Abstract
In the following chapter, Lam Peng Er argues that the South China Sea dispute has led to greater political antagonism between Beijing and Tokyo even though the latter is not a claimant state in those waters . This chapter analyzes Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s strategic outlook, and policies towards China’s rising assertiveness in these maritime waters. A survey of Beijing’s responses to Tokyo’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute follows. The chapter concludes that in the midst of a power transition in East Asia, Tokyo’s efforts to restrain Beijing in various multilateral forums over the South China Sea dispute provide more “capacity building” to some ASEAN states , and reinforcing its alliance with the United States may be inadequate to prevent the South China Sea from becoming a “Lake Beijing” in the long run. Lam notes: “Whether or not the South China Sea will become ‘Lake Beijing’ in the long run will hinge on the United States remaining a superpower with an interest to balance China in those waters and supported by Japan within the framework of their alliance.”
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Notes
- 1.
There are four distinct issues in the South China Sea dispute: Hainan island (an undisputed Chinese territory) and its vicinity in the SCS where US military claims overflight rights over a Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone in order to spy on China; the Paracels where the fracas is only between Hanoi and Beijing; the contention among six parties over the Spratlys in the SCS; and the tension between Beijing and Manila over the Scarborough Shoal located between Macclesfield Bank and Luzon island of the Philippines. These four distinct issues are sometimes conflated and further muddy the waters in the SCS dispute.
Some claimant states seek to reclaim and enlarge the maritime features controlled by them in the SCS, willfully ignoring the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and disregarding the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
- 2.
On the US balance of power mentality, see for example “By 2030, South China Sea will be ‘virtually a Chinese lake,’ study warns”, Washington Post, 20 January 2016. See also “US must bolster patrol activity to secure stability in South China Sea”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 February 2016 and “New US defense chief highlights uneasy military balance in Asia–Pacific”, Nikkei Asian Review, 23 April 2015.
A Japanese view is that Chinese assertiveness in the SCS “continues to challenge the US-led order in Asia.” See “China responsible for inflaming tensions in South China Sea”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 April 2016 and “Japan–China Cold War: China’s maritime aggression distorts international norms”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 March 2014.
- 3.
The Chinese proposal is a “one giant, one pigmy” formula which obviously benefits Beijing given its power asymmetry with the Lilliputian claimant states.
- 4.
“US hype over ‘militarization’ in South China Sea double standards”, Xinhua, 25 February 2016 and “Beijing asks G7 not to hype South China Sea issue at Japan meeting”, China Daily, 10 April 2016.
- 5.
Ikeshima Taisaku writes: “… the People’s Republic of China submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf a note verbale dated 7 May 2009, whose attached map shows a U-shaped line consisting of nine segments of a dashed line drawn in the South China Sea. The map and the dashed line attracted considerable attention because this was a very rare opportunity for the Chinese government to introduce, by way of an official document in the United Nations (or its specialised agencies), the map on which the U-shaped dashed line was drawn in the South China Sea. The notes verbales, which were submitted in opposition of the joint submission made by Malaysia and Vietnam on 6 May 2009, and of Vietnam’s single submission on 7 May 2009 on the grounds that ‘[the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as contained in the Joint Submission by the two countries] has seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the South China Sea.’” See Ikeshima Taisaku, “China’s Dashed Line in the South China Sea: Legal Limits and Future Prospects”, Waseda Global Forum, No. 10, 2013, p. 22 (Ikeshima 2013).
- 6.
The editorial of the Asahi Shimbun wrote: “Although China asserts its historical rights in most of the South China Sea, its reclamation project at seven locations can only be seen by other countries as a blatant case of expansionism.” See “Editorial: China triply unreasonable in vital waterway for world’s trading vessels”, Asahi Shimbun, 28 October 2015.
- 7.
However, critics would say that the scale and speed of Chinese reclamation of artificial islands have considerably outstripped that of other claimant states in the Spratly islands.
- 8.
“Beijing tightening grip on South China Sea”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 February 2016.
- 9.
“US gears up to challenge Beijing’s ‘Great Wall of Sand’”, Foreign Policy, 22 September 2015.
- 10.
The US media reported: “‘China is changing the facts on the ground, literally, by essentially building man-made islands on top of coral reefs, rocks and shoals.’ Adm. Harris said in a July meeting at the Aspen Security Forum: ‘I believe that China’s actions to enforce its claims within the South China Sea could have far-reaching consequences for our own security and economy, by disrupting the international rules and norms that have supported the global community for decades,’” Washington Post, 11 September 2015.
- 11.
See for example “Time for a U.S. Military Strategy to Stop China in the South China Sea”, National Interest, 24 August 2015 and “China Accuses the U.S. of ‘Militarizing’ the South China Sea”, Time, 4 March 2016.
The Chinese media noted: “The root cause of the escalating tensions in the South China Sea is Washington’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy and its increasingly aggressive military deployment in the region. Beijing’s defence-oriented actions in the East and South China seas, in comparison, are only to keep the possible provocations from Japan and the Philippines at bay.” See “South China Sea not a playground for US”, China Daily, 28 March 2016.
- 12.
Leszek Buszynski writes: “China requires sanctuaries for its naval platforms to protect them against sea and air attack. Carriers and SSBNs (ballistic missile submarine) also require access to the open seas to fulfil their mission … Only a few places along China’s coastline can provide sanctuaries for its navy, where defenses can be organized and which can also provide access to the open sea. One is in the Yellow Sea, where a submarine base is located at Xiaopingdao near Dalian. The other logical place is the Hainan area and the semi-enclosed area of the northern South China Sea, which has the advantage of proximity to the Strait of Malacca and the sea lanes reaching the Indian Ocean. Anything farther north would become vulnerable to U.S. interdiction from the open sea. For this reason, China has been constructing an underground base in Sanya on Hainan Island, which would house not only SSBNs but also aircraft carriers and their escort vessels when they are deployed.” See Leszek Buszyski, Washington Quarterly, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China Strategic Rivalry”, Spring 2012, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 146. See also “Nuclear weapons complicate South China Sea dispute”, Oxford Analytica, Daily Brief, 24 February 2016 (Buszyski 2012).
- 13.
The Chinese media noted: “Using the South China Sea issue to contain China is an ‘innovation’ of Japan’s policy toward China. This policy has highly aroused the vigilance of the Chinese government, and it was reported by the Kyodo News Agency in late February that Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida’s proposal to visit China this spring was rejected. Obviously, in the South China Sea issue, Tokyo infuriates Beijing, bringing some uncertainties to the Sino–Japanese relationship. … The South China Sea policy is Japan’s latest attempt to build a net to contain China.” See “Japan’s South China Sea policy lacks foundation”, Global Times, 7 March 2016.
A Japanese diplomat based at his embassy in Manila intimated that the dip in Sino–Japanese relations is, in part, due to Beijing’s unhappiness with Tokyo’s active role in the SCS. Japanese official, Interview, Manila, March 2016.
- 14.
See “Joint naval patrols can reduce tensions in South China Sea: US”, Channel News Asia, 11 February 2016, “US would welcome Japan air patrols in South China Sea”, Reuters, 30 January 2015 and “US wants Japan to help monitor South China Sea”, Nikkei Asian Review, 9 April 2015.
- 15.
“US–Japan joint patrol plan in South China Sea stemmed by ulterior motives”, Global Times, 8 July 2015.
- 16.
The Wall Street Journal reported: “In a Journal interview … Japan’s top military commander said Japanese forces may join US troops in patrolling the South China Sea, where China has been aggressively staking territorial claims around crucial international waterways.” See “Japan to the South China Sea”, Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2015. See “SDF chief says South China Sea surveillance possible”, Reuters, 17 July 2015.
- 17.
“Japan to boost South China Sea role with training patrols with U.S.: minister”, Reuters, 16 September 2016.
- 18.
On Japan’s role in the South China Sea, see Lam Peng Er, “Japan and the Spratlys Dispute”, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10, October 1996; Joshua P. Rowan, “The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute ”, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 3, May/June 2005; Celine Pajon, “Japan and the South China Sea: Forging Strategic Partnerships in a Divided Region”, IFRI, Asie Visions 60, January 2013; Shoji Tomotaka, “The South China Sea: A view from Japan”, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, No. 15, December 2014; Paul Midford, “Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea”, Asian Survey, Vol. 55 No. 3, May/June 2015; and Yoji Koda, “Japan’s perceptions of and interests in the South China Sea”, Asia Policy, No. 21, January 2016 (Koda 2016; Lam 1996; Midford 2015; Pajon 2013; Rowan 2005; Shoji 2014).
- 19.
The Japanese media noted: “The government in an annual foreign policy report Friday called for international cooperation in stabilizing the situation in the South China Sea, where China’s growing activities are increasing tensions. China is continuing to take unilateral actions that could change the status quo and increase tensions in the sea, the 2016 Diplomatic Bluebook said. The international community needs to join forces to ensure freedom of navigation and the safety of sea lanes, the report said. The report also said that Japan will continue to respond resolutely and calmly to Chinese coast guard ships’ repeated intrusions into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea , and the country’s natural gas development in areas near the median line between the two countries, the report said.” See “Japan seeks international cooperation to stabilize South China Sea situation”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 April 2016.
The Japan Times also reported: “The defense white paper for 2015 examines a range of global threats and pays particular attention to China’s growing military assertiveness in the East China Sea and South China Sea, accusing it of “high-handed” actions to change the status quo by force.” See “Defense white paper stresses threat posed by China”, Japan Times, 21 July 2015. See also “Defense paper cites China’s ‘assertive measures in East, South China Seas”, Mainchi Shimbun, 21 July 2015.
- 20.
Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio affirmed: “[W]e will continue to ensure the rule of law and freedom of navigation, the international community must work in a united manner to ensure this, based upon international law, we need to seek peaceful solution and [the] importance of that should be sent out as a message for the whole international society.” See Ministry of Defense of Japan, Japan–Australia Joint Press Conference by the Defense and Foreign Ministers, 22 November 2015.
- 21.
Abe Shinzo, Utsukushii kuni e [Towards a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo: Bunshun shinsho, 2006), pp. 158–161 (Abe 2006).
- 22.
Fukuda Yasuo is the son of former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo who forged the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty with China. Apparently, Fukuda Yasuo has a “family mission” to maintain friendly relations between Japan and China, and between Japan and Southeast Asia as exemplified by the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine.
- 23.
LDP administrations would pragmatically “catch and release” Chinese “intruders” in the vicinity of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands without kicking up a big fuss and worsening Sino–Japanese diplomatic relations. China also had a tacit understanding with Japan to intercept and limit its fishing boats and expeditions by its nationalistic activists in those disputed waters to avoid a row with Japan. However the inexperienced DPJ administration did not realize the consequences when it cavalierly switched to a “catch, detain, and charge under Japanese law” approach which it subsequently had to abandon to avoid deterioration in Sino–Japanese relations. However the damage was done despite the Kan administration’s about-turn on the detention of the Chinese captain.
- 24.
Abe Shinzo, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012. Abe wrote the article in mid-November but it was released only in December 2012 after his electoral victory (Abe 2012).
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
Ibid.
- 27.
See for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Abe Shinzo, Prime Minister of Japan: Japan is Back”, 22 February 2013 at CSIS.
- 28.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “IISS Shangri La Dialogue: 2014 Keynote Address.”
- 29.
See, for example, “Editorial: China’s military base-building in South China Sea totally unlawful”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 May 2016.
- 30.
“Abe says Japan won’t tolerate use of force to change regional status quo”, Asahi Shimbun, 28 October 2013.
- 31.
“Abe sees World War One echoes in Japan–China tensions”, Reuters, 23 January 2014.
- 32.
Sawa Takamitsu wrote: “Abe’s scenario must have been like this: heightening Sino–Japanese tensions with his visit to Yasukuni would clear the way for him to follow such steps as approving the exercise of the right to collective self-defense under the existing war-renouncing Constitution and abolishing the three-point weapons export ban. He would then wait for a right opportunity and move aggressively to amend the Constitution.” See Sawa Takamitsu, “Japan heading for darker days”, Japan Times, 22 January 2014.
- 33.
“Japan defense minister supports US in South China Sea”, Associated Press, 24 November 2015. See also “As US eyes South China Sea patrols, will Japan play a role?”, Japan Times, 21 October 2015 and “A dangerous game in the South China Sea: Is Japan ready to ‘set sail’?”, National Interest, 30 October 2015.
On Washington’s aspiration for its Japanese ally’s role in the SCS, the Japanese media wrote: “Given continuing combat operations in the Middle East, the US military has only limited resources to devote to the South China Sea. Under such circumstances, hopes have started growing among senior US navy officers that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces will expand the scope of operations to the South China Sea and gather intelligence on Chinese military movements there.” See “Chinese reclaimed land worries US’, Nikkei Asian Review, 14 April 2014.
- 34.
The priority of the SDF is the defense of the home islands and adjacent waters in the East China Sea and not the SCS. Any deployment to the vast SCS would require a larger budget, a new operational doctrine, adequate training, and appropriate equipment for the SDF. An undertaking for joint aerial and naval patrols with the United States would be a major undertaking for Japan and the SDF and therefore would not be taken lightly.
- 35.
There is already considerable disquiet in Japan about the Abe administration’s set of security bills to permit collective security and intent to revise the pacifist constitution. It is not inconceivable that a decision to dispatch the SDF to the SCS will galvanize greater opposition against the Abe administration.
- 36.
“Editorial: Diet should debate risks of Japan’s involvement in South China Sea dispute”, Mainichi Shimbun, 31 August 2015.
- 37.
Ibid.
- 38.
Ibid.
- 39.
“Japan navy drill in South China Sea may lead to larger role”, Mainichi Shimbun, 24 June 2015, “Joint exercise in South China Sea reflects Japan’s ‘strong concern’ about Beijing”, Asahi Shimbun, 29 June 2015 and “US plans naval exercises with India and Japan in Philippine Sea”, Channel News Asia, 3 March 2016.
- 40.
“China urges US, Japan not to flex muscles on South China Sea”, China Daily, 26 November 2015. See also “No patrols, but Japan helping in South China Sea in other ways”, Stars and Stripes, 24 November 2015 and “A First: Japanese and US navies hold exercise in South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 31 October 2015.
- 41.
“MSDF vessels call at South China Sea ports”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 April 2016, “Japanese submarine, destroyers arrive in Philippines for port call near disputed South China Sea waters”, Japan Times, 3 April 2016 and “Philippine port welcomes MSDF submarine to South China Sea”, Asahi Shimbun, 4 April 2016.
- 42.
“Philippines wants defense pact for Japanese troops”, Associated Press, 5 June 2015.
- 43.
“Manila asks Japan for large ships to patrol South China Sea”, Reuters, 20 November 2015; “Japan to supply Philippines with military equipment”, Japan Times, 28 February 2016; and “Japan, Philippines to step up security ties to deter Chinese expansionism”, Asahi Shimbun, 5 June 2015. See also “Japan, Vietnam concerned over land reclamation in South China Sea”, Mainichi Shimbun, 5 July 2015; “Japan, Vietnam must ramp up strategic ties in South China Sea”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 September 2015; and “Testing Beijing, Japan eyes growing role in South China Sea security”, Reuters, 10 March 2015.
- 44.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement by the Press Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, on an issue concerning the South China Sea (Arbitral Proceedings by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, 31 March 2014.
- 45.
See “Japan, US, ASEAN must team up to counter China’s maritime advance”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 September 2013; “Editorial: Global pressure needed to curb China’s aggressive maritime moves”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 May 2015; and “Unity key to dealing with China’s construction of artificial island”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 June 2015.
Abe has no illusion about the ability of the ASEAN states to resist Chinese advances in the SCS. The Japanese media quoted Abe: “‘The military power of each Southeast Asian country in the South China Sea is very weak,’ Abe told Obama during a summit meeting in Washington on April 28. ‘The role of US forces and the Japan–US alliance is key.’” See “Abe’s diplomatic challenge: China makes advances; Abe government keeps guard up”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 July 2015.
- 46.
See “Editorial: China must not hinder freedom of navigation in South China Sea”, Asahi Shimbun, 23 October 2015.
- 47.
“China upset over India–Japan agreement on South China Sea”, Times of India, 15 December 2015 and “first time in a joint statement: India, Japan unite on South China Sea”, Indian Express, 13 December 2015.
- 48.
“Abe, Turnbull affirm opposition to South China Sea buildup”, Nikkei Asian Review, 19 December 2015.
- 49.
“G–7 Raises South China Sea Territorial Disputes in Statement”, Bloomberg, 11 April 2016. The Japanese media reported: “Prime Minister Abe Shinzo hopes to make maritime security one of the main topics of discussion at the Ise-Shima G–7 summit meeting scheduled for May 26 and 27.” See “Abe’s summit diplomacy : government quietly steps up pressure on China”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 May 2016.
- 50.
“China urges Japan to keep South China Sea row off G–7 agenda: sources”, Mainichi Shimbun, 20 March 2016.
- 51.
Between the 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and the 2016 Kishida-Wang Yi talks, bilateral summits had been held only on the sidelines of multilateral meetings.
- 52.
“Kishida pushes China by maritime affairs”, Yomiuri Shimbun, May 2016. Speaking ahead of his meeting with Wang Yi in Beijing, Kishida said: “Candidly speaking, a rapid and opaque increase in (China’s) military spending and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas under the aim of building a strong maritime state are having not only people in Japan, but countries in the Asia–Pacific region and the international community worried greatly.” See “Japan says China’s maritime expansion making the world ‘greatly worried’”, Reuters, 25 April 2016.
- 53.
“US is bringing storms to South China Sea”, Global Times, 18 November 2015 and “US ready to reposition in South China Sea”, Global Times, 15 February 2016.
- 54.
“China media criticize ‘growing’ US–Japan military ties”, BBC, 9 October 2014.
- 55.
“Double-dealing undercuts Japan’s diplomacy ”, Global Times, 3 May 2015. See also “China is on ‘high alert’ for Japan’s ‘intervention’ in South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 21 November 2015 and “China rebukes Japan’s meddling in South China Sea issue”, China Daily, 12 June 2015.
- 56.
“US–Japan joint patrol plan in South China Sea stemmed by ulterior motives”, Global Times, 8 July 2015.
The China Daily wrote: “Yin Zhou, director of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Expert Consultation Committee, said Japan’s actions in the South China Sea are aimed at partially supporting the US pivot-to-Asia strategy and using that to contain China. ‘In addition, it is using the excuse of stability in the South China Sea to legalize its future involvement in the region.’” See “Japanese submarine calls at ex-US naval base”, China Daily, 5 April 2016.
The China Daily noted: “Japan has also supported countries with disputes with China in the South China Sea in a bid to keep China in check.” See “Japan’s move risk creating a new Cold War”, China Daily, 5 April 2016 and “Japan overtly meddling”, China Daily, 6 April 2016.
- 57.
The Chinese media wrote: “Japan’s interference with the disputes in the South China sea aims partly to divert China’s attention and resources from the East China Sea , where China–Japan tension over the Diaoyu islands has been rising.” See “Japan’s meddling in the South China Sea at wrong time, wrong place”, Global Times, 17 April 2015.
- 58.
“China urges Japan to stop provoking tensions in South China Sea”, China Daily, 3 July 2015.
- 59.
“China urges Japan to keep South China Sea row off G–7 agenda: sources”, Mainichi Shimbun, 20 March 2016. See also “China summoned Japanese ambassador over G–7 statement this week”, Nikkei Asian Review, 14 April 2016.
- 60.
Ibid.
- 61.
Quoted in “Japan’s moves threaten regional peace and stability”, China Daily, 30 March 2016. See also “Chinese experts warn against Japan’s unilateral agenda for G7 on South China Sea”, China Daily, 10 April 2016 and “Beijing asks G7 not to hype South China Sea issue at Japan meeting”, China Daily, 10 April 2016.
- 62.
“US wants Japan to help monitor South China Sea”, Nikkei Asian Review, 9 April 2015.
- 63.
“Japan has ‘no plan’ to dispatch ships”, Japan Times, 3 November 2015.
- 64.
Ibid.
- 65.
“China praises Cambodia’s position on South China Sea”, Nikkei Asian Review, 22 April 2016.
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Lam Peng Er (2017). Japan and the South China Sea Dispute: Preventing “Lake Beijing”. In: Peng Er, L. (eds) China-Japan Relations in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4373-4_10
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