Abstract
Multi-agent decision systems can be defined as systems in which several autonomous agents interact and make decisions according to their “internal models.” This view can be useful for understanding, analyzing, and predicting how human behaviors emerge from social interactions. Following an introduction to multi-agent decision systems, this chapter mainly discusses a game-theoretical framework called hypergame theory as their basic model. Game theory provides formal methods for modeling interactive decision-making. Unlike standard game theory that typically assumes common knowledge about the game structure, hypergames allow agents to perceive it in different ways and make decisions based on their own “subjective games.” Hypergame theory has been used in a variety of applications, from conflict analysis to business and management. This chapter provides an overview of its historical developments and several (past and future) research agendas. In addition, a related game-theoretical model called drama theory is briefly introduced. It deals with dynamic processes, where agents facing some dilemmas may redefine games during pre-play interactions.
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Sasaki, Y. (2021). Multi-agent Decision System. In: Metcalf, G.S., Kijima, K., Deguchi, H. (eds) Handbook of Systems Sciences. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0720-5_49
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