places far and near all went through the nurturing of rites, music and edification. And the word “family” has been used as a metaphor referring to the comfort, ease and content each individual finds himself or herself in, which would pave the way for a joyful life in an ideal world. The concept of Tianxiaism is deeply rooted in Chinese ideology. It says in The Analects: Yanyuan, “If a gentleman attends to business and does not idle away his time, if he behaves with courtesy to others and observes the rules of ritual, then all within the Four Seas are his brothers.” Thus, since ancient days, Chinese people have broadened their love for their loved ones to all people around the world.

More importantly, the “world as one family” is realized through “harmony.” What is “harmony?” In the Spring and Autumn Period, Yanzi elaborated on the difference between “harmony” and “common ground.” “Common ground” refers to the accumulation of simple and identical things. “Harmony,” on the other hand, is like a soup made of different ingredients and seasonings. “Harmony” is the result of interaction complementarity and restriction between different factors and different things and the blending of conflicts and confrontation. “Common ground” is simple homogeneity that precludes all differences. Homogeneity alone will hinder the survival and development of things. Thus, differences are actually the origin of life. Things gather together in harmony because of differences and without differences things will not gather together in harmony. This is true both of natural things such as grass and trees and of society.Footnote 47 Things because of difference and close, there is no difference and the close. Vegetation and other natural things like this, so the society.

Thus, “Harmony” is not elimination of differences, but admission and even admiration of the existence of differences. As Du Weiming pointed out, “great unity” is preconditioned on the harmony of differences.

As expressed in classic Confucianism, “A gentleman seeks harmony but not uniformity.” (The Analects: Zi Lu XIII). In this sense, “unity” or rather “great unity” praises difference and strives to seek overlapping consensus and uses it as the starting point for reconciling the trend of differences. Harmony admits the existence of conflicts and contradictions, but it attempts to transform destructive pressure into constructive tension, so that stressful relations may be incited to grow in integration.”Footnote 48

Although this may sound idealistic, it has merits of its own. Through creative transformation, it can become an ideological resource through which humanity ponders the future world. It is basically peaceful because it deals with relationships through cultural paths instead of conquering and eliminating differences. It is the seeking of a harmonious situation through the symbiosis of various cultures and subjects, and it’s exactly what is needed to bring the future world into coherence.

8.4 Significance of China’s Cosmopolitanism for the Future

China’s cosmopolitanism, rooted in the Zhou Dynasty, evolved throughout a long history from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty. It has rich connotations and a far-reaching influence. Elements constituting its kernel include illustration of external relations as concentric circles that can be infinitely stretched out, the idea of internally and externally isomorphic order, and a self-confident and an introspective cultural structure. Under this structure, the identity of the acting agent is variable. Under this structure, there is no absolute other party, but only the relative “me-others” who will eventually become part of a harmonious family. This doctrine, if divested of its hierarchical components and after going through transformative remaking, can become an extremely important ideological resource in the future world and a constructive ideological concept that Chinese culture can contribute to the world.

Over the past centuries, Western ideologies have dominated the world due to the overwhelming national strength of Western countries. However, as we all can see, while Western ideologies have their merits in dealing with problems of the world, they are limited in what they can do and have often undeniably run counter to the positive good they wish to do. The state of “one-sided” dominance of Western ideology and the marginalization of ideologies in other parts of the world is by no means a healthy one. It needs to be complemented and balanced and alternative solutions and paths need to be found or created. Critical voices are not lacking even within the inner circles of Western ideologies. The questioning of “Orientalism” and monism is an example of this nature. The problem with such criticism is that the critics themselves fail to provide an alternative plans or options and therefore less than constructive. By contrast, China’s cosmopolitanism and the connotations thereof does provide options. It has the following five characteristics that bear extremely important and non-negligible and constructive significance for reducing dispute and increasing harmony.

Firstly, China’s cosmopolitanism is inclusive rather than exclusive. Western cosmopolitanism in the Christian context consistently aims at converting the rest of the world to Christianity. By contrast, China’s cosmopolitanism allows for differences and even considers differences as preconditions for the vital development of things. No faith or individual should become an object of exclusion, but is rather a remote person or entity that can be approached and interacted with. China’s cosmopolitanism does not repel variances, but considers it part of the natural order. Therefore, variances in the human world are proper arrangements based on the natural trend of things. The key to the peace of the world is that each actor finds its own proper role.

Secondly, as far as China’s cosmopolitanism is concerned, relationships are convertible. There are no absolute “me” and “others,” which means there are no clear-cut “foe” and “me.” This principle of “non-antagonism” helps eradicate one fatal problem in Western thinking, which is the “enemy assumption” derived from the “pagan consciousness” rooted in religious irrationality.Footnote 49 Even where “foe” and “me” do exist, they are still convertible and transformable. This is very different from the dualism between good and bad and between light and darkness and is therefore a profound and brilliant type of cosmopolitanism that deserves the world’s repeated deliberation, digestion and absorption and thus becomes an ideological track shift of transitional dimensions.

Thirdly, as far as China’s cosmopolitanism is concerned, the path of the shift is cultural rather than military. China’s cosmopolitanism highlights “virtue” and constantly demonstrates itself through the convincing power of virtue. Therefore, what it depends on attraction and appeal. Its emergence is far earlier than that of today’s concept of “soft power” and has a far greater significance.

Fourthly, as far as China’s cosmopolitanism is concerned, the method of change is voluntary rather than coercive. Western ideology argues that freedom is something that could be forced on someone.” This is clearly a kind of hegemony rather than kingship. China does not follow this kind of thinking, but values acceptance by the other party. She is willing to wait and can wait. With such thinking, she is unlikely to launch a war on Iraq or something to that effect. As revealed in the ill consequences of the War on Iraq, the practice of meeting evil with evil will not bring about a world of good. There will have to be change and another way out.

Fifthly, the world can have peace and harmony as a family. This is the ultimate ideal of China’s cosmopolitanism. Its path is not mechanical “unity,” but the “you in me, and I in you” “harmony;” not the absolute good or bad, but equal integration and transformation. It is a path of mutual tolerance and humility among acting agents, mutual appreciation in the gaze of each other and the understanding that the other party may be right and oneself wrong and vice versa. The key is not to prove anything through the magnitude of power, but through some kind of interactive practice. It is on this basis that we realize peaceful coexistence and move on to harmonious symbiosis.

As Wang Gengwu has pointed out, “From China’s perspective, the talk of ‘peaceful rising’ indicates that a richer and stronger China in the future may seek to provide an even more modern view of the world. The world referred to here will no longer be the unified world of China as an empire. Instead, China will be a huge multinational country under a modern global framework based on the principles of equality and sovereignty in today’s international system.Footnote 50 As a matter of fact, today’s China abides by this above-mentioned new outlook. The purpose of this thesis is to seek possible constructive thinking resources China’s transformation of cosmopolitanism could contribute to the world. Hopefully it might enlighten further research agendas. In fact, China today is already such a country. What’s important is what kind of constructive ideological resources Tianxiaism will provide the world with after going through creative transformation, which is exactly the main thrust of this article. It will probably also enlighten people as they go about future research agendas.