1 Introduction

German is a language with many peculiarities which often cause confusion and sometimes even mockery. One concepts which bears the potential for confusion is the term Bildung.Footnote 1 Simultaneously, there is an incredibly rich philosophical discourse surrounding Bildung intersecting at the domains of self-cultivation, education, schooling, (self-)formation, moral education, and, more generally, philosophy of life. Throughout the ages, Bildung underwent dramatic semantic changes and turns. These semantic turns reflect implied concepts of the individual as well as the world. Thereby, no ultimate concept of Bildung exists and all existing concepts have to be contextualized historically (cf. Böhm, 2005: 90)—most definitely one reason why Bildung is often considered one of German pedagogy’s least clarified terms (cf. Dohmen, 1964: 15).

Niklas Luhmann and Karl Eberhard Schorr argue that Bildung is pedagogy’s “god-term” (1988: 464), a concept vague enough that it enables discourse throughout different times while remaining stable enough that the area of discourse is limited. Similar to God, nobody can claim with certainty whether Bildung really exists or define its form, yet rich discourse, discussions, and educational planning is conducted with regard to Bildung. According to Luhmann and Schorr, it is less important what Bildung actually is but how it is discussed over time. Therefore, this contribution tries to reconstruct Germany’s key discourses of the past centuries.

After having discussed Bildung’s most relevant thinkers and notions, Bildung’s implicitly uttered contributions to moral education and self-cultivation will be outlined and conceptualized by differentiating between Bildung’s substrate and superstrate level. This division of the term can partially explain the workings of god-terms in general and Bildung in particular. The article will end on a provocative note by arguing that education as we define and act it out in the twenty-first century is not just the archenemy of Bildung but also inhibits self-cultivation and societal progress on a larger scale.

2 A History of Bildung

In the European context, one of the first comprehensive discussions regarding self-formation and transformation was presented by Plato. In his Cave Allegory, Plato describes mankind’s painful transition from limited beings—blinded by illusions and commonsense assurances—to seekers of knowledge, truth, beauty, and the good in general (cf. Hall, 1980: 74). This process is tightly knit to and generally associated with pain and sacrifice. According to Plato, thriving for truth, knowledge, the good, and the beautiful permeates all areas of life from personal relationships to the organization of the state and is powered by Eros, the inner drive for the aforementioned qualities. It is thereby assumed that deep within human beings, we hold those qualities and they must only be triggered and/or cultivated. Plato argues that through thinking, philosophy, and self-reflection, mankind can leave the sphere of illusion and find these truths. Thereby mankind can reach a higher state of being, a state Aristotle later called Eudaimonia (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2008: 2). According to Plato, truth should translate itself into action and all actions should be guided by the principles of truth and the good. Through action, “good is beyond being” (McGuirk, 2008: 170) as it transcends the individual through steady transformation of the community, the state, and mankind. A plethora of eighteenth and nineteenth century educational philosophers and educational planners idealized Ancient Greek society and the works of the Greek philosophers, especially with regard to self-cultivation and what should later be known as Bildung. However, in the territory which should later become Germany, these thoughts did not have the impact they have had elsewhere until the concepts of self-formation and transformation were spread in the Middle Ages through Christian belief and teachings.

At an etymological level of analysis, the term Bildung is derived from and tightly linked to the concept of the image as one of the earliest translations of the Latin word imaginatio—conducted by Monk Notker III of St. Gallen—results in the term bildungaFootnote 2 (cf. Dörpinghaus & Uphoff, 2011: 63). From its earliest beginnings, Bildung had a religious connotation (cf. Hellmeier, 2016: 73) as God created mankind in his own image (Ebenbild). The semantic twist added by Meister Eckart (1260—1328) in the Middle Ages was that Bildung not only represents the bodily image after which human beings were created but primarily the process human beings have to go through in order to complete themselves in the from God intended way (cf. ibid.)—Bildung developed from a descriptor of a state (i.e. an image) to an action or event (cf. Schneider, 2012: 304). Meister Eckart’s concept of Bildung, even though it solely focuses on Christian teachings, already incorporates aspects which later definitions should refer to, such as an egalitarian notion—Eckart wrote and preached in German instead of Latin to reach lay people as well as the formally educated (cf. Sturlese, 2008: 19)—, the idea of mankind’s completion through interaction with (Christian) teachings, and the provocative potential of Bildung (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019: 35) as the interpretation of theological matters has always involved a political perspective and has had the potential to undermine existing power structures. Lastly, it should be noted that Meister Eckart’s re-interpretation of Bildung also caused a second major shift: Bildung as the on-going process of unifying the human soul with God (cf. Bechthold-Hengelhaupt, 1990: 482) focuses exclusively on the divine individual, his/her dignity, and potential—an idea which shall be one of the core proclamations of the Renaissance and beyond (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019: 35/36).

Even though the teachings of Meister Eckart were well ahead of their times, the concept of Bildung failed to transition to the educational context—the German poet F. G. Klopstock (1724–1803) was the first thinker to use Bildung with regard to education (cf. Nordenbo, 2002: 342)—and remained exclusively in the theological realm. As a result, Bildung was not explicitly addressedFootnote 3 until the eighteenth and nineteenth century (cf. Dörpinghausen & Uphoff 2011: 62) when Immanuel Kant and the philosophers of German Idealism started tinkering with the concept of Bildung.

2.1 German Idealism in the Eighteenth Century

Germany as a nation state did not exist in the eighteenth century. Instead, more than 300 kingdoms and principalities—Prussia and Habsburg (Austria) being the most influential ones—were in its place. Even though the more than 300 entities shared some loose connections, they lacked a political and cultural center. The emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations had limited influence and was mainly occupied with deescalating conflicts. This endeavor failed in 1618 with the outbreak of the Thirty-Years War (1618–1648); a war which shaped the zeitgeist and intellectual history for the next century. The eighteenth century was also the time of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is widely conceptualized as the transition from Middle Age’s thinking (i.e., religious superstitions) to the introduction of rationality and empiricism as the preferred and accepted mode of operation (cf. Fischer, 1975: 432). The Enlightenment gained momentum all across Europe, either overthrowing or transforming states, and found its way into German law by the policies of Frederick the Great of Prussia, a representative of enlightened absolutism (cf. Birtsch, 1987: 9). Prussia and Habsburg struggled for domination over the German territory and fought multiple wars for marginal territorial gain and strategic advantages (cf. Dotzauer, 1988: 412). Simultaneously, estate-based society gradually transformed itself into a civil society as “[t]his new thinking [Enlightenment] reflected changing economic realities: the rise of private property, market competition, and the bourgeois” (Carothers & Barndt, 1999: 18).

The intellectual history of the eighteenth century mainly consists of two dominant intellectual streams: Pietism and Enlightenment. Pietism (cf. Horlacher, 2011: 16–18) originated from the clash of Christian ideals with the observations during the Thirty-Years War and warned against a lack of belief and spiritual devotion. According to Pietist teachings, this lack could only be overcome through individual spiritual reincarnation/atonement. This reincarnation could only be achieved through bible study and the development of an independent religious identity (cf. Horlacher, 2011: 16)—the resurgence of the individualistic perspective in the theological domain. This individualistic perspective was further encouraged by Enlightenment which aimed at the emancipation of the individual from external forces (cf. Weitz, 2015: 470) as well as the maximization of individual freedom, i.e. in thinking and action (cf. Dörpinghaus et al., 2012: 54). In eighteenth century Prussia, torture was abandoned, free exercise of religion was ensured, and mandatory schooling as well as freedom of the press were introduced. All of these can be read as manifestations of the Enlightenment’s spirit and the strengthening of individual freedom.

Due to the focus on the individual as well as the emancipatory tendencies of the Enlightenment, Bildung gained intellectual momentum and was discussed extensively by philosophers and artist such as Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, Joachim Heinrich Campe, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann G. Herder, Leopold Mozart, Heinrich von Kleist, Peter Villaume, Gotthold E. Lessing, and George W. F. Hegel. Kant and Hegel are widely regarded as the starting and ending point of the intellectually highly potent phase often referred to as German Idealism. Therefore, their educational philosophies will be illustrated in the following paragraphs.

For Kant, the ideal of Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred UnmündigkeitFootnote 4 by the means of rationality (cf. Kant, 1784/1983: 53). Kant’s emphasis on freedom and Mündigkeit can best be explained by considering societal structures at the time. Man’s lack of courage to use his own reason, intellect, and wisdom, combined with institutions attempting to exercise power over people, resulted in lives governed by others (cf. Dörpinghaus & Uphoff, 2011: 38/39). Bildung should enable people to free themselves from such mental barriers/ineptitude and ultimately societal structures. External force and internal desire for freedom should define Kant’s discourse as he turned Bildung into an oxymoron—external force as a means to cultivate freedom and Mündigkeit (cf. Baumgart, 2007: 33). Kant splits the process of Bildung into three parts: Disciplination, cultivation, and civilization. The first aiming at controlling the animalistic traits of human beings, the second describes the cultivation and fostering of abilities and skills (i.e., writing, reading, or music), while the latter hints at the necessary ability to fit into society and its sub-groups (cf. Kant, 1803: 706). All three can only be accomplished by the application of external force, submission under a guiding scheme, and/or instruction.Footnote 5 In Kant’s educational philosophy, these three steps serve as a means for the highest purpose of Bildung: Moralization.Footnote 6 Contrary to the aforementioned three stages, moralization is supposed to take place within the human being and is an on-going, never-concluded process consisting of interaction with the world, self-consultation, reflection, and reaction to externalities. Kant is a strong proponent of freedom and Mündigkeit but stresses the point that freedom requires a concept of morality. Morality in turn can only be fostered through Bildung. Kant follows the Ancient Greek’s line of thinking by proposing that individually acted out morality will eventually improve the community as well as the state.

German Idealism was a phase of contradicting ideas. While Kant suggests to employ external disciplination in order to arrive at Mündigkeit and moralization, Georg W. F. Hegel’s key contradictions circled around the dualisms of alienation/unification, individual/societal, and particular/general. According to Hegel, the introduction of rationality as an ideal of human conduct, led to a split of mankind’s perception of the world. As a result, there is rationality and (superstitious) beliefs/traditions which govern thought and action (cf. Siemek, 2001: 214). Hegel sees similar splits in the dualisms outlined above and proposes that Bildung has a two-fold task: Cause alienation and, in a second step, enable (re-) unification (cf. Sandkaulen, 2014: 430). Hegel proposes this recursive approach to Bildung as the individual voluntarily alienates itself from the natural state (i.e., the culture one lives in) (cf. Odenstedt, 2008: 560), exposes itself to another state, and—after some time—rediscovers itself in that state. Through the combination of the already known and the unknown, a new natural state is created and the process starts anew. This on-going process of constant alienation and re-unification is supposed to create a more reflective and cultivated person. In order to achieve Hegel’s ideal of Bildung—taking manifold cultures and perspectives into accountFootnote 7 (cf. ibid.)—the individual is required to temporarily give up its individualistic traits and particularities and is supposed to immerse with other cultural and/or historical milieus. Hegel suggests to expose oneself to ancient Greek culture as it provides the necessary irritation, confusion, and distance to one’s own culture while simultaneously having common traits (cf. Odenstedt, 2008: 560). In the Hegelian approach, self-cultivation, culture, and the individual intersect, cause, and influence one another. Thereby, the Hegelian approach to Bildung is in accordance with Ancient Greek philosophy as the “Greeks thought of culture as character” (Gaddis, 2018: 44) but also vice versa. The process of alienation and (re-)unification of contradicting perspectives repeats itself throughout life and does not have a pre-defined aim. Kant, Hegel, and the other philosophers of the era raised awareness for a plethora of paradoxical relationships and tried to unite them in their approaches; an endeavor which shaped the term Bildung significantly.

2.2 The Nineteenth Century and the Rise of (Neo-)Humanism

While the thinkers of the eighteenth century tried to emancipate the individual from external as well as intellectual restrictions, the nineteenth century started with a triplet of real-life, high impact events which changed the ways philosophers of the time perceived the state as well as the individual. These events, which tremendously changed the course of Europe, were the French Revolution and the succeeding reorganization of the state, the end of the Holy Roman Empire of German States, and the defeat of Napoleon including the reorganization of Europe  at the Vienna Conference (cf. Kissinger, 2014). All three events emphasized the importance of the nation state. Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, it was attempted to unify Germany. First as a loose association called Deutscher Bund (1815), followed by failed attempts in 1848/1849, and later in 1871—due to necessity caused by on-going war with France—as an empire under Prussian leadership. Germany became a nation state comparatively late (cf. Plessner, 1959). Yet, once Germany was unified, it tried to narrate and define its unique historical, cultural, and political patterns, sometimes, referred to as the German Sonderweg (cf. Kocka, 1988: 3/4).

Simultaneously, Germany needed to form a national cultural identity and demarcate itself from other states. Bildung became Germany’s way to demarcate itself from the courtly and—from the German perspective at the time—highly suspicious French structures (cf. Horlacher, 2011: 40/41). Further, emerging nation states required civil servants for their administrations and institutions, which created opportunities for citizens to rise through the ranks of public administrations through the acquisition of formal education, performance, effort, and persistency. This presented an opportunity unheard of in prior times of inherited status and social position and marks the rise of meritocracy (cf. Vogt & Neuhaus, 2021: 119). Through the reorganization of the state and the newly emerging class of citizens and civil servants, Bildung not just gained in importance but also became a marker of social distinction as certain educational paths were required for particular positions (cf. ibid.). In the nineteenth century, Bildung served Germany as a marker of cultural and historical identity as well as an internal social distinction mechanism. This distinction also contributed to already existing tensions as the Kaiserreich “appeared to be a strange mixture of highly successful capitalist industrialization and socio-economic modernization, on the one hand, and of surviving pre-industrial institutions, power relations, and cultures on the other” (Kocka, 1988: 5; cf. Wehler, 1973).

Influential thinkers and philosophers of the nineteenth century were Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Johann Wilhelm Süvern, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Karl Marx. Humboldt changed Germany’s educational landscape like no other thinker as he established Germany’s unique school system, which reflects his approach toward Bildung. Due to Humboldt’s crucial contributions, his educational philosophy will be outlined in the following section.

Wilhelm von Humboldt “studied at Göttingen, the intellectual center of political science favored by aristocrats headed for government careers” (Sorkin, 1983: 57). As such, Humboldt embodied the newly emerging, intellectual upper-class of the nineteenth century. Contrary to most of his peers, he was also influenced by in-depth readings of Kant and Romantic scholars as well as by conversations with countless intellectuals of the time. Especially the study of Romanticism caused an inward turn (cf. ibid.) and Humboldt started to question core beliefs of the Enlightenment and the state itself—an ironic turn as his formal education qualified him primarily for public positions. Humboldt—later in charge of Prussia’s educational sector—assumes that every person possesses certain forces or powers. These forces can be cultivated by confronting different artifacts of the world (i.e., natural sciences, languages etc.). By studying and engaging with these artifacts, the individual transforms his/her potential into a growing force (cf. Böhm, 2013: 91). Simultaneously, through the exercise of one’s forces, the individual changes the world. Conceptualizing Bildung as such, it becomes a dialogical concept in which the world changes the person and vice versa (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019: 50/51). Contrary to the idea of early specialization, Humboldt proposes that all of human being’s potential forces should be cultivated and co-exist in harmony. HarmonyFootnote 8 is a recurrent theme in Humboldt’s works and permeates all levels of analysis as “the individual and the public must be in harmony. Personal morality and politics are two sides of the same coin” (Nordenbo, 2002: 348). While the thinkers of the Enlightenment have argued for the betterment of society through Bildung, Humboldt solely focuses on the individual as his approach toward Bildung aims at self-cultivation not vocational training, the ability to think scientifically not the accumulation of knowledge, and intellectual self-activity (Selbsttätigkeit) and not the reproduction of already existing thoughts (cf. Zehnpfenning, 2010: 124). According to Humboldt, the highest aim of Bildung and the meaning of life are the cultivation and balancing of each individual’s forces (cf. Humboldt, 1792/2002: 64), a process without a pre-defined aim.

In order to realize Humboldt’s idea of Bildung certain preconditions must be provided and Humboldt, as a high-ranking Prussian government official, was able to implement some of these conditions. For Humboldt, the two core conditions for successful Bildung are freedom and the chance for social interaction/the exchange of ideas. Apart from that, “Humboldt proposed the reduction of state power to the barest minimum in order to insure freedom for individual self-cultivation […]” (Sorkin, 1983: 55). Following Humboldt’s concept, the individual educates and forms itself as independently as possible while the state is only supposed to enable this endeavor. Enabling of these processes happens through the acquisition of fundamentals (i.e. reading and writing) in corresponding schools and should be made available to all children, independent of their social rank (cf. Tenorth, 2013). The institutions imagined, designed, and implemented by Humboldt can be found in Germany until the very day. Humboldt implemented a variety of new institutions and approaches and, at least initially, democratized Bildung, introduced the idea of general knowledge, and redefined the relationship between the state and the individual.

2.3 The 20th Century Pending Between Nihilism and Reformation

By the end of the nineteenth century, the newly emerging class of citizen, which legitimized their position by the acquisition of Bildung—often referred to as Bildungsbürgertum—, fossilized. Branded as an elitist project, Bildungsbürgertum was criticized by all political fronts. Further, Bildungsbürgertum was equated with a lack of morals, enhanced materialism, and a lack of belief. The corresponding institutions of formal education were considered antiquated and often portraited as lethargic (cf. Horlacher, 2011: 63/64).

Friedrich Nietzsche, who foresaw many of the twentieth century’s horrors, observed these fin-de-siècle resentments and “believed modern society changes rapidly, but in the wrong direction” (Washburn, 2019: 171). Also, Nietzsche considered the “triumph of the middle class” and the “crisis of values” as “the seeds of the destruction of European civilization” (Washburn, 2019: 173). Further, Nietzsche (among others) criticized the corruption of Bildung as it was reduced to a tool for economic and/or political gain (cf. Horlacher, 2011: 63). The rise of Adolf Hitler, 12 years of national-socialist dictatorship, the horrors of the concentration camps, and two World Wars, proved Nietzsche’s prophecies to be correct and scholars who conceptualized Bildung primarily as a means for betterment of the individual, community, and state saw themselves confronted with an immense paradox as a generation formally educated under the paradigm of humanism committed mass murder (cf. Bulthaup, 2007: 60).

The reaction toward these atrocities split the community of philosophers and educational scientists into two camps. Educators and philosophers of ReformpädagogikFootnote 9 argued that the suppression and thereby absence of humanistic Bildung during the times of fascism enabled the above-mentioned abhorrence. They proposed a revitalization of Bildung—referencing Johann A. Comenius, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or John Dewey—with a particular focus on democratic values, emancipation, and the child as an individual. For representatives of Reformpädagogik, it was rather a matter of how to cultivate Bildung. Well-known spokes-people of this school of thought are Heinz Joachim Heydorn, Rudolf Steiner, Hartmut von Hentig, Herman Nohl, and Berthold Otto. In the following section, Reformpädagogik’s general propositions will be presented.

Contrary to the representatives of Reformpädagogik, the other camp of philosophers was less optimistic about the future of Bildung and rather (fore-)saw a deformation of Bildung in the twentieth century and beyond. This camp of scholars does not criticize the how but rather asks if the concept of Bildung can be realized—a more fundamental criticism of Bildung. The fiercest critics on the conceptional level of Bildung (and its commodification) can be considered Theodor W. Adorno, Konrad Paul Liessmann, and Jochen Krautz. Arguably, Adorno presented the most profound criticism of Bildung as he “abandoned the hope that education for humanity […] could retain its normative power in our time” (Lovlie & Standish, 2002: 317) and whose key criticisms will be outlined after the illustration of Reformpädagogik’s central propositions.

From 1933 to 1945—for East Germany (GDR) this period has to be extend until 1989/1990—Germany and its educational sector were governed by totalitarian structures which abandoned the idea of Bildung and replaced it with drill, obedience, and a none questioning attitude toward the system and leaders in power. After 1945/1990, Reformpädagogik was, at least by educational planners, considered the counter-approach to totalitarian education (cf. Tenorth, 1994: 585) as Reformpädagogik tried to cultivate reflection, introspection, and a critical attitude toward the social and cultural status quo (cf. Ullrich, 1990: 895). Reformpädaogik focuses on the child as an individual and tries to provide opportunities to learn from (for the learner) meaningful real-life artifacts. The aim of Reformpädagogik’s holistic pedagogy is to cultivate theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, as well as introspection (cf. Ullrich, 1990: 893/894). Thereby, Reformpädagogik opened pedagogy’s perspective and added a plethora of methods, artifacts, and modes of learning to schools’ repertoire, such as project learning, cooperative arrangements, experiments, field trips, and the alike (cf. Schulze, 2011: 764). The attentive reader recognizes many of Reformpädagogik’s aspects as components of aforementioned thinkers. This observation led critics (i.e., Oelkers, 1989) to claim that Reformpädagogik is not a distinct and original phenomenon but only the logical continuation of humanistic Bildung of the last 200 years—a dispute which will never be resolved.

Advocates of Reformpädagogik suspected pedagogy’s problem primarily in the mode of how Bildung should be cultivated. Theodor W. Adorno on the contrary criticizes Bildung on a conceptional level and grounds his criticism on the promise of the nineteenth century to create an equal, meritocratic, and free society through Bildung. While some individuals rose through the ranks of science, business, or administration, the general dynamic of a privileged against a less privileged class largely remained intact (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019: 97). Bildung just created the illusion of convergence (cf. Tischer, 1989: 7). This illusion is caused by Adorno’s philosophical understanding of Bildung. He frames it as a double-edged concept describing the inner processes of understanding the world as well as the real-life application of Bildung (cf. Adorno, 1959/2003: 95). Basically, a re-run of the sophists’ dilemma of ethical utilitarianism and epistemological relativism. According to Adorno, it is of utter importance that Bildung oscillates between these two poles because as soon as Bildung serves only one purpose—either introspection or real-life application—it is corrupted. If Bildung only focuses on the inner workings, it is blind for the real-life injustices and thereby silently legitimizes these, whereas if it only focuses on the real-life application, Bildung adapts itself to the system in power and also legitimizes it (cf. Adorno, 1959/2003: 104). The contradiction of autonomy and freedom on the one side and the strict societal orders and structures, in which Bildung can take place, on the other side, denies Bildung’s existence because as soon as Bildung is defined as a societal aim, it already contradicts itself (cf. ibid.).

For the twentieth century, Adorno primarily criticizes the commodification of Bildung, which is fueled by mass media and solely allows the mode of consumption (cf. Liessmann, 2006: 9). Consumption of Bildung has to be seen as the process of going through the motions (i.e., reading a book, visiting a museum or theater, etc.) without the in-depth experience of the action. The experience of the less privileged can only be shallow due to their lack of economic and cultural resources necessary for an in-depth study of the works being part of Bildung (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019: 97). Due to the given economic mode of operation, in which Bildung opens doors for citizens and the middle class alike, Bildung is reduced to its mere economic value. Under such circumstances Bildung is commodified and follows the logic of trade and business. The perception of artifacts in this economically shaped mode is considered Halbbildung (semi-Bildung) (cf. Tischer, 1989: 7). Thereby, Halbbildung is not the half of the original concept but its fiercest enemy (cf. Gruschka, 2001: 30) as the recipient of Halbbildung consumes culture with the sole intention of delineating him-/herself from the (perceived to be) uneducated, yet she/he only knows few bits and pieces and uses those only to arrogantly show-off and signal belonging to an assumed to be prestigious group (cf. Adorno, 1959/2003: 115; cf. Gruschka, 2001: 18). The corrupt status quo is reinforced by amusement provided by mass media aiming at conformity of citizen as well as producers of culture alike (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/2008: 153).

3 The Different Layers of Bildung

As shown in the prior sections, Bildung is a multifaceted term which underwent tremendous historical change. Some aspects of the god-term Bildung can be found in almost all realizations/concepts of Bildung, others are only temporarily present. In order to conceptualize the workings of the god-term Bildung, we differentiate between stratums of Bildung’s, a superstrate and a substrate. The superstrate is Bildung’s time-stable core while the substrate underwent change. It is argued that due to the unique entanglement of Bildung’s super- and substrate-layer, it became Germany’s solution to one of the most crucial philosophical problems relating to self-cultivation.

3.1 The Superstrate

At the superstrate level, it can be argued that all concepts of Bildung directly or indirectly refer to the idea of arête, the imagined state of personal excellence and virtuousness (cf. Böhm, 2010: 12). Excellence and virtuousness are not limited to a chosen few but are stages at which every person, who is willing to make the proper sacrifices, can arrive at. This egalitarian notion is emphasized even in the earliest concepts of Bildung (cf. Rieger-Ladich, 2019: 35/36). Bildung, just as arête, permeates all spheres of human interaction starting at the individual and reaching all the way up to the state level. Due to its egalitarian notion and impact on the individual, the polis, and the state, Bildung, as a way to approximate arête, is closely related to the concept of paideia. Further, Bildung has always understood itself as the combination of introspectively arriving at values but also acting these virtues out as “one cannot just be virtuous, one must become virtuosity by performing and hence embodying virtuous actions in public” (Hawhee, 2002: 187)—a combination of theoretical wisdom (arête) and practical wisdom (phronesis).Footnote 10 Another time-stable trait of Bildung is that it—in accordance with its Ancient Greek tradition—focuses first and foremost on the individual as the unit of analysis as “moral value is centered within a person” (Birmingham, 2004: 316) and from there on alters the community and/or state. Bildung and thereby the development, rejuvenation, and renewal of the individual and ultimately all following social arrangements needs to be understood as a bottom-up process. Lastly, all concepts of Bildung share Socrates’ notion that they are framed as on-going and never-ending processes (cf. Böhm, 2010: 20).

3.2 Bildung’s Substrate and the Problems It Has Solved

However, the sophists already hinted at the potential dangers of verbalized and acted out virtues. The dilemma the sophists illustrate is the tension between ethical utilitarianism and epistemological relativism. This tension can be considered the pending between truth and impact of the performed and/or uttered virtues. The ever-changing understanding of Bildung in Germany mirrors the negotiation of Bildung’s pending status between the search for truth and Bildung as a means for an “individual’s desired end” (Noel, 1999: 276). From a historical perspective, Bildung oscillates between these two poles. Every time introspection (as the search for truth) was overemphasized, Bildung became worldlier and vice versa.Footnote 11 Germany and its territorial predecessors established this mechanism by (unconsciously) incorporating Socrates’ idea of dialogue/maieutic. Through consultation and intellectual exchange with varying people, thinkers, times/epochs, and artifacts, an approximation of truth and virtuousness should be reached (cf. Böhm, 2010: 20)—an idea which can be found in the accounts of the aforementioned scholars and thinkers as “knowledge creation requires […] practice and dialogue” (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007: 377).

At the superstrate level, the process of Bildung unites the Ancient Greek ideals of arête and phronesis. However, German Bildung is more than that. The substrate level of Bildung—the concepts which underwent change and were illustrated in the prior section—helped these superstrate ideals to remain relevant and prominent over time. One problem of secular approaches toward morals is the lack of imperative force compared to religious doctrines (cf. Anscombe, 1958). As outlined in the prior section, Germany received the teachings of the Ancient Greek thinkers through the translations provided by the Christian churches. At the beginning, the Christian church used the idea of self-cultivation, self-formation, and Bildung as a blueprint for its teachings, later the thinkers of the Enlightenment emancipated themselves from the fossilized church doctrine. However, the underlying teachings on self-formation and cultivation remained intact and found their application in new approaches. Through that unique mode of reception, Bildung and thereby the ideals of the Ancient Greek philosophers have a quasi-religious imperative force and anchoring in societyFootnote 12 while having developed into secular concepts.

In the introduction, we stated that Luhmann and Schorr argue for Bildung as pedagogies god-term. God-terms are specific enough that a conversation about them can take place while exhibiting a certain degree of flexibility. The superstrate aspects outlined above are the temporally stable, while the substrate consists of the fluid, elements in the god-term Bildung. Linking the Ancient Greek’s teachings about self-cultivation to the god-term Bildung also solved the problem of relevance and presence in the public discourse. Due to Bildung’s omnipresence, relevance, and its connectivity to public as well as academic discourse, Germany found a subtle way to incorporate discussions about self-formation, moral education, and self-cultivation into all areas of life.

4 Education’s Attempted Murder of Immortal Bildung

Historically, Bildung oscillated between truth/introspection and worldliness/extrospection. Its potential to adapt to varying times and places made it an extremely potent and long-lasting concept. However, from the second half the twentieth century onwards, an increasing number of scholars has tried to replace Bildung. The reasons for these efforts are manifold: Bildung has undergone too much historical change and is no longer clear-cut in its aims (cf. Gieseke, 1970), Bildung is untranslatable and does not allow connection to international discourse, Bildung, due to its definitional vagueness, invites misuse of the term (cf. Thomä, 2012), just to name a few. The substitute of choice in the twentieth and twenty-first century is the concept of competences, which refuses to refer to Bildung and its history at all. Instead competences focus solely on functional knowledge and skills to be used in every-day situations (cf. Höhne, 2007). Competences, contrary to Bildung, split interest and passion from the artifact and reduce the occupation with an object or artifact to the mere act of gaining transferable skills. The degree of desirability of these skills is dictated by the market (cf. Grigat, 2012: 76). On the contrary, Bildung aims at self-cultivation, igniting interest, becoming a more complete human being, and the mastering of life and oneself on multiple level of analysis. This is a deeply personal process which carefully positions the individual on the line between the known and unknown, order and chaos, the self and the world. Competences on the other side—embedded into the broader discourse of education—are universal, neglect individual differences, and are defined from the outside. This is also reflected on the linguistic level: One ‘gets educated’, ‘receives an education’, or ‘was educated’ while ‘sich bilden’ requires a reflective pronoun and is an active verb, just as Bildung is a reflective and active endeavor. Due to the standard setting from the outside, education and competences can be tested, measured, and compared—an impossible attempt with Bildung as it does not produce standardized outcomes. Therefore, Bildung and its outcomes are infinite in its potential. Bildung enables progress, game-changing discoveries, and paradigm-shifting thoughts while education and competences are capped as they aim at reproduction of already established thoughts and procedures. Thereby, education and competence hinder intellectual disruption and ultimately progress.

Due to the global standard setting of institutions, such as the OECD and the corresponding PISA studies, competences became the gold standard in global educational rankings and comparisons. These approaches are incompatible with Bildung. However, due to the global incentive structure from markets, employers, companies, and ultimately the OECD, Bildung has been abandoned in German schools. As argued earlier, Bildung does not require schools; however, for most citizens, schools have been at least one station in their Bildungsbiographie. Momentarily, Bildung seems to be at its weakest point, yet human beings seem to require and thrive for a concept more holistically oriented than mere competences. Based on the general framework of Greek philosophy as well as Bildung, contemporary philosopher Wilhelm Schmid maps out an approach he named “the art of living” (cf. Schmid, 2005) which aims at living “a beautiful life” (cf. D’Olimpio & Teschers, 2017: 4) and thereby contrasts current educational trends and fashions. Schmid’s philosophy represents the gentle resurgence of holistic ideals concerning self-cultivation, Mündigkeit, aestheticism, and self-reflection in the twenty-first century.

For the moment, it seems to be the case that the global rise of education and competences slowly but surely kills the concept of Bildung. However, if history has taught us one thing, then that Bildung has an enormous transformative potential, is deeply rooted in Germany’s history as well as its culture, and has risen from the ashes of prior systems multiple times before. It is extremely likely that we will see Bildung resurrect yet another time.