Keywords

2.1 Introduction

It seems that almost every time a valuable natural resource is discovered in the world – whether it be diamonds, rubber, gold, oil, whatever – often what results is a tragedy for the country in which they are found. Making matters worse, the resulting riches from these resources rarely benefit the people of the country from which they come. (Brookner 2013)

This quote by Edward Zwick, director of the award-winning movie Blood Diamonds (Brookner 2013; Wikipedia 2018a), shows that valuable natural resources won from mining, i.e., “…the extraction of ore, defined as rock from the earth’s crust containing valuable minerals…” (The Canadian Encyclopedia 2018) can cause serious problems. Although this movie is set in Sierra Leone, West Africa, where the De Beers mining company – once founded by the British racist Cecil Rhodes Footnote 1 with whom Adolf Hitler would identify later onFootnote 2 (Waterman 1996; Goldschein 2011; Parkinson 2015; Wikipedia 2018a) – is trying to whitewash the dirty image of the diamond industry by a certification app tracing the origin of diamonds (Stoddard 2018; Allen 2012), mining problems are restricted neither to Africa nor to blood diamonds.

Although mining is necessary to win essential major sources of energy and materials, it involves serious risks concerning all pillars of sustainable development, i.e., the ecological, the social, and the economic pillars, often causing significant damage to the natives of the affected countries who once owned the land. Apparently, the indigenous people of countries affected by mining activities recognized these risks already back in 2002, putting severe restrictions on mining in the Indigenous People’s Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Development (Tebtebba 2002; Schwarz-Herion 2007, with further references).

Latin America has quite a record of problems around mining. This includes not only the violation of federal and state laws by some mining companies, e.g., Minera San Xavier (MSX) in Cerro de San Pedro, Mexico, which is infamous for endangering historic heritage, cultural and environmental goods, as well as human health by cheap technology (Guadalajara 2010; Vargas-Hernandez 2007), but also several disastrous accidents (Hernandez 2010).

Severe mining disasters in Latin America include (1) the August 2014 disaster in Mexico, where Grupo México’s subsidiary Buenavista del Cobre Mining Company polluted Mexico’s public waterways, and (2) the mining disaster in Minas Gerais, Brazil, from November 5, 2015, where two ruptured dams caused a dramatic chemical contamination in the nearby regions (Wilton 2015). These two disasters will serve as case studies to highlight certain risks of mining and to figure out some preventive measures to avert such disasters in the future.

Before taking a further look at the two mining disasters mentioned above, it may be interesting to provide a short overview over the history of mining in Mexico and Brazil. This will help the reader to gain some insight into the significance of this industrial sector in these two countries.

2.2 History of Mining in Mexico and Brazil

2.2.1 Mexico

Mexico’s history of commercial mining started over five centuries ago (FM 2018). Before the Spaniards came to Mexico in 1521, pre-Columbian populations had already been interested in gold, silver, and other metals. The introduction of European production techniques into the “New World” facilitated colonial mining, so that flows of gold and silver from Mexican mines were transferred to the Spanish state coffers. In the subsequent three centuries of Spanish domination, many other minerals including copper, coal, lead, and iron (FM 2018) have been won. Since 1697, the Jesuits established various missions in Baja California, reigning the region as an independent Jesuit political entity (Bitto 2016). The Jesuits operated productive mines in Mexico (Bitto 2016) under violation of Spanish law (Rancho Cacachilas 2018; Haydock 2011), enslaving the local natives to mine the gold (Zucke 2017). In the 1700s, the Jesuits benefitted from a trade with pirates, exchanging basic foodstuff against pirate booty including gold. Before the Jesuits got kicked out of Mexico by King Charles III’s Order of Expulsion, they managed to seal the small canyon and to destroy all documents reminding their misdeeds (Bitto 2016).

Until the 1870s, silver formed over 70% of Mexico’s total exports. Back then, mining was mainly built on slave labor – a dangerous and precarious work under inhuman conditions including, among others, deep narrow shafts, longer narrow tunnels, underground flooding, and insufficient ventilation systems (FM 2018). In the period from 1867 to 1876, President Benito Juárez tried to draw international capital in favor of Mexico’s economic modernization by upgrading the transportation and communications infrastructure. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Mexico’s mining industry expanded in the era of General Diaz (FM 2018).

In the 1880s and 1890s, the Mexican mining code was reformed by including liberal codes granting mineral rights (subsoil ownership) to landowners, removing the previous domination of Spaniards and other European mining owners. Due to subsoil ownership, mining concessions of several mines led to the creation of the Compañía Minera de Peñoles in 1887 (FM 2018). Although the nationalization of subsoil rights made investors jittery, triggering an economic crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century, the period from 1890 to 1960 has seen several acquisitions, mergers, and fusions with other mining companies (FM 2018). Mexico’s revolution in 1910 prepared the ground for the revised constitution enacted in 1917, enabling Mexico to recapture ownership of its mineral resources. Later on, in the 1930s, the state confined the number of mining licenses, fostered the establishment of cooperative societies, and instituted the Comision de Fomento Minero (“Commission of Mining Promotion”), paving the way for the establishment of Grupo México and Industrias Peñoles after industrialists like Jorge Larrea and Raul Bailleres had bought the majority of the shares from Great Britain, Germany, and the United States (FM 2018). The Constitution on the Exploration and Treatment of Mineral Resources in 1961 led to the nationalization of the mining industry by requiring a minimum of 51% Mexican ownership of mining projects, to persuade foreign investors to sell their mining shares or to establish themselves as Mexican companies (FM 2018). Nowadays, Mexico is one of the largest producers of different minerals.

2.2.2 Brazil

Brazil has quite a legacy of slavery in the mines after gold had been discovered toward the end of the seventeenth century. Subsequently, a major part of the populace of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro ensued the gold rush with thousands arriving from Portugal. By 1720, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese as well as hundreds of thousands of indigenous and African slaves had arrived in the region (Sandy 2015). Although slavery was finally abolished in Brazil in 1888, Minas Gerais benefits economically from the exploitation of slaves until today. Moreover, the exploitation of workers in a kind of modern slavery continues nowadays (Sandy 2015). While agriculture is the largest source of employment, mining is the largest source of wealth in Minas Gerais. Gold had been discovered in 1698, followed by diamonds in 1729 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018).

Once inhabited by the Indian natives, the state of Minas Gerais, i.e., “General Mines” in English (Mindat.org. 2018), was famous for its wealth in terms of gold, gems, and diamonds. Sharing borders, inter alia, with São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and the Federal District of Brazil, Minas Gerais has 20 million inhabitants and is home to many mines yielding gold and semiprecious gems (Meyer 2010). In the 1700s, the mines were mainly explored by the Portuguese, demanding high taxes on everything which was extracted, repeatedly triggering acts of rebellion from the part of the colonists who tried to fight the Portuguese crown (Meyer 2010).

Although the richest gold sources had been used up by 1800, Minas Gerais is nowadays famous for its semiprecious gems like aquamarine and topaz (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018). Of even greater importance nowadays are the huge deposits of high-grade iron ore and manganese (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018). Today, Brazil exports ca. 75% of its iron ore; the major part of the exported ore is produced in Minas Gerais which also supplies, inter alia, bauxite, iron pyrite, graphite, nickel, and titanium (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018).

2.3 Case Studies

2.3.1 Mexico: The August 2014 Buenavista del Cobre Disaster

2.3.1.1 Company Profile

Buenavista del Cobre S.A de C.V, currently owned by German Larrea Mota-Velasco, Mexico’s second richest man (Estevez 2017), is one of Mexico’s most famous mining companies. It has been operating since 1926 and became a subsidiary of Grupo México in 1990 (BNAmericas 2018a). Buenavista del Cobre is not only the largest mercury mine in the nation owned by one man but also one of the California mines jointly producing 9/10ths of the mercury mined in the United States (Middlecamp 2018). Based in the northwest of Mexico in Cananea, Sonora, the Buenavista mine – yielding ca. 36 million tons of ore grading 3.3% zinc, 0.69% copper, and over 33 million oz. of silver – is sited 35 km south of the US border close to Nogales, Arizona (Wikipedia 2018b).

Grupo México and the Buenavista del Cobre mine have become noticeable with various acts of environmental pollution, resulting in nine complaints against the mine since 2008 (Trevizo and López 2014). In 2009, Grupo México had to pay $1.79 billion to the US government to settle hazardous waste pollution at over 80 sites contaminated by its Asarco mining operations in 19 states (Trevizo and López 2014).

2.3.1.2 The Disaster and Its Environmental and Social Consequences

On August 6, 2014, Buenavista del Cobre spilled 10 million gallons, i.e., 40,000 m3, of copper sulfate acid and high levels of arsenic into public waterways near Cananea, damaging the Sonora and Bacanuchi rivers (Wilton 2015; Guevara 2014; Estevez 2017) and inverting the lives of 25,000 people in seven counties along the river (Trevizo and López 2014). Juan José Guerra Abud, Mexico’s Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, called this ecological disaster “the worst environmental disaster by the mining industry in modern times” (Wilton 2014), posing an immense threat to human health by highly dangerous toxins, leading to a dramatic loss of public drinking waters (Lindsaynewlandbowker 2014). According to Alberto Rojas Rueda, head of Greenpeace Mexico, the chemicals could enter the food chain, poisoning humans and animals; the decontamination of the area might take 15–20 years (Wilton 2014). PROFEPA, Mexico’s Federal Department of Environmental Protection, stated in an official report: “The spill of the copper sulphate solution could put the integrity of the ecosystem at risk…When a spill of dangerous substances remains unattended, it can cause persistent and increasing damage to the soil, subsoil, water and other natural resources” (Wilton 2014).

At least 360 people experienced health issues from the incident. Schools had to close and 322 wells had to shut down (Estevez 2017). Farmers in the affected communities cannot sell their goods because of buyers’ fears of contamination. The disaster affected ca. 24,000 people directly and 250,000 people indirectly in seven communities on the shores of the Sonora River, 25 miles southward of the Arizona frontier (Guevara 2014; Wilton 2014). According to PROFEPA, the environmental damage from the accident may exceed $134 M (Wilton 2014).

2.3.1.3 Causes of the Disaster

While Grupo México was unavailable for comment when approached by the Daily Star about the accident, an interview with Arturo Rodríguez Abitia, the deputy director for industrial inspection at PROFEPA revealed the following (Trevizo and López 2014):

  • Grupo México was using unfinished installations without the necessary operating permits under violation of several federal laws.

  • The failure of a seal on a polyethylene pipe in one of the leachate ponds at the Buenavista del Cobre mine caused the spill.

  • Grupo México had failed to install a valve which could have stopped the spill.

  • There were not any overflow ponds or impermeable linings confining this sort of spill as the project was still under construction.

  • The company informed the authorities with a delay of 28 h under violation of the law which requires an immediate notification.

So, apparently human error, negligence, and violation of laws were responsible for the incident (Trevizo and López 2014).

2.3.1.4 Economic and Legal Consequences

The new installations at the mine have been closed until the mine will have overflow ponds and geomembranes. Any further activities have been suspended as ordered by PROFEPA (Trevizo and López 2014). The company did a cleanup along the banks of the nearly 270 km Bacanuchi and Sonora rivers, cleaning up the products resulting from the neutralization efforts with lime (Trevizo and López 2014). Grupo México has been obliged to present a remediation plan subject to approval by Mexico’s Department of the Environment and Natural Resources by the end of October 2014 (Trevizo and López 2014).

After Mexico’s federal environmental authorities had found 55 irregularities in Buenavista del Cobre’s activities, Grupo México received a fine of 23 M pesos (ca. $1.8 M) and pledged itself to donate to a trust fund of 2 billion pesos (ca. $154 M) for remedy, repair, and indemnification for health effects in the communities afflicted by the spillage as well as for environmental and economic damages (Estevez 2017). Although the trust is judicial by nature, it consists of a technical committee with a representative from the government, one representative from the company, and three technical experts from academic institutions. The trust cannot disappear unless the committee decides (Trevizo and López 2014). Furthermore, Grupo México obliged itself to take various measures, including the establishment of 28 water purification facilities for the filtration of heavy metals and the construction of a clinic to treat those who suffered health problems (Estevez 2017).

In 2015 and 2016, 12 different complaints against government agencies were filed under the 2013 law on the constitutional complaint mechanism (amparo) by the municipalities concerned by the incident – not only for the various damages caused by the spill but also for the denial of access to information about the incident (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018). The legal entitlements referred to violations of healthy environment, access to water, property, communities’ right to work, as well as compensation for damages and participation in public affairs (Trevizo and López 2014; Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018). The lawsuits also concerned government failure to comply with environmental and safety regulations and to realize remediation plans (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018). In order to help determine the cause of the spillage, the communities had filed a petition under the Foreign Legal Assistance Status to the US District Court in Arizona in April 2016, demanding information about the mine’s operations and environmental practices from Buenavista del Cobre’s parent company, the US-headquartered Southern Copper (Trevizo and López 2014).

Finally, in August 2016, Southern Copper provided the requested information by court order. Two months later, several UN Special Rapporteurs pushed the Mexican government to provide information about the actual implication of the spill and the measures adopted to alleviate its consequences (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018; Trevizo and López 2014). Half a year later, a UN Working Group on business and human rights stated in its country visit report that the government and Grupo México missed to perform their duties under the initial trust fund agreement and that the Attorney General failed to open a criminal investigation (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018). In August 2017, the First Tribunal of the Sonora State district supported the plaintiffs in a lawsuit concerning the government’s omission to take care of health problems caused by water pollution, whereas the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed a case with Buenavista del Cobre as defendant for their failure to comply with environmental norms since the company could generally not qualify as a responsible authority under the 2013 amparo law (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018). In August 2017, the trust fund had been closed, a decision vindicated by the government who claims that the restoration and reimbursement plans had been fulfilled – an allegation strongly disputed by the inflicted communities (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018; Trevizo and López 2014).

The court still has a decision to make if Fideicomiso Río Sonora as an entity composed of both public and private actors can be sued in court for human rights violations under the 2013 amparo law. On August 22, 2018, the Mexican Supreme Court heard a constitutional complaint (amparo) from members of the rural community of Bacanuchi challenging the construction of a new backwater dam in the catchment area of the Sonora River by Buenavista del Cobre in which the applicants requested the Court to acknowledge their right to be consulted on environmental affairs of public interest (Business and Human Rights Support Center 2018).

2.3.2 Brazil: The Samarco Dam Disaster and Its Environmental and Social Consequences

2.3.2.1 Company Profile

Samarco Mineração S.A. is “…a Brazilian entity jointly controlled by Vale and BHP Billiton Brazil Ltda, in which each shareholder has a 50 % ownership interest” (Mining Data Solutions 2018). Located in Belo Horizonte in Minas Gerais state, Samarco Mineração was established in 1977 (BNAmericas 2018b). Being active in the extraction, granulation, and export of iron ore, it has four granulate plants in Anquieta municipality, in Brazil’s Espírito Santo state, and three concentrators in its Germano plant in Minas Gerais state (BNAmericas 2018b). Samarco Mineração conducts business worldwide (Bloomberg 2018).

Before the Samarco dam disaster to be discussed in the following sections, Samarco had already been fined six times between 2005 and 2010 for breaking environmental laws, inter alia, by rejecting inspections, by operating without proper licenses, furthermore by breaking pollution laws, by establishing new projects without a proper license, and by dumping pollutants in a creek (Pitman 2015). Furthermore, BHP Billiton as one of Samarco’s two 50% owners has already been responsible for many company-related fatalities, e.g., 37 fatalities from coal mine explosions and significant environmental harm, among others, by its Olympic Dam, by the largest uranium mine on the globe, by copper waste spills in Chile, as well as by the release of millions of tons of copper waste in the Ok Tedi and Fly River basins in Papua New Guinea, destructing the environment and affecting 50,000 people (Viana 2018). Samarco’s other 50% owner Vale  made a name for itself when a joint raid by the Ministry of Labor and Federal Police officers carried out in February 2015  found that 309 drivers employed by a subcontractor driving trucks between two Vale excavations were being kept in slave-like conditions (Sandy 2015).

2.3.2.2 The Disaster and Its Consequences

The dam break led to the destruction of all forms of life in the region. Mud covered everything, resulting in 20 deaths and unmeasurable environmental destruction. We have seen whole communities destroyed by BHP Billiton and Vale’s operations. They have lost everything, without receiving any real compensation…what is becoming evident is the blatant corporate capture of our government by transnational companies. (London Mining Network 2016)

Thus Rodrigo de Castro Amédée Péret from the Churches and Mining Network in Latin America described the disaster in the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil on November 5, 2015, when ca. 40–62 m3 of water and sediment from iron ore mining flowed on a mountain slope after the Fundão dam had burst at an open-pit mine operated by Samarco and another dam had ruptured (The Guardian 2015). Due to this incident, the “biggest disaster of its kind” (Kiernan 2016), a wave of chemically highly toxic mud was released into neighboring regions (Winston 2016), triggering a stream of mud washing away villages and farmland; killing 20 people, fish, and aquatic life hundreds of km away; making potable water non-drinkable for hundreds of thousands of persons;  displacing 700 people; destroying livelihood; poisoning hundreds of kilometers of the Rio Doce River Valley; and travelling over 400 miles through the Rio Doce Basin in Southeast Brazil before reaching the Atlantic Ocean (Kiernan 2016; Phillips 2015; Richard 2016; The Guardian 2015).

The severe environmental effects impact the livelihoods of over one million people in 41 communities, constraining local access to clean water, fishery resources, plant production, hydropower, and raw materials (Wilson et al. 2016). Threats to human communities living at the riverside are especially acute for disadvantaged populations from isolated areas who depend from fisheries and subsistence agriculture (Wilson et al. 2016).

Ecologists foresee various negative impacts like chronic vegetative loss, changes in biological diversity of fish populations, bad recovery in polluted areas, impairment of ground stability and drainage monitoring, and enhanced risk of other geomorphological disorders, including mudslides, bank collapse, mass displacements, bank failure, and mass motions (Wilson et al. 2016). According to expert estimates, the regeneration period of the biophysical composition, the eco-function, and the biological diversity in impacted areas might take decades or even a century (Wilson et al. 2016). The devastation of watersides, fresh water, and maritime ecological systems eradicated essential biological resources and eco-processes preserving traditional livelihoods and disturbing the provisioning of fresh water, fisheries, agriculture, and tourism (Wilson et al. 2016).

2.3.2.3 Causes of the Disaster

As the police found out, the main cause of the dam burst had been the enormous accumulation of water inside the reservoir (Gonzalez 2016). Dewatering errors and indicators of erosion had already been appearing since the tailings dam was opened in 2008 (Gonzalez 2016). Otávio Guerra, a civilian police expert, revealed that a reduction of the water flow caused more fluid to remain within the dam, thus resulting in reduced reliability and stability of the embankment structure, finally leading to the dam break (Gonzalez 2016).

Samarco’s board of directors consisting of representatives of Vale and BHP Billiton had been repeatedly informed about the dam’s construction problems and measures to remedy the problem in various meetings between 2009 and 2014 as proven by the minutes appearing in the judicial files. Joaquim Pimenta de Ávila, a consultant who inspected the area in December 2014, had already warned Samarco against “static liquefaction” (Phillips 2018), telling them that the situation may get out of control (Phillips 2018). Internal documents cautioning that a maximal potential loss due to a liquefaction pause could result in up to 20 deaths, have serious impacts on land, water resources, and biodiversity over 20 years; and cost over 3 billion dollars (Phillips 2018) show that the company was fully aware of the risks. Nonetheless, the devices supposed to measure liquid pressure were not properly waited and the company did not have any warning siren (Phillips 2018). José Adércio Sampaio, supervisor of a taskforce of federal prosecutors, stated in his summary of the criminal case: “They prioritized profits and left safety in second place” (Phillips 2018). So, after all not only human failure but also human greed facilitated the disaster.

2.3.2.4 Economic and Legal Consequences of the Disaster

Right after the accident, Samarco’s mining operations were stalled and have not been taken up until today. Furthermore, Samarco had 30 M reals (£5.2 M) of its capital frozen by a judge in Mariana to remedy damage done in the region (The Guardian 2015). It initially agreed one billion real (£174M) of compensation and prevention measures with state attorneys, but according to estimations by Carlos Pinto – heading a team of environmental prosecutors for the State of Minas Gerais who investigated the tragedy – the charges will be much heavier.

In October 2016, Brazilian Federal Prosecutors filed charges against 21 people for “qualified homicide with eventual intentFootnote 3” (Gonzalez 2016; Kiernan 2016; Nogueira and Blount 2016) in connection with the disaster. Charges were filed, inter alia, against former and current top executives of Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton Ltd. including the former Samarco Chief Executive Ricardo Vescovi, Vale’s Iron-Ore Director Peter Poppinga, eight Vale and BHP representatives at Samarco, and an engineer from VogBR for his report assuring the dam’s safety (Kiernan 2016; Gonzalez 2016). According to the prosecutors, the accused, who include 16 Brazilians, two Americans, a Briton, a French citizen, a South African, and an Australian, may face sentences of up to 54 years. Eduardo Santos de Oliveira, one of the prosecutors, said about those who died in the disaster: “These people were murdered” (Nogueira and Blount 2016).

Additionally, a separate civil lawsuit by public prosecutors for damages in the amount of USD 48 billion was initiated in 2016. In January 2017, the public prosecutors and the three companies (Samarco, Vale, and BHP Billiton) signed a $680 M preliminary contract for restoration work (Phillips 2018).

Beyond that, 3000 investors have signed up to participate in a class action against miner BHP over the Samarco dam disaster of 2015 for continuously violating disclosure obligations and engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct. According to the statement of claim, filed in the Federal Court of Australia, problems at the Fundão tailings dam in Brazil were encountered since 2009, and BHP who was aware of the “dam failure risk” at least since August 27, 2014, should immediately have informed the Australian Securities Exchange of this risk and the “consequential financial risk” (Gray 2018). Nevertheless, none of these negative consequences of the November 2015 Samarco dam disaster have finally compelled Samarco’s 50% owner Vale to improve its poor safety precautions: On January 25, 2019, the Brumadinho dam, equally located in Minas Gerais, Brazil, broke, triggering an unprecedented ecological disaster that killed nearly 300 people (The Guardian 2019).

2.4 Conclusion and Proposed Solutions

The two case studies in Mexico and Brazil showed that in both cases, human failure and in the second case additionally human greed caused the disaster and that prevention is better than cure in mining operations. In the Buenavista del Cobre disaster case, it has been irresponsible of the company to use unfinished installations. Regarding the Samarco dam disaster, it was unforgivable that Samarco – after having repeatedly been briefed on the risks and possible disastrous consequences including the concise maximum number of potential fatalities along with measures to mitigate the risks – failed to install a warning siren along with a functioning emergency system which would have been obligatory under the given circumstances, even if the lawmaker in Brazil obviously failed to oblige mining companies to have alarm and warning systems (Phillips 2018).

At first glance, the reputational loss due to this dramatic incident, unpleasant legal procedures, as well as the liabilities created by these disasters may be sufficient to serve as a deterrent example to other companies. Nevertheless, the fact that these disasters happened although these companies had already been repeatedly fined for legal violations of environmental laws and human rights shows that the state has to take more decisive action to ensure appropriate measures for safety and environmental protection in the mining sector. Therefore, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers in both countries should be more rigorous in their actions toward those mining operators who repeatedly violate legal regulations to achieve a deterrent effect in the long term. Currently, however, some state actors in Mexico and Brazil do not seem to act in a responsible manner.

In the Buenavista del Cobre disaster case, the government’s failure to comply with environmental laws and safety regulations as well as the Attorney General’s default to open a criminal investigation shows apparent weaknesses in parts of the executive power in Mexico. It is also highly problematic that the Mexican government defends the closure of the trust fund by claiming that the restoration and reimbursement plans had been entirely fulfilled, while the affected communities strongly deny the veracity of this claim in a credible way (see Sect. 2.3.1.4, paragraph 4).

The establishment of a properly working alarm system along with appropriate emergency measures laid down in a corporate manual along with yearly obligatory random governmental inspections should be a basic legal requirement for any mining company to receive and keep a license. For that, the legislators in Mexico, Brazil, and many other countries would have to take responsibility. Nevertheless, legal rules alone will not be sufficient. Compliance with environmental and security legislation must also be monitored and enforced by the executive power, if necessary. This requires the permanent employment of excellent and reliable engineers by the state as well as consequent sanctions in case of non-compliance. According to PROFEPA, 65% of the mines operating in Mexico breach the environmental regulations, but only ca. 10% of them are closed (Mendoza 2016).

Finally, all state powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers, must act responsibly and honestly to avoid such disasters in the future. In the case of the Buenavista del Cobre Disaster in Mexico, the license of the company should have been revoked after the many complaints the company received and after the company had been fined by a foreign government. This goes even to a greater extent for Samarco and its owners. Eventually, a law regulating that a company should lose its license after repeatedly having been penalized for environmental violations, safety regulations, and/or human right violations might help to clean the mining business from irresponsible mining operators. While several parts of the executive power in Mexico have basically failed, the police and public prosecutors in Brazil have done an excellent job and showed a very high level of commitment. Now, it will be up to the judicial power to grant justice.

Ideally, all actors, mining operators, and state actors have to fulfill their obligations to ensure that mining operations are done in a safe and sustainable way. Additionally, global entities like the UN as well as scientists, scholars, and journalists should help to enlighten mining operators and the general public for potential safety and environmental risks of mining to ensure sustainable mining operations, above all responsible disaster prevention measures while doing due diligence on mining companies to expose black sheep among mining operators.